How lucky can you get?
Synthese 158 (3):315 - 327 (2007)
| Abstract | In this paper, I apply Duncan Pritchard’s anti-luck epistemology to the case of knowledge through testimony. I claim (1) that Pritchard’s distinction between veritic and reflective luck provides a nice taxonomy of testimony cases, (2) that the taxonomic categories that emerge can be used to suggest precisely what epistemic statuses are transmissible through testimony, and (3) that the resulting picture can make clear how testimony can actually be knowledge-generating. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,672 |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Configure |
Sanford Goldberg & David Henderson (2006). Monitoring and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):600-617.
Charlie Pelling (2013). Testimony, Testimonial Belief, and Safety. Philosophical Studies 164 (1):205-217.
Duncan Pritchard (2004). The Epistemology of Testimony. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):326–348.
Ian M. Church (2013). Getting 'Lucky' with Gettier. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):37-49.
Jonathan Kvanvig (2008). ``Critical Notice of Pritchard's E Pistemic Luck &Quot. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77:272-281.
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2010). Luck as an Epistemic Notion. Synthese 176:361-377.
Duncan Pritchard (2007). Anti-Luck Epistemology. Synthese 158 (3):277 - 297.
Duncan Pritchard (2008). Knowledge, Luck and Lotteries. In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave Macmillan.
Kevin Morris (2012). A Defense of Lucky Understanding. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (2):357-371.
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads13 ( #87,888 of 549,069 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,185 of 549,069 )How can I increase my downloads? |

