Moral realism and moral judgments

Erkenntnis 36 (1):103 - 112 (1992)
For moral realists moral judgments will be a kind of factual judgment that involves the basically reliable apprehension of an objective moral reality. I argue that factual judgments display at least some degree of conceptual sensitivity to error, while moral judgments do not. Therefore moral judgments are not a kind of factual judgment.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00401966
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References found in this work BETA
Peter Railton (1986). Moral Realism. Philosophical Review 95 (2):163-207.
Phillipa Foot (1997). Virtues and Vices. In Thomas L. Carson & Paul K. Moser (eds.), Morality and the Good Life. OUP Usa
Donald Davidson (1977). The Method of Truth in Metaphysics. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1):244-254.

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