The ordinary concept of valuing
In Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva (eds.), Metaethics. Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (2009)
| Abstract | The concept of valuing plays an important role in the way we think about people’s attitudes toward the things they care about most. We invoke this concept in sentences like: I value your friendship. We need to find a leader who truly values political equality. To live a good life, one must always return to the things one values most. Yet there also seem to be cases in which a person has a strong desire for a particular object but in which we would not say that he or she ‘values’ this object. Thus, consider the typical heroin addict. It would sound wrong to say of such a person | |||||||||
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