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Philosophy of Action > Action Theory > Motivation and Will > Compulsion and Addiction

Compulsion and Addiction

Edited by Jesse Summers (Duke University)
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Summary

Addictions and compulsions pose, most centrally, the question of how we ought to understand our actions when they are, by common understanding, not entirely free. On the one hand, are the compelled and addicts forced to act? If so, do they force themselves, or are they forced by their psychology, or by their neurobiology? Each of these possible explanations are problematic. How do we force ourselves? Why is part of our psychology independent of "us"? What relationship is there between neurological explanations and psychological explanations? On the other hand, if the compelled and addicts are not forced to act, what accounts for their consistently bad and even self-defeating actions and for their regularly violating their own resolutions to change their actions? Such attempts to explain addiction and compulsion also shed light on ordinary actions and action explanations and on what it means for actions to be free.
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  1. George Ainslie (2008). Vulnerabilities to Addiction Must Have Their Impact Through the Common Currency of Discounted Reward. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (4):438-439.
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  2. George Ainslie (2001). Breakdown of Will. Cambridge University Press.
    Ainslie argues that our responses to the threat of our own inconsistency determine the basic fabric of human culture. He suggests that individuals are more like populations of bargaining agents than like the hierarchical command structures envisaged by cognitive psychologists. The forces that create and constrain these populations help us understand so much that is puzzling in human action and interaction: from addictions and other self-defeating behaviors to the experience of willfulness, from pathological over-control and self-deception to subtler forms of (...)
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  3. Chrisoula Andreou (2008). Addiction, Procrastination, and Failure Points in Decision-Making Systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (4):439-440.
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  4. Chrisoula Andreou (2008). Making a Clean Break: Addiction and Ulysses Contracts. Bioethics 22 (1):25–31.
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  5. Robert Archibald (2000). Jon Elster and Ole‐Jorgen Skog, Getting Hooked: Rationality and Addiction:Getting Hooked: Rationality and Addiction. Ethics 110 (3):609-612.
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  6. Giorgio A. Ascoli & Kevin A. McCabe (2006). Scarcity Begets Addiction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (2):178-178.
    As prototypical incentive with biological meaning, food illustrates the distinction between money as tool and money as drug. However, consistent neuroscience results challenge this view of food as intrinsic value and opposite to drugs of abuse. The scarce availability over evolutionary time of both food and money may explain their similar drug-like non-satiability, suggesting an integrated mechanism for generalized reinforcers. (Published Online April 5 2006).
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  7. Robert N. Audi (1974). Moral Responsibility, Freedom, and Compulsion. American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (January):1-14.
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  8. James Beebe (forthcoming). Weakness of Will, Reasonability, and Compulsion. Synthese.
    Experimental philosophers have recently begun to investigate the folk conception of weakness of will (e.g., Mele in Philos Stud 150:391–404, 2010; May and Holton in Philos Stud 157:341–360, 2012; Beebe forthcoming; Sousa and Mauro forthcoming). Their work has focused primarily on the ways in which akrasia (i.e., acting contrary to one’s better judgment), unreasonable violations of resolutions, and variations in the moral valence of actions modulate folk attributions of weakness of will. A key finding that has emerged from this research (...)
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  9. Stephanie Bell, Adrian Carter, Rebecca Mathews, Coral Gartner, Jayne Lucke & Wayne Hall (forthcoming). Views of Addiction Neuroscientists and Clinicians on the Clinical Impact of a 'Brain Disease Model of Addiction'. Neuroethics.
    Addiction is increasingly described as a “chronic and relapsing brain disease”. The potential impact of the brain disease model on the treatment of addiction or addicted individuals’ treatment behaviour remains uncertain. We conducted a qualitative study to examine: (i) the extent to which leading Australian addiction neuroscientists and clinicians accept the brain disease view of addiction; and (ii) their views on the likely impacts of this view on addicted individuals’ beliefs and behaviour. Thirty-one Australian addiction neuroscientists and clinicians (10 females (...)
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  10. Piers Benn (2007). Disease, Addiction and the Freedom to Resist. Philosophical Papers 36 (3):465-481.
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  11. Warren K. Bickel & Richard Yi (2008). Addiction Science as a Hedgehog and as a Fox. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (4):441-442.
