The varieties of emergence: Their purposes, obligations and importance
Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):95-121 (2002)
| Abstract | I outline reasons for the recent popularity, and lingering suspicion, about 'emergence' by examining three distinct concepts of property emergence, their purposes and associated obligations. In Part 1, I argue 'Strong' emergence is the grail for many emergentists (and physicalists), since it frames what is needed to block the 'Argument from Realization' (AR) which moves from the truth of physicalism to the inefficacy of special science properties. I then distinguish 'Weak' and 'Ontological' emergence, in Part 2, arguing each is a way one may fail to establish the possibility of Strong emergence. But I also show Weak emergence can help the full-blown reductionist and Ontological emergence helps those opposed to physicalism. Lastly, in Part 3, I argue that the Completeness of Physics (CoP) is incompatible with Strong emergence and that rejecting CoP provides hope for the possibility of Strong emergence in a physical world. The result is a notion of Strong emergence offering much to non-reductive physicalism. My final conclusion is that concepts of emergence, when properly understood, have important contributions to make to philosophical debate. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Causation Emergence Metaphysics Mind Physicalism | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,705 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesTim Crane (2001). The Significance of Emergence. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.
Sandra D. Mitchell (2012). Emergence: Logical, Functional and Dynamical. Synthese 185 (2):171-186.
John J. Haldane (1996). The Mystery of Emergence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:261-67.
Paul Humphreys (2008). Synchronic and Diachronic Emergence. Minds and Machines 18 (4).
Paul Humphreys (2008). Computational and Conceptual Emergence. Philosophy of Science 75 (5):584-594.
Mark A. Bedau (2008). Is Weak Emergence Just in the Mind? Minds and Machines 18 (4).
David J. Chalmers (2006). Strong and Weak Emergence. In P. Davies & P. Clayton (eds.), The Re-Emergence of Emergence. Oxford University Press.
Mark A. Bedau (2002). Downward Causation and the Autonomy of Weak Emergence. Principia 6 (1):5-50.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads130 ( #3,550 of 549,252 )Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,418 of 549,252 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
