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  1. Sophie R. Allen (2002). Deepening the Controversy Over Metaphysical Realism. Philosophy 77 (4):519-541.
    A significant ontological commitment is required to sustain metaphysical realism—the view that there is a single, objective way the world is—in order to defend it from common sense objections. This involves presupposing the existence of properties (or tropes, or universals) and relations between them which define the objective structure of the world. This paper explores the grounds for accepting this ontological assumption and examines a sceptical argument which questions whether, having assumed the world is objectively divided into fundamental properties, we (...)
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  2. William Alston (2001). A Sensible Metaphysical Realism. Marquette University Press.
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  3. William P. Alston (ed.) (2002). Realism & Antirealism. Cornell University Press.
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  4. William P. Alston (2002). What Metaphysical Realism Is Not. In Realism and Antirealism. Cornell Up. 97-115.
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  5. Jamin Asay (2012). A Truthmaking Account of Realism and Anti-Realism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (3):373-394.
    Realism and anti-realism about a domain of thought are metaphysical theses that involve the natures of the truthmakers in that domain and the truthmaking relation that is operant in the domain. Truthmaker theory is not exclusive territory for realists: anti-realist views are also best understood in terms of how they understand truthmakers and truthmaking. In particular, I explore the possibility of projectivist truthmaking, and show how it makes sense of quasi-realism. In addition to critically examining some extant accounts of the (...)
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  6. Jamin Asay (2011). Truthmaking, Truth, and Realism: New Work for a Theory of Truthmakers. Dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
    Truthmaker theory begins with the idea that truth depends upon reality. When a truth-bearer is true, that is because something or other in the world makes it true. My dissertation offers a theory of truthmakers that shows how we should flesh out this thought while avoiding the contentious metaphysical commitments that are built into other truthmaker theories. Because of these commitments, many philosophers have come to view truthmaker theory as being essentially tied to correspondence theories of truth, and to metaphysical (...)
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  7. S. J. Avery Cardinal Dulles (2008). The Metaphysical Realism of Pope John Paul II. International Philosophical Quarterly 48 (1):99-106.
    Karol Wojtyła (Pope John Paul II) found phenomenology very helpful for the analysis of concrete human experience and for overcoming the ethical formalism ofKant. Phenomenology, he believed, could also enrich classical Thomism by exploring the lived experience of freedom, interiority, and self-governance. But phenomenology, in his opinion, needed to be supplemented by metaphysics in order to ground experiences such as the sense of duty in the real order. He criticized much modern philosophy for abandoning metaphysics and thus neglecting the sapiential (...)
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  8. Guy Axtell (1993). Naturalism, Normativity, and Explanation: The Scientistic Biases of Contemporary Naturalism. Metaphilosophy 24 (3):253-274.
    The critical focus of this paper is on a claim made explicitly by Gilbert Harman and accepted implicitly by numerous others, the claim that naturalism supports concurrent defense of scientific objectivism and moral relativism. I challenge the assumptions of Harman's ‘argument from naturalism' used to support this combination of positions, utilizing. Hilary Putnam’s ‘companions in guilt’ argument in order to counter it. The paper concludes that while domain-specific anti-realism is often warranted, Harman’s own views about the objectivity of facts and (...)
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  9. Lynne Rudder Baker (2007). The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism. Cambridge University Press.
    Lynne Rudder Baker presents and defends a unique account of the material world: the Constitution View. In contrast to leading metaphysical views that take everyday things to be either non-existent or reducible to micro-objects, the Constitution View construes familiar things as irreducible parts of reality. Although they are ultimately constituted by microphysical particles, everyday objects are neither identical to, nor reducible to, the aggregates of microphysical particles that constitute them. The result is genuine ontological diversity: people, bacteria, donkeys, mountains and (...)
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  10. Lynne Rudder Baker (2006). Everyday Concepts as a Guide to Reality. The Monist 89 (3):313-333.
    On September 11, 2001, as everyone knows, the towers of the World Trade Center in New York were attacked. I want to discuss this event in order to motivate a nonreductionist view of the extensions of everyday concepts. Next, I shall set out, and begin to defend, the particular view of nonreductionism that I favor—the Constitution View. Then, I shall consider two venerable metaphysical issues (the nature of vagueness and the mind-independent/mind- dependent distinction) in light of the Constitution View. If (...)
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  11. Stephen J. Boulter (2004). Metaphysical Realism as a Pre-Condition of Visual Perception. Biology and Philosophy 19 (2):243-261.
    In this paper I present a transcendental argument based on the findings of cognitive psychology and neurophysiology which invites two conclusions: First and foremost, that a pre-condition of visual perception itself is precisely what the Aristotelian and other commonsense realists maintain, namely, the independent existence of a featured, or pre-packaged world; second, this finding, combined with other reflections, suggests that, contra McDowell and other neo-Kantians, human beings have access to things as they are in the world via non-projective perception. These (...)