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  12. Daniel Buchman, Judy Illes & Peter Reiner (2011). The Paradox of Addiction Neuroscience. Neuroethics 4 (2):65-77.
    Neuroscience has substantially advanced the understanding of how changes in brain biochemistry contribute to mechanisms of tolerance and physical dependence via exposure to addictive drugs. Many scientists and mental health advocates scaffold this emerging knowledge by adding the imprimatur of disease, arguing that conceptualizing addiction as a brain disease will reduce stigma amongst the folk. Promoting a brain disease concept is grounded in beneficent and utilitarian thinking: the language makes room for individuals living with addiction to receive the same level (...)
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  13. Ronald J. Burke & Lisa Fiksenbaum (2009). Work Motivations, Work Outcomes, and Health: Passion Versus Addiction. Journal of Business Ethics 84:257 - 263.
    Individuals in managerial and professional jobs now work long hours for a variety of reasons. Building on previous research on workaholism and on types of passion, the results of three exploratory studies of correlates of work-based Passion and Addiction are presented. Data were collected in three samples using anonymously completed questionnaires: Canadian managers and professionals, Australian psychologists, and Norwegian journalists. A common pattern of findings was observed in the three samples. First, respondents scoring higher on Passion and on Addiction were (...)
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  14. Adrian Carter & Wayne Hall (2007). The Social Implications of Neurobiological Explanations of Resistible Compulsions. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (1):15 – 17.
    The authors comments on several articles on addiction. Research suggests that addicted individuals have substantial impairments in cognitive control of behavior. The authors maintain that a proper study of addiction must include a neurobiological model of addiction to draw the attention of bioethicists and addiction neurobiologists. They also state that more addiction neuroscientists like S. E. Hyman are needed as they understand the limits of their research. Accession Number: 24077921; Authors: Carter, Adrian 1; Email Address: adrian.carter@uq.edu.au Hall, Wayne 1; Affiliations: (...)
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  15. R. Andrew Chambers (2008). Impulsivity, Dual Diagnosis, and the Structure of Motivated Behavior in Addiction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (4):443-444.
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  16. L. C. Charland (2001). Strong Feelings: Emotion, Addiction and Human Behavior. Philosophical Review 110 (1):108-110.
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  17. Louis Charland (2012). The Varieties of Compulsion in Addiction. AJOB Neuroscience 3 (2):50-51.
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  18. Louis C. Charland (2007). Affective Neuroscience and Addiction. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (1):20 – 21.
    The author comments on the article “The neurobiology of addiction: Implications for voluntary control of behavior,‘ by S. E. Hyman. Hyman suggests that addicted individuals have substantial impairments in cognitive control of behavior. The author states that brain and neurochemical systems are involved in addiction. He also suggests that neuroscience can link the diseased brain processes in addiction to the moral struggles of the addicts. Accession Number: 24077919; Authors: Charland, Louis C. 1; Email Address: charland@uwo.ca; Affiliations: 1: University of Western (...)
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  19. Louis C. Charland (2002). Cynthia's Dilemma: Consenting to Heroin Prescription. American Journal of Bioethics 2 (2):37 – 47.
    Heroin prescription involves the medical provision of heroin in the treatment of heroin addiction. Rudimentary clinical trials on that treatment modality have been carried out and others are currently underway or in development. However, it is questionable whether subjects considered for such trials are mentally competent to consent to them. The problem has not been sufficiently appreciated in ethical and clinical discussions of the topic. The challenges involved throw new light on the role of value and accountability in contemporary discussions (...)
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  20. Thomas I. Cochrane (2007). Brain Disease or Moral Condition? Wrong Question. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (1):24 – 25.
    The author comments on the article “The neurobiology of addition: Implications for voluntary control of behavior,‘ by S. E. Hyman. The author agrees with Hyman that debate persists whether addiction is a brain disease or a moral condition. The author suggests that even if we understand the neurobiology of addiction, it will make sense to seek accountability from the addict and to modify his behavior. He also suggests that no facts about neurobiology will change these moral requirements. Accession Number: 24077917; (...)
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  21. Peter J. Cohen (2007). Addiction, Molecules and Morality: Disease Does Not Obviate Responsibility. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (1):21 – 23.
