David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophers' Imprint 11 (14):1-25 (2011)
On Kratzer’s canonical account, modal expressions (like “might” and “must”) are represented semantically as quantifiers over possibilities. Such expressions are themselves neutral; they make a single contribution to determining the propositions expressed across a wide range of uses. What modulates the modality of the proposition expressed—as bouletic, epistemic, deontic, etc.—is context.2 This ain’t the canon for nothing. Its power lies in its ability to figure in a simple and highly unified explanation of a fairly wide range of language use. Recently, though, the canon’s neat story has come under attack. The challenge cases involve the epistemic use of a modal sentence for which no single resolution of the contextual parameter appears capable of accommodating all our intuitions.3 According to these revisionaries, such cases show that the canonical story needs to be amended in some way that makes multiple bodies of information relevant to the assessment of such statements. Here I show that how the right canonical, flexibly contextualist account of modals can accommodate the full range of challenge cases. The key will be to extend Kratzer’s formal semantic account with an account of how context selects values for a modal’s..
|Keywords||philosophy of language epistemic modals modals contextualism flexible contextualism|
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Citations of this work BETA
Teresa Marques (2015). Retractions. Synthese:1-25.
Justin Khoo (2016). Probabilities of Conditionals in Context. Linguistics and Philosophy (1):1-43.
Justin Khoo (2015). Modal Disagreements. Inquiry (5):1-24.
Eric Swanson (forthcoming). The Application of Constraint Semantics to the Language of Subjective Uncertainty. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-26.
Ezra Cook (2013). Epistemic Modals and Common Ground. Inquiry 56 (2-3):179-209.
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