"The property of being red": On Frank Jackson's opacity puzzle and his new theory of the content of colour experience.
Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):187 - 202 (2007)
|Abstract||Frank Jackson has a new objectivist and representationalist account of the content of colour-experience. I raise several objections both against the account itself and, primarily, against how he tries to support it. He argues that the new account enables us to see what is wrong with the so-called Opacity Puzzle. This alleged puzzle is an argument in which a seemingly implausible conclusion is derived from three premises of which seem plausible to an representationalist. Jackson|
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