    The author comments on the article “The neurobiology of addiction: Implications for voluntary control of behavior,‘ by S. E. Hyman. The author agrees with Hyman that debate persists whether addiction is a brain disease or a moral condition. The author states that Hyman has not fully answered the question of when addicted persons are responsible for what they do. The author also suggests that addiction is a brain disease and therapy can improve the symptoms of this life-threatening syndrome. Accession Number: (...)
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  22. Michael Louis Corrado (2000). Addiction and Responsibility – Part II. Law and Philosophy 19 (1).
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  23. Michael Louis Corrado (1999). Addiction and Responsibility: An Introduction. Law and Philosophy 18 (6):579 - 588.
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  24. Ezio Di Nucci (forthcoming). Addiction, Compulsion, and Agency. Neuroethics:1-3.
    I show that Pickard’s argument against the irresistibility of addiction fails because her proposed dilemma, according to which either drug-seeking does not count as action or addiction is resistible, is flawed; and that is the case whether or not one endorses Pickard’s controversial definition of action. Briefly, we can easily imagine cases in which drug-seeking meets Pickard’s conditions for agency without thereby implying that the addiction was not irresistible, as when the drug addict may take more than one route to (...)
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  25. Hubert Dreyfus & Jane Rubin (1994). Kierkegaard on the Nihilism of the Present Age: The Case of Commitment as Addiction. Synthese 98 (1):3 - 19.
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  26. Gerald B. Dworkin (1968). Compulsion and Moral Concepts. Ethics 78 (3):227-233.
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  27. Carl Elliott (2002). Who Holds the Leash? American Journal of Bioethics 2 (2):48.
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  28. Jon Elster (ed.) (1999). Addiction: Entries and Exits. Russell Sage Publications.
    Chapter 1 Disordered Appetites: Addiction, Compulsion, and Dependence Gary Watson In both popular and technical discussion, addictive behavior is said to be ...
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  29. William Ferraiolo (2004). Against Compatibilism: Compulsion, Free Agency and Moral Responsibility. Sorites 15 (December):67-72.
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  30. Owen Flanagan (2011). What Is It Like to Be an Addict? In Jeffrey Poland (ed.). Mit Press.
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  31. Bennett Foddy & Julian Savulescu (2010). A Liberal Account of Addiction. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (1):1-22.
    Philosophers and psychologists have been attracted to two differing accounts of addictive motivation. In this paper, we investigate these two accounts and challenge their mutual claim that addictions compromise a person’s self-control. First, we identify some incompatibilities between this claim of reduced self-control and the available evidence from various disciplines. A critical assessment of the evidence weakens the empirical argument for reduced autonomy. Second, we identify sources of unwarranted normative bias in the popular theories of addiction that introduce systematic errors (...)
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  32. Bennett Foddy & Julian Savulescu (2010). Relating Addiction to Disease, Disability, Autonomy, and the Good Life. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (1):35-42.
    Concepts We thank all three commentators for extremely constructive, insightful, and gracious commentaries. We cannot address all their valuable points. In this response, we elucidate and relate the concepts of addiction, disease, disability, autonomy, and well-being. We examine some of the implications of these relationships in the context of the helpful responses made by our commentators. We begin with the definitions of the relevant concepts which we employ: ¥? ? ? Addiction (Liberal Concept): An addiction is a strong appetite. ¥? (...)
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  33. Bennett Foddy & Julian Savulescu (2007). Addiction is Not an Affliction: Addictive Desires Are Merely Pleasure-Oriented Desires. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (1):29 – 32.
    The author comments on the article “The neurobiology of addiction: Implications for voluntary control of behavior,‘ by S. E. Hyman. Hyman presents that addiction is a brain disease or a moral condition. The authors present that addiction is a strong preference, similar to appetitive preferences. They state that addiction is merely a form of pleasure-seeking. The authors conclude that the problem of addiction is the problem of the management of pleasure, not treatment of a disease. Accession Number: 24077914; Authors: Foddy, (...)
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  34. Bennett Foddy & Julian Savulescu (2006). Addiction and Autonomy: Can Addicted People Consent to the Prescription of Their Drug of Addiction? Bioethics 20 (1):1–15.
