David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2006)
Virtually every aspect of the current philosophical discussion of self-deception is a matter of controversy including its definition and paradigmatic cases. We may say generally, however, that self-deception is the acquisition and maintenance of a belief (or, at least, the avowal of that belief) in the face of strong evidence to the contrary motivated by desires or emotions favoring the acquisition and retention of that belief. Beyond this, philosophers divide over whether this action is intentional or not, whether self-deceivers recognize the belief being acquired is unwarranted on the available evidence, whether self-deceivers are morally responsible for their self-deception, and whether self-deception is morally problematic (and if it is in what ways and under what circumstances). The discussion of self-deception and its associated puzzles gives us insight into the ways in which motivation affects belief acquisition and retention. And yet insofar as self-deception represents an obstacle to self-knowledge, which has potentially serious moral implications, self-deception is more than an interesting philosophical puzzle. It is a problem of particular concern for moral development, since self-deception can make us strangers to ourselves and blind to our own moral failings.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Alexandre Erler (2011). Does Memory Modification Threaten Our Authenticity? Neuroethics 4 (3):235-249.
Michael Brownstein & Alex Madva (2012). The Normativity of Automaticity. Mind and Language 27 (4):410-434.
Similar books and articles
Lisa Damm (2011). Self-Deception About Emotion. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):254-270.
Robert Audi (1997). Self-Deception Vs. Self-Caused Deception: A Comment on Professor Mele. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):104-104.
Stanley Paluch (1967). Self-Deception. Inquiry 10 (1-4):268-278.
Christoph Michel & Albert Newen (2010). Self-Deception as Pseudo-Rational Regulation of Belief. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (3):731-744.
W. J. Talbott (1997). Does Self-Deception Involve Intentional Biasing? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):127-127.
William N. Whisner (1993). Self-Deception and Other-Person Deception: Toward a New Conceptualization of Self- Deception. Philosophia 22 (3-4):223-240.
Annette Barnes (1997). Seeing Through Self-Deception. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kent Bach (1988). Critical Notice. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press.
Alfred R. Mele (1997). Understanding and Explaining Real Self-Deception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):127-134.
Eric Funkhouser (2005). Do the Self-Deceived Get What They Want? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):295-312.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads29 ( #59,060 of 1,098,955 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #175,054 of 1,098,955 )
How can I increase my downloads?