Graduate studies at Western
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (4):544-552 (2001)
|Abstract||I have argued that a strong kind of physicalism based on the strict implication thesis can consistently reject both eliminativism and reductionism (in any nontrivial sense). This piece defends that position against objections from Andrew Melnyk, who claims that either my formulation doesn't entail physicalism, or it must be interpreted in such a way that the mental is after all reducible to the physical. His alternatives depend on two interesting assumptions. I argue that both are mistaken, thereby, making this kind of nonreductive physicalism clearer and more clearly defensible|
|Keywords||Language Logic Physicalism Reductionism Strict Implication Chalmers, D Kim, J|
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