    It is often claimed that the autonomy of heroin addicts is compromised when they are choosing between taking their drug of addiction and abstaining. This is the basis of claims that they are incompetent to give consent to be prescribed heroin. We reject these claims on a number of empirical and theoretical grounds. First we argue that addicts are likely to be sober, and thus capable of rational thought, when approaching researchers to participate in research. We reject behavioural evidence purported (...)
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  35. Bennett Foddy & Julian Savulescu (2006). Autonomy, Addiction and the Drive to Pleasure: Designing Drugs and Our Biology: A Reply to Neil Levy. Bioethics 20 (1):21–23.
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  36. Ian Freckelton (2002). Choice, Rationality, and Substance Dependence. American Journal of Bioethics 2 (2):60-61.
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  37. Dwight Furrow (1998). Schindler's Compulsion: An Essay on Practical Necessity. American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (3):209 - 229.
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  38. Andrew James Goudie, Matt Field & Jon Cole (2008). Different Vulnerabilities for Addiction May Contribute to the Same Phenomena and Some Additional Interactions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (4):445-446.
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  39. George Graham (2010). The Disordered Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Mental Illness. Routledge.
    Conceiving mental disorder -- Disorder of mental disorder -- On being skeptical about mental disorder -- Seeking norms for mental disorder -- An original position -- Addiction and responsibility for self -- Reality lost and found -- Minding the missing me.
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  40. Mary Tod Gray (2007). Freedom and Resistance: The Phenomenal Will in Addiction. Nursing Philosophy 8 (1).
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  41. Mary Tod Gray (2005). The Shifting Sands of Self: A Framework for the Experience of Self in Addiction. Nursing Philosophy 6 (2):119-130.
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  42. O. H. Green (2002). Jon Elster, Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions and Strong Feelings: Emotion, Addiction, and Behavior:Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions;Strong Feelings: Emotion, Addiction, and Behavior. Ethics 112 (2):371-375.
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  43. Mark D. Griffiths (2008). The Biopsychosocial and “Complex” Systems Approach as a Unified Framework for Addiction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (4):446-447.
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  44. Wayne Hall (2003). Addiction, Neuroscience and Ethics. Addiction 98 (7):867-870.
    If one believes that the brain is, in some as yet unspecified way, the organ of mind and behaviour, then all human behaviour has a neurobiological basis. Neuroscience research over the past several decades has provided more specific reasons for believing that many addictive phenomena have a neurobiological basis. The major psychoactive drugs of dependence have been shown to act on neurotransmitter systems in the brain (Nutt 1997; Koob 2000); common neurochemical mechanisms underlie many of the rewarding effects of these (...)
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  45. Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2008). Neither Necessary nor Sufficient for Addiction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (4):447-448.
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  46. Carl L. Hart & Robert M. Krauss (2008). Human Drug Addiction is More Than Faulty Decision-Making. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (4):448-449.
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  47. Janna Hastings, Nicolas Le Novère, Werner Ceusters, Kevin Mulligan & Barry Smith (2012). Wanting What We Don’T Want to Want: Representing Addiction in Interoperable Bio-Ontologies. In Proceeedings of the Third International Conference on Biomedical Ontology. CEUR.
    Ontologies are being developed throughout the biomedical sciences to address standardization, integration, classification and reasoning needs against the background of an increasingly data-driven research paradigm. In particular, ontologies facilitate the translation of basic research into benefits for the patient by making research results more discoverable and by facilitating knowledge transfer across disciplinary boundaries. Addressing and adequately treating mental illness is one of our most pressing public health challenges. Primary research across multiple disciplines such as psychology, psychiatry, biology, neuroscience and pharmacology (...)
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  48. Robert Heinaman (1988). Compulsion and Voluntary Action in the Eudemian Ethics. Noûs 22 (2):253-281.
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  49. Edmund Henden (forthcoming). Addictive Actions. Philosophical Psychology:1-21.
    It is common to think of addiction as involving behavior which in some sense is ?out of control.? But does this mean addictive actions occur because of compulsion or because of ordinary weakness of will? Many philosophers argue that addictive actions occur because of weakness of will, since there is plenty of evidence suggesting that they are not caused by irresistible desires. In fact, addicts seem, in general, to perform these actions freely in the sense of having the ability to (...)
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  50. Edmund Henden (forthcoming). Heroin Addiction and Voluntary Choice: The Case of Informed Consent. Bioethics.
