Temporary intrinsics and relativization

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (1):64-77 (2010)
Abstract
Some have concluded that the only appropriate response to the problem of temporary intrinsics is the view that familiar, concrete objects persist through time by perduring, that is, by having temporal parts. Many, including myself, believe this view of persistence is false, and so reject this conclusion. However, the most common attempts to resolve the problem and yet defend the view that familiar, concrete objects endure are self-defeating. This has heretofore gone unnoticed. I consider the most familiar such attempts, based on a strategy called tensing the copula , and present a general argument to demonstrate why this strategy – and any strategy based on relativization – fails. I then show how the considerations raised in this general argument undermine other attempts to resolve the problem while denying perdurance. All these attempts are undermined by an assumption essential to the problem of temporary intrinsics, to wit, that there are many moments of time and all have the same ontological status. As long as this assumption is maintained, the only solution to the problem is that familiar, concrete objects perdure. Thus, in order to defend the view that objects persist through time by enduring, one must adopt a different metaphysics of time (viz., presentism). I conclude that it is neither unreasonable nor impracticable to do so.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,747
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
William R. Carter & H. Scott Hestevold (1994). On Passage and Persistence. American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (4):269 - 283.
M. Oreste Fiocco (2007). A Defense of Transient Presentism. American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (3):191 - 212.

View all 22 references

Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2010-03-02

Total downloads

73 ( #18,546 of 1,098,844 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #79,596 of 1,098,844 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.