David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2010)
The “ethics of belief” refers to a cluster of questions at the intersection of epistemology, philosophy of mind, psychology, and ethics. The central question in the debate is whether there are norms of some sort governing our habits of belief formation, belief maintenance, and belief relinquishment. Is it ever or always morally wrong (or epistemically irrational, or imprudent) to hold a belief on insufficient evidence? Is it ever or always morally right (or epistemically rational, or prudent) to believe on the basis of sufficient evidence, or to withhold belief in the perceived absence of it? Is it ever or always obligatory to seek out all available epistemic evidence for a belief? Are there some ways of obtaining evidence that are themselves immoral or imprudent?
|Keywords||ethics of belief belief evidentialism justification|
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Dylan Dodd (2012). Evidentialism and Skeptical Arguments. Synthese 189 (2):337-352.
Craig Duncan (2013). Religion and Secular Utility: Happiness, Truth, and Pragmatic Arguments for Theistic Belief. Philosophy Compass 8 (4):381-399.
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