David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):1-25 (1998)
There is a difference between someone breaking a glass by accidentally brushing up against it and smashing a glass in a fit of anger. In the first case, the person's cognitive state has little to do with the event, but in the second, the mental state qua anger is quite relevant. How are we to understand this difference? What is the proper way to understand the relation between the mind, the brain, and the resultant behavior? This paper explores the popular "middle ground" reply in which mental phenomena are claimed to be "as real as" other higher level properties. It argues that this solution fails to answer epistemological difficulties surrounding how to chose the appropriate factors in an explanation. A more sophisticated understanding of scientific theorizing and of the relation between ontology and explanation give us a framework in which we can determine when we should refer to mental states as being the causally efficacious agents for some behavior
|Keywords||Causation Matter Mental Metaphysics Mind|
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Edward T. Cox (2008). Crimson Brain, Red Mind: Yablo on Mental Causation. Dialectica 62 (1):77–99.
J. M. Musacchio (2005). Why Do Qualia and the Mind Seem Nonphysical? Synthese 147 (3):425-460.
Huib L. de Jong (2006). Explicating Pluralism: Where the Mind to Molecule Pathway Gets Off the Track - Reply to Bickle. Synthese 151 (3):435-443.
Huib Looren De Jong (2006). Explicating Pluralism: Where the Mind to Molecule Pathway Gets Off the Track: Reply to Bickle. Synthese 151 (3):435 - 443.
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