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  12. Lee Braver (2012). A Brief History of Continental Realism. Continental Philosophy Review 45 (2):261-289.
    This paper explains the nature and origin of what I am calling Transgressive Realism, a middle path between realism and anti-realism which tries to combine their strengths while avoiding their weaknesses. Kierkegaard created the position by merging Hegel’s insistence that we must have some kind of contact with anything we can call real (thus rejecting noumena), with Kant’s belief that reality fundamentally exceeds our understanding; human reason should not be the criterion of the real. The result is the idea that (...)
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  13. Phillip Bricker, Realism Without Parochialism.
    I am a realist of a metaphysical stripe. I believe in an immense realm of "modal" and "abstract" entities, of entities that are neither part of, nor stand in any causal relation to, the actual, concrete world. For starters: I believe in possible worlds and individuals; in propositions, properties, and relations (both abundantly and sparsely conceived); in mathematical objects and structures; and in sets (or classes) of whatever I believe in. Call these sorts of entity, and the reality they comprise, (...)
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  14. Lars Brink (1968). Experience, Reality and Conditions for Description. Inquiry 11 (1-4):85 – 100.
    This paper deals with the problem of the External World, taking its point of departure in Peter Zinkernagel's Conditions for Description. In the first section I try to give an outline of the theses contained in that book. In the second I raise a main objection against it, pointing out that Zinkernagel, in one respect, has not sufficiently sharpened the argumentation between phenomenalism and realism. In the third section I turn realism and phenomenalism sharply against each other, presenting the latter (...)
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  15. Anthony Brueckner (1992). Conceiving One's Envatment While Denying Metaphysical Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (4):469 – 474.
    J.D. Collier sees Putnam as arguing (in the 'Brains in a Vat' chapter of [4]) that metaphysical realism is false.' He sees the argument as proceeding from the background assumption that metaphysical realism has the consequence that truth is 'radically non-epistemic', so that 'an [epistemically] ideal theory could be radically wrong about the world' [3, p. 413]. But, according to Collier, Putnam argues that 'an ideal theory satisfying all of our methodological and theoretical constraints cannot be false' [3, p. 413]. (...)
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  16. Anthony L. Brueckner (1984). Putnam's Model-Theoretic Argument Against Metaphysical Realism. Analysis 44 (3):134--40.
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  17. Panayot Butchvarov (2002). Metaphysical Realism and Logical Nonrealism. In Richard M. Gale (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics. Blackwell Publishers. 282.
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  18. Tim Button (forthcoming). Brains in Vats and Model Theory. In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Brain in a Vat. Cambridge University Press.
    Hilary Putnam’s BIV argument first occurred to him when ‘thinking about a theorem in modern logic, the “Skolem–Löwenheim Theorem”’ (Putnam 1981: 7). One of my aims in this paper is to explore the connection between the argument and the Theorem. But I also want to draw some further connections. In particular, I think that Putnam’s BIV argument provides us with an impressively versatile template for dealing with sceptical challenges. Indeed, this template allows us to unify some of Putnam’s most enduring (...)
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  19. Marc Champagne (2008-09). What Anchors Semiosis: How Descartes Changed the Subject. RS/SI (Recherches Sémiotiques / Semiotic Inquiry) 28 (3-1):183–197.
    The goal of this article is twofold. First, it revises the historiographic partition proposed by John Deely in Four Ages of Understanding (2001) by arguing that the moment marking the beginning of philosophical Modernity has been vividly recorded in Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy with the experiment with the wax. Second, an upshot of this historical study is that it helps make sense of Deely’s somewhat iconoclastic use of the words “subject” and “subjectivity” to designate mind-independent worldly things. The hope (...)
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  20. Marc Champagne (2006). Some Convergences and Divergences in the Realism of Charles Peirce and Ayn Rand. Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 8 (1):19-39.
    Structured around Charles S. Peirce's three-fold categorical scheme, this article proposes a comparative study of Ayn Rand and Peirce's realist views in general metaphysics. Rand's stance is seen as diverging with Peirce's argument from asymptotic representation but converging with arguments from brute relation and neutral category. It is argued that, by dismissing traditional subject-object dualisms, Rand and Peirce both propose iconoclastic construals of what it means to be real, dismissals made all the more noteworthy by the fact each chose to (...)
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  21. Hugh S. Chandler, -≫Putnam on Physical Realism.
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  22. Hugh S. Chandler, Putnam on Realism.
