How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?
In Joel Feinberg (ed.), Moral Concepts. Oxford University Press (1970)
| Abstract | D. In doing x an agent acts incontinently if and only if: 1) the agent does x intentionally; 2) the agent believes there is an alternative action y open to him; and 3) the agent judges that, all things considered, it would be better to do y than to do x | |||||||||
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