Emotions, feelings and intentionality

Emotions, I will argue, involve two kinds of feeling: bodily feeling and feeling towards. Both are intentional, in the sense of being directed towards an object. Bodily feelings are directed towards the condition of one's body, although they can reveal truths about the world beyond the bounds of one's body – that, for example, there is something dangerous nearby. Feelings towards are directed towards the object of the emotion – a thing or a person, a state of affairs, an action or an event; such emotional feelings involve a special way of thinking of the object of the emotion, and I draw an analogy with Frank Jackson's well-known knowledge argument to show this. Finally, I try to show that, even if materialism is true, the phenomenology of emotional feelings, as described from a personal perspective, cannot be captured using only the theoretical concepts available for the impersonal stance of the sciences.
Keywords Philosophy   Phenomenology   Philosophy of Mind   Artificial Intelligence   Interdisciplinary Studies   Developmental Psychology
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1023/A:1021306500055
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,667
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Angela Mendelovici (2013). Intentionalism About Moods. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):126-136.
Jan Slaby (2008). Affective Intentionality and the Feeling Body. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):429-444.
Uriah Kriegel (2012). Towards a New Feeling Theory of Emotion. European Journal of Philosophy (3):420-442.

View all 19 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

238 ( #5,959 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

20 ( #41,183 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.