    In 1974 Putnam was a ‘realist’ in regard to the physical world. By 1981 he had become a 'non-realist' in this regard. (I don’t know where he stands today.) In this paper I argue that his realism was more plausible than his non-realism. The physical world is what it is independently of any rational being’s interpretation of it.
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  23. Steve Clarke (2004). Ontological Disunity and a Realism Worth Having. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):628-629.
    Ross & Spurrett (R&S) appear convinced that the world must have a unified ontological structure. This conviction is difficult to reconcile with a commitment to mainstream realism, which involves allowing that the world may be ontologically disunified. R&S should follow Kitcher by weakening their conception of unification so as to allow for the possibility of ontological disunity.
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  24. Andrew Collier (2003). In Defence of Objectivity and Other Essays: On Realism, Existentialism and Politics. Routledge.
    This volume develops and defends critical realism whilst engaging critically with existentialist philosophy in a number of ways. The work of existentialist thinkers as diverse as Kierkegarrd, R.D. Laing, Heideggar and Sartre is discussed at length and Andrew Collier argues that there is much to be learnt from their work, especially in Heidegger's critique of the technological view of the world. However the book concludes with a defence of objectivity against the various forms of subjectivism advanced by the existentialists.
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  25. Gabriele Contessa (2010). Empiricist Structuralism, Metaphysical Realism, and the Bridging Problem. Analysis 70 (3):514-524.
    This paper is part of a book symposium on Bas van Fraassen's Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective (OUP, 2010).
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  26. Damian Cox (1998). Metaphysical Realism and Idealisation. Philosophia 26 (3-4):465-487.
    Hilary Putnam's famous model-theoretic arguments have the virtue of presenting metaphysical realists with a clear challenge. On pain of embracing either an implausible antifallibilism or the radical indeterminacy of reference, metaphysical realists must appeal to metalinguistic levels of interpretation richer than our own in order to fix meaning. And sense must be made of this appeal. In this paper I begin the task of developing a version of metaphysical realism that takes up this challenge.
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  27. Daniel O. Dahlstrom (ed.) (1984/1985). Realism. National Office of the American Catholic Philosophical Association.
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  28. David Davies (1987). Horwich on 'Semantic' and 'Metaphysical' Realism. Philosophy of Science 54 (4):539-557.
    Horwich argues that we should reject metaphysical realism, but that we can preserve semantic realism by adhering to a redundancy theory of truth and a confirmationist account of linguistic understanding. But the latter will give us semantic realism only if it allows that the truth-values of sentences may transcend our recognitional capacities, and this is possible only insofar as we covertly reintroduce metaphysical realism. In spite of its intuitive appeal, we should not endorse semantic realism, but this need not bear (...)
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  29. Tamás Demeter (2009). Two Kinds of Mental Realism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 40 (1):59-71.
    I argue that there is a distinction to be drawn between two kinds of mental realism, and I draw some lessons for the realism-antirealism debate. Although it is already at hand, the distinction has not yet been drawn clearly. The difference to be shown consists in what realism is about: it may be either about the interpretation of folk psychology, or the ontology of mental entities. I specify the commitment to the fact-stating character of the discourse as the central component (...)
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  30. Alan Donagan (1963). Universals and Metaphysical Realism. The Monist 47 (2):211-246.
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  31. Heather Dyke (ed.) (2009). From Truth to Reality: New Essays in Logic and Metaphysics. Routledge.
    Questions about truth and questions about reality are intimately connected. One can ask whether reality includes numbers by asking ‘Are there numbers?’ But one can also ask what (arguably) amounts to the very same question by asking ‘Is the sentence “There are numbers” true?’ Such ‘semantic ascent’ makes it seem that the nature of reality can be investigated by investigating our true sentences. This line of thought was very much taken for granted in twentieth century philosophy, but it is now (...)
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  32. Terence Rajivan Edward, Has Nagel Uncovered a Form of Idealism?
    In the sixth chapter of The View from Nowhere, Thomas Nagel attempts to identify a form of idealism. The position that he deems idealist is that what there is must be possibly conceivable by us. Nagel claims that this position is held by a number of contemporary philosophers. Even if this is so, I justify the view that it is not a form of idealism.
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  33. Matti Eklund (2005). Book Review. Realism and Antirealism. William Alston. [REVIEW] Dialogue 44:786-88.
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  34. Crawford L. Elder (2005). Undercutting the Idea of Carving Reality. Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):41-59.
    It is widely supposed that, in Hilary Putnam’s phrase, there are no “ready-made objects” (Putnam 1982; cf. Putnam 1981, Ch. 3). Instead the objects we consider real are partly of our own making: we carve them out of the world (or out of experience). The usual reason for supposing this lies in the claim that there are available to us alternative ways of “dividing reality” into objects (to quote the title of Hirsch 1993), ways which would afford us every bit (...)
