Graduate studies at Western
Erkenntnis 58 (1):33 - 46 (2003)
|Abstract||Hilary Putnam and Nelson Goodman are two of the twentieth century's most persuasive critics of metaphysical realism, however they disagree about the consequences of rejecting metaphysical realism. Goodman defended a view he called irrealism in which minds literally make worlds, and Putnam has sought to find a middle path between metaphysical realism and irrealism. I argue that Putnam's middle path turns out to be very elusive and defend a dichotomy between metaphysical realism and irrealism.|
|Keywords||780199 Other Philosophy Realism C1 440107 Metaphysics|
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