David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Tim Bayne & Jordi Fernandez (eds.), Delusion and Self-Deception: Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation (Macquarie Monographs in Cognitive Science). Psychology Press (2008)
Subjects with delusions profess to believe some extremely peculiar things. Patients with Capgras delusion sincerely assert that, for example, their spouses have been replaced by impostors. Patients with Cotard’s delusion sincerely assert that they are dead. Many philosophers and psychologists are hesitant to say that delusional subjects genuinely believe the contents of their delusions.2 One way to reinterpret delusional subjects is to say that we’ve misidentified the content of the problematic belief. So for example, rather than believing that his wife is has been replaced by an impostor, we might say that the victim of Capgras delusion believes that it is, in some respects, as if his wife has been replaced by an impostor. Another is to say that we’ve misidentified the attitude that the delusional subject bears to the content of their delusion. So for example, Gregory Currie and co-authors have suggested that rather than believing that his wife has been replaced by an impostor, we should say that the victim of Capgras delusion merely imagines that his wife has been replaced by an impostor.3.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Lisa Bortolotti (2011). In Defence of Modest Doxasticism About Delusions. Neuroethics 5 (1):39-53.
Andy Egan (2011). Comments on Gendler's, “the Epistemic Costs of Implicit Bias”. Philosophical Studies 156 (1):65-79.
Similar books and articles
Philip Gerrans (2001). Delusions as Performance Failures. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 6 (3).
Garry Young (2008). Restating the Role of Phenomenal Experience in the Formation and Maintenance of the Capgras Delusion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):177-189.
Tim Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie (2004). Bottom-Up or Top-Down: Campbell's Rationalist Account of Monothematic Delusions. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1):1-11.
Elisabeth Pacherie, Melissa Green & Timothy J. Bayne (2006). Phenomenology and Delusions: Who Put the 'Alien' in Alien Control? Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):566-577.
Marga Reimer (2009). Is the Impostor Hypothesis Really so Preposterous? Understanding the Capgras Experience. Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):669 – 686.
Matthew Ratcliffe (2008). The Phenomenological Role of Affect in the Capgras Delusion. Continental Philosophy Review 41 (2):195-216.
Timothy J. Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie (2005). In Defence of the Doxastic Conception of Delusions. Mind and Language 20 (2):163-88.
Philip Gerrans (2000). Refining the Explanation of Cotard's Delusion. Mind and Language 15 (1):111-122.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads144 ( #6,368 of 1,101,941 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #68,246 of 1,101,941 )
How can I increase my downloads?