David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (1):64-77 (2010)
Some have concluded that the only appropriate response to the problem of temporary intrinsics is the view that familiar, concrete objects persist through time by perduring, that is, by having temporal parts. Many, including myself, believe this view of persistence is false, and so reject this conclusion. However, the most common attempts to resolve the problem and yet defend the view that familiar, concrete objects endure are self-defeating. This has heretofore gone unnoticed. I consider the most familiar such attempts, based on a strategy called tensing the copula , and present a general argument to demonstrate why this strategy – and any strategy based on relativization – fails. I then show how the considerations raised in this general argument undermine other attempts to resolve the problem while denying perdurance. All these attempts are undermined by an assumption essential to the problem of temporary intrinsics, to wit, that there are many moments of time and all have the same ontological status. As long as this assumption is maintained, the only solution to the problem is that familiar, concrete objects perdure. Thus, in order to defend the view that objects persist through time by enduring, one must adopt a different metaphysics of time (viz., presentism). I conclude that it is neither unreasonable nor impracticable to do so.
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References found in this work BETA
William R. Carter & H. Scott Hestevold (1994). On Passage and Persistence. American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (4):269 - 283.
William Lane Craig (1998). Mctaggart's Paradox and the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics. Analysis 58 (2):122–127.
William Lane Craig (1999). Oaklander on Mctaggart and Intrinsic Change. Analysis 59 (4):319–320.
Douglas Ehring (1997). Lewis, Temporary Intrinsics and Momentary Tropes. Analysis 57 (4):254–258.
M. Oreste Fiocco (2007). A Defense of Transient Presentism. American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (3):191 - 212.
Citations of this work BETA
M. Oreste Fiocco (2013). Consequentialism and the World in Time. Ratio 26 (2):212-224.
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