Fictions, feelings, and emotions

Philosophical Studies 132 (2):211 - 242 (2007)
Abstract
Many philosophers suggest (1) that our emotional engagement with fiction involves participation in a game of make-believe, and (2) that what distinguishes an emotional game from a dispassionate game is the fact that the former activity alone involves sensations of physiological and visceral disturbances caused by our participation in the game. In this paper I argue that philosophers who accept (1) should reject (2). I then illustrate how this conclusion illuminates various puzzles in aesthetics and the philosophy of mind.
Keywords Currie  emotion  feeling  fiction  make-believe  tragedy  Walton
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References found in this work BETA
William Charlton (1984). Feeling for the Fictitious. British Journal of Aesthetics 24 (3):206-216.
Wayne Davis (1988). A Causal Theory of Experiential Fear. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (3):459 - 483.
Wayne A. Davis (1987). The Varieties of Fear. Philosophical Studies 51 (3):287 - 310.

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