    Does addiction to heroin undermine the voluntariness of heroin addicts' consent to take part in research which involves giving them free and legal heroin? This question has been raised in connection with research into the effectiveness of heroin prescription as a way of treating dependent heroin users. Participants in such research are required to give their informed consent to take part. Louis C. Charland has argued that we should not presume that heroin addicts are competent to do this since heroin (...)
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  51. Richard Holton (2009). Willing, Wanting, Waiting. Oxford University Press.
    Richard Holton provides a unified account of intention, choice, weakness of will, strength of will, temptation, addiction, and freedom of the will.
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  52. Richard Holton & Kent Berridge (forthcoming). Addiction Between Compulsion and Choice. In Neil Levy (ed.), Addiction and Self-Control. Oxford University Press.
    We aim to find a middle path between disease models of addiction, and those that treat addictive choices as choices like any other. We develop an account of the disease element by focussing on the idea that dopamine works primarily to lay down dispositional intrinsic desires. Addictive substances artifically boost the dopamine signal, and thereby lay down intrinsic desires for the substances that persist through withdrawal, and in the face of beliefs that they are worthless. The result is cravings that (...)
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  53. Malcolm Horne (2010). Johnny Wilkinson's Addiction. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (1):31-34.
    A brief poll of my scientific colleagues confirmed that, to a person, they regard addiction as a disease, whereas most non-science acquaintances consider it to be a failure of willpower. Reconciliation of these polarized views seems difficult and rather than finding a middle path, such as suggested by Foddy and Savulescu. I am an entrenched supporter of the view that addiction can be a disease. I first should declare my position as a card-carrying biologist, holding the view that behavior emanates (...)
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  54. Ferenc Huoranszki (2011). Weakness and Compulsion: The Essential Difference. Philosophical Explorations 14 (1):81-97.
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  55. Douglas N. Husak (1999). Addiction and Criminal Liability. Law and Philosophy 18 (6):655 - 684.
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  56. Steven E. Hyman (2007). The Neurobiology of Addiction: Implications for Voluntary Control of Behavior. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (1):8 – 11.
    There continues to be a debate on whether addiction is best understood as a brain disease or a moral condition. This debate, which may influence both the stigma attached to addiction and access to treatment, is often motivated by the question of whether and to what extent we can justly hold addicted individuals responsible for their actions. In fact, there is substantial evidence for a disease model, but the disease model per se does not resolve the question of voluntary control. (...)
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  57. Annemarie Kalis (2011). Failures of Agency: Irrational Behavior and Self-Understanding. Lexington Books.
    This book explores classic philosophical questions regarding the phenomenon of weakness of will or ‘akrasia’: doing A, even though all things considered, you judge it best to do B. Does this phenomenon really exist and if so, how should it be explained? Nacht van Descartes -/- The author provides a historical overview of some traditional answers to these questions and addresses the main question: how does the phenomenon of 'going against your own judgment' relate to the idea that we are (...)
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  58. Helen Keane (2004). Disorders of Desire: Addiction and Problems of Intimacy. Journal of Medical Humanities 25 (3):189-204.
    This essay investigates the tensions produced by the categorization of different forms of excessive desire under the singular model of addiction, and it challenges the increasing acceptance of addiction as an all-purpose explanation for unruly desires through a comparison of the different forms of disordered desire in sex addiction and alcoholism. Moreover, it argues for a broad understanding of addictive processes to undermine the normative and moralizing assumptions of addiction discourses. Refiguring addiction as a kind of intimacy is one way (...)
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  59. Ryan Kemp (2009). The Temporal Dimension of Addiction. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 40 (1):1-18.
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  60. Jeanette Kennett (2001). Agency and Responsibility: A Common-Sense Moral Psychology. Oxford University Press.
    Distinctions between recklessness, weakness of will, and compulsion have been the targets of much philosophical attack. Beginning with the problem of weakness of will, this volume builds an admirably comprehensive and integrated account of moral agency that highly regards the capacity for self-control. It addresses with clarity a range of important topics-such as the nature of valuing and desiring, conceptions of virtue, moral conflict, and the varieties of recklessness-making this work especially important to those interested in philosophy, psychology, law, and (...)
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  61. Harold Kincaid & Jacqueline A. Sullivan (2010). Medical Models of Addiction. In Kincaid Ross (ed.), What is Addiction?
