David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Psychology 7 (2):149-162 (1994)
In the present article, the role of Gestalt concepts in clarifying the issues of perception is evaluated. Grounded in anti-atomism, Gestalt assumed organizing forces intrinsic to perception. Insofar these were identified with singularity preference, Gestalt is criticized for having failed to distinguish between perception and thought.
|Keywords||Atomism Gestalt Holism Metaphysics Perception|
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Marianna Papadopoulou & Roy Birch (2009). 'Being in the World': The Event of Learning. Educational Philosophy and Theory 41 (3):270-286.
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