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Profile: Malte Willer (University of Chicago)
  1. Malte Willer (2013). Epistemic Modality. Philosophical Review 122 (4):641-647.
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  2. Malte Willer (2012). A Remark on Iffy Oughts. Journal of Philosophy 109 (7):449-461.
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  3. Malte Willer (2011). Realizing What Might Be. Philosophical Studies 153 (3):365 - 375.
    Schulz has shown that the suppositional view of indicative conditionals leads to a corresponding view of epistemic modals. But his case backfires: the resulting theory of epistemic modals gets the facts wrong, and so we end up with a good argument against the suppositional view. I show how and why a dynamic view of indicative conditionals leads to a better theory of epistemic modals.
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  4. Malte Willer (2010). New Surprises for the Ramsey Test. Synthese 176 (2):291 - 309.
    In contemporary discussions of the Ramsey Test for conditionals, it is commonly held that (i) supposing the antecedent of a conditional is adopting a potential state of full belief, and (ii) Modus Ponens is a valid rule of inference. I argue on the basis of Thomason Conditionals (such as ' If Sally is deceiving, I do not believe it') and Moore's Paradox that both claims are wrong. I then develop a double-indexed Update Semantics for conditionals which takes these two results (...)
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