    Biomedical science has been remarkably successful in explaining illness by categorizing diseases and then by identifying localizable lesions such as a virus and neoplasm in the body that cause those diseases. Not surprisingly, researchers have aspired to apply this powerful paradigm to addiction. So, for example, in a review of the neuroscience of addiction literature, Hyman and Malenka (2001, p. 695) acknowledge a general consensus among addiction researchers that “[a]ddiction can appropriately be considered as a chronic medical illness.” Like other (...)
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  62. Marc T. Kiviniemi & Rick A. Bevins (2008). Role of Affective Associations in the Planning and Habit Systems of Decision-Making Related to Addiction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (4):450-451.
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  63. Joshua Knobe & Erica Roedder (2009). The Ordinary Concept of Valuing. In Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva (eds.), Metaethics. Wiley Periodicals, Inc..
    The concept of valuing plays an important role in the way we think about people’s attitudes toward the things they care about most. We invoke this concept in sentences like: I value your friendship. We need to find a leader who truly values political equality. To live a good life, one must always return to the things one values most. Yet there also seem to be cases in which a person has a strong desire for a particular object but in (...)
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  64. Michel Le Moal (2008). Negative Affects Are Parts of the Addiction Syndrome. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (4):451-452.
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  65. Daniel H. Lende (2008). Addiction: More Than Innate Rationality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (4):453-454.
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  66. Mark Leon (2001). The Willing Addict: Actor or (Helpless) Bystander? Philosophia 28 (1-4):437-443.
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  67. Neil Levy (ed.) (forthcoming). Addiction and Self-Control. Oxford University Press.
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  68. Neil Levy (2007). The Social: A Missing Term in the Debate Over Addiction and Voluntary Control. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (1):35 – 36.
    The author comments on the article “The Neurobiology of Addiction: Implications for Voluntary Control of Behavior,‘ by S. E. Hyman. Hyman’s article suggests that addicted individuals have impairments in cognitive control of behavior. The author agrees with Hyman’s view that addiction weakens the addict’s ability to align his actions with his judgments. The author states that neuroethics may focus on brains and highlight key aspects of behavior but we still risk missing explanatory elements. Accession Number: 24077912; Authors: Levy, Neil 1,2; (...)
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  69. Neil Levy (2006). Autonomy and Addiction. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):427-447.
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  70. Neil Levy (2006). Addiction, Autonomy and Ego-Depletion: A Response to Bennett Foddy and Julian Savulescu. Bioethics 20 (1):16–20.
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  71. Neil Levy (2003). Self-Deception and Responsibility for Addiction. Journal of Applied Philosophy 20 (2):133–142.
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  72. Hans Madueme (2007). Addiction as an Amoral Condition? The Case Remains Unproven. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (1):25 – 27.
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  73. Neil Manson, 14 Addiction and the Diagnostic Criteria for Pathological Gambling.
    A philosophical question divides the field of addiction research. Can a psychological disorder count as an addiction absent a common underlying physical basis (neurological or genetic) for every case of the disorder in the category? Or is it appropriate to categorize a disorder as an addiction if the symptoms of and diagnostic criteria for it are sufficiently similar to those of other disorders also classified as addictions—regardless of whether there is some underlying physical basis common to each case of the (...)
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  74. Eric Matthews (2010). Explaining Addiction. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (1):23-26.
    “A Liberal Account of Addiction‘ is a major contribution to the discussion of addiction, its treatment, and the social and policy issues which arise from it. Questioning as it does many generally accepted assumptions about addictive behavior, particularly the use of hard drugs, it will provoke even those who do not agree with it to rethink their positions. Many of its suggestions are relevant also, in my opinion, to thinking about other areas of psychiatric interest. Nevertheless, I want to argue (...)
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  75. Carolyn McLeod (2002). Authenticity and the Hijacked Brain. American Journal of Bioethics 2 (2):62-63.
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  76. Alfred R. Mele (2004). Action: Volitional Disorder and Addiction. In Jennifer Radden (ed.), The Philosophy of Psychiatry. Oxford University Press.
