How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?

In Joel Feinberg (ed.), Moral Concepts. Oxford University Press (1970)
Abstract
D. In doing x an agent acts incontinently if and only if: 1) the agent does x intentionally; 2) the agent believes there is an alternative action y open to him; and 3) the agent judges that, all things considered, it would be better to do y than to do x
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Citations of this work BETA
Alfred Mele (2010). Weakness of Will and Akrasia. Philosophical Studies 150 (3):391–404.
Neil Levy (2011). Resisting 'Weakness of the Will'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):134 - 155.
Eugene Marshall (2010). Spinoza on the Problem of Akrasia. European Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):41-59.

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