Graduate studies at Western
Erkenntnis 36 (1):103 - 112 (1992)
|Abstract||For moral realists moral judgments will be a kind of factual judgment that involves the basically reliable apprehension of an objective moral reality. I argue that factual judgments display at least some degree of conceptual sensitivity to error, while moral judgments do not. Therefore moral judgments are not a kind of factual judgment.|
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