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  35. Brian Ellis (ed.) (forthcoming). Metaphysical Realism.
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  36. Kenneth G. Ferguson (2009). Meaning and the External World. Erkenntnis 70 (3):299 - 311.
    Realism, defined as a justified belief in the existence of the external world, is jeopardized by ‘meaning rationalism,’ the classic theory of meaning that sees the extension of words as a function of the intensions of individual speakers, with no way to ensure that these intensions actually correspond to anything in the external world. To defend realism, Ruth Millikan ( 1984 , 1989a , b , 1993 , 2004 , 2005 ) offers a biological theory of meaning called ‘teleosemantics’ in (...)
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  37. Gail Fine (1981). Armstrong on Relational and Nonrelational Realism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62:262-71.
    This paper considers and criticizes david armstrong's defense in his book of an allegedly nonrelational version of realism, "universals and scientific realism". It also challenges his claim that plato, But not aristotle, Held a relational version of realism.
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  38. G. Forrai (2002). Review of James Conant, Urszula M. Zeglen (Eds.), Hilary Putnam: Pragmatism and Realism, Routledge. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (7).
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  39. Sanford Goldberg (2008). Metaphysical Realism and Thought. American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (2):149 - 163.
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  40. Moltke S. Gram (1983). Direct Realism: A Study Of Perception. Boston: Nijhoff.
    a vigorous and challenging defence of direct realism in which one gets not only a clear overview of what precisely the problems are, but also a forceful and ...
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  41. Lorna Green, Some Radical New Ideas About Consciousness 2012 - Consciousness and the Cosmos: A New Copernican Reolution, Part 1 Science, Consciousness and the Universe.
    Some Radical New Ideas About Consciousness Consciousness and the Cosmos: A New Copernican Revolution Consciousness is our new frontier in modern science. Most scientists believe that it can be accomodated, explained, by existing scientific principles. I say that it cannot. That it calls all existing scientific principles into question. That consciousness is to modern science just exactly what light was to classical physics: All of our fundamental assumptions about the nature of Reality have to change. And I go on, in (...)
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  42. Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.) (2006). Truth and Realism. Oxford University Press.
    Is truth objective or relative? What exists independently of our minds? The essays in this book debate these two questions, which are among the oldest of philosophical issues and have vexed almost every major philosopher, from Plato, to Kant, to Wittgenstein. Fifteen eminent contributors bring fresh perspectives, renewed energy, and original answers to debates of great interest both within philosophy and in the culture at large.
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  43. Susan Haack (2007). On Real Metaphysics and Real Realism : Response to Cynthia MacDonald. In Cornelis De Waal (ed.), Susan Haack: A Lady of Distinctions: The Philosopher Responds to Critics. Prometheus Books.
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  44. John Haldane (1996). On Coming Home to (Metaphysical) Realism. Philosophy 71 (276):287 - 296.
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  45. John Haldane & Crispin Wright (eds.) (1993). Reality, Representation, and Projection. Oxford University Press.
    This book is an important collection of new essays on various topics relating to realism and its rivals in metaphysics, logic, metaethics, and epistemology. The contributors include some of the leading authors in these fields and in several cases their essays constitute definitive statements of their views. In some cases authors write in response to the essays of other contributors, in other cases they proceed independently. Although not primarily historical this collection includes discussions of philosophers from the middle ages to (...)
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  46. Bob Hale & Crispin Wright (eds.) (1997). A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Blackwell Pub..
    Written by an international assembly of leading philosophers, this volume provides a survey of contemporary philosophy of language.
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  47. Bob Hale & Crispin Wright (1997). Putnam's Model-Theoretic Argument Against Metaphysical Realism. In Bob Hale & Crispin Wright (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Blackwell. 427--57.
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  48. Toby Handfield (2010). Review of A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism: Knowing the Unobservable, by Anjan Chakravartty. [REVIEW] Mind 118 (472):1118-1121.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  49. Gilbert Harman (1982). Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam's Reason, Truth and History. Journal of Philosophy 79 (10):568-575.
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  50. Graham Harman (2008). DeLanda's Ontology: Assemblage and Realism. [REVIEW] Continental Philosophy Review 41 (3):367-383.
    Manuel DeLanda is one of the few admitted realists in present-day continental philosophy, a position he claims to draw from Deleuze. DeLanda conceives of the world as made up of countless layers of assemblages, irreducible to their parts and never dissolved into larger organic wholes. This article supports DeLanda’s position as a refreshing new model for continental thought. It also criticizes his movement away from singular individuals toward disembodied attractors and topological structures lying outside all specific beings. While endorsing DeLanda’s (...)
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