    Weakness of will has perplexed philosophers since Plato's time. This chapter places some of the literature on volitional disorders and addictions in a philosophical context dating back to Plato and Aristotle in an attempt to shed light on issues that a theorist who wishes to analyze the idea of a volitional disorder will face. Key here is the notion of the irresistability and resistability of pertinent desires, which is explored in relation to George Ainslie's work on the ability to make (...)
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  77. Alfred R. Mele (2002). Akratics and Addicts. American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (2):153 - 167.
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  78. Alfred R. Mele (1996). Addiction and Self-Control. Behavior and Philosophy 24 (2):99 - 117.
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  79. Alfred R. Mele (1990). Irresistible Desires. Noûs 24 (3):455-72.
    The topic of irresistible desires arises with unsurprising frequency in discussions of free agency and moral responsibility. Actions motivated by such desires are standardly viewed as compelled, and hence unfree. Agents in the grip of irresistible desires are often plausibly exempted from moral blame for intentional deeds in which the desires issue. Yet, relatively little attention has been given to the analysis of irresistible desire. Moreover, a popular analysis is fatally flawed. My aim in this paper is to construct and (...)
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  80. Carla Meurk, Adrian Carter, Wayne Hall & Jayne Lucke (forthcoming). Public Understandings of Addiction: Where Do Neurobiological Explanations Fit? Neuroethics.
    Developments in the field of neuroscience, according to its proponents, offer the prospect of an enhanced understanding and treatment of addicted persons. Consequently, its advocates consider that improving public understanding of addiction neuroscience is a desirable aim. Those critical of neuroscientific approaches, however, charge that it is a totalising, reductive perspective–one that ignores other known causes in favour of neurobiological explanations. Sociologist Nikolas Rose has argued that neuroscience, and its associated technologies, are coming to dominate cultural models to the extent (...)
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  81. Allison Mitchell (2007). Confronting Addiction Across Disciplines. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (3):233-236.
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  82. Allison Mitchell (2007). Taking Mentality Seriously: A Philosophical Inquiry Into the Language of Addiction and Recovery. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (3):211-222.
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  83. David Morris (2001). Lived Time and Absolute Knowing: Habit and Addiction From Infinite Jest to the Phenomenology of Spirit. Clio 30:375-415.
    A study of habit and other unconscious backgrounds of action shows how shapes of spiritual life in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit each imply correlative senses of lived time. The very form of time thus gives spirit a sensuous encounter with its own concept. The point that conceptual content is manifest in the sensuous form of time is key to an interpretation of Hegel's infamous and puzzling remarks about time and the concept in ``absolute knowing.'' The article also shows how Hegel's (...)
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  84. Stephen J. Morse (2000). Hooked on Hype: Addiction and Responsibility. Law and Philosophy 19 (1):3 - 49.
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  85. Daniel Moseley (2008). Review of Carlton Erickson, "The Science of Addiction". [REVIEW] Metapsychology.
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  86. Lennart Nordenfelt (2010). On Concepts and Theories of Addiction. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (1):27-30.
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  87. Lennart Nordenfelt (2007). Rationality and Compulsion: Applying Action Theory to Psychiatry. OUP Oxford.
    Rationality and Compulsion presents a unique examination of mental illness - derived from philosophical action theory. Delusion is common to many mental disorders, resulting in actions that, though perhaps rational to the individual, might seem entirely inappropriate or harmful to others. So what is it that causes these actions, and why do they continue? The theory expounded in this book shows how the key to this problem might be compulsion. -/- This book presents a new analysis of the notion of (...)
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  88. Christian Perring (2002). Resisting the Temptations of Addiction Rhetoric. American Journal of Bioethics 2 (2):51-52.
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  89. Hanna Pickard (2013). Psychopathology and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3).
    When philosophers want an example of a person who lacks the ability to do otherwise, they turn to psychopathology. Addicts, agoraphobics, kleptomaniacs, neurotics, obsessives, and even psychopathic serial murderers, are all purportedly subject to irresistible desires that compel the person to act: no alternative possibility is supposed to exist. I argue that this conception of psychopathology is false and offer an empirically and clinically informed understanding of disorders of agency which preserves the ability to do otherwise. First, I appeal to (...)
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  90. Hanna Pickard (2012). The Purpose in Chronic Addiction. AJOB Neuroscience 3 (2):40-49.
    I argue that addiction is not a chronic, relapsing, neurobiological disