David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):95-121 (2002)
I outline reasons for the recent popularity, and lingering suspicion, about 'emergence' by examining three distinct concepts of property emergence, their purposes and associated obligations. In Part 1, I argue 'Strong' emergence is the grail for many emergentists (and physicalists), since it frames what is needed to block the 'Argument from Realization' (AR) which moves from the truth of physicalism to the inefficacy of special science properties. I then distinguish 'Weak' and 'Ontological' emergence, in Part 2, arguing each is a way one may fail to establish the possibility of Strong emergence. But I also show Weak emergence can help the full-blown reductionist and Ontological emergence helps those opposed to physicalism. Lastly, in Part 3, I argue that the Completeness of Physics (CoP) is incompatible with Strong emergence and that rejecting CoP provides hope for the possibility of Strong emergence in a physical world. The result is a notion of Strong emergence offering much to non-reductive physicalism. My final conclusion is that concepts of emergence, when properly understood, have important contributions to make to philosophical debate.
|Keywords||Causation Emergence Metaphysics Mind Physicalism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Robert C. Bishop (2005). Downward Causation in Fluid Convection. Synthese 160 (2):229 - 248.
Robert C. Bishop & Harald Atmanspacher (2006). Contextual Emergence in the Description of Properties. Foundations of Physics 36 (12):1753-1777.
Carl Gillett (2010). Moving Beyond the Subset Model of Realization: The Problem of Qualitative Distinctness in the Metaphysics of Science. Synthese 177 (2):165 - 192.
Kari L. Theurer (2014). Complexity-Based Theories of Emergence: Criticisms and Constraints. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 28 (3):277-301.
Tjeerd Van De Laar (2006). Dynamical Systems Theory as an Approach to Mental Causation. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 37 (2):307-332.
Similar books and articles
Tim Crane (2001). The Significance of Emergence. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press
Mark A. Bedau (2002). Downward Causation and the Autonomy of Weak Emergence. Principia 6 (1):5-50.
David J. Chalmers (2006). Strong and Weak Emergence. In P. Davies & P. Clayton (eds.), The Re-Emergence of Emergence. Oxford University Press
Mark A. Bedau (2008). Is Weak Emergence Just in the Mind? Minds and Machines 18 (4):443-459.
Paul Humphreys (2008). Computational and Conceptual Emergence. Philosophy of Science 75 (5):584-594.
Paul Humphreys (2008). Synchronic and Diachronic Emergence. Minds and Machines 18 (4):431-442.
John J. Haldane (1996). The Mystery of Emergence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1):261-67.
Jessica M. Wilson (2015). Metaphysical Emergence: Weak and Strong. In Tomasz Bigaj & Christian Wuthrich (eds.), Metaphysics in Contemporary Physics. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 251-306.
Sandra D. Mitchell (2012). Emergence: Logical, Functional and Dynamical. [REVIEW] Synthese 185 (2):171-186.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads189 ( #18,665 of 1,911,384 )
Recent downloads (6 months)8 ( #79,655 of 1,911,384 )
How can I increase my downloads?