How lucky can you get?

Synthese 158 (3):315 - 327 (2007)
In this paper, I apply Duncan Pritchard’s anti-luck epistemology to the case of knowledge through testimony. I claim (1) that Pritchard’s distinction between veritic and reflective luck provides a nice taxonomy of testimony cases, (2) that the taxonomic categories that emerge can be used to suggest precisely what epistemic statuses are transmissible through testimony, and (3) that the resulting picture can make clear how testimony can actually be knowledge-generating.
Keywords Testimony  Transmission  Luck  Justification  Knowledge
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DOI 10.2307/27653598
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References found in this work BETA
Tyler Burge (1993). Content Preservation. Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.
Jennifer Lackey (1999). Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (197):471-490.

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Citations of this work BETA
Sanford C. Goldberg (2008). Testimonial Knowledge in Early Childhood, Revisited. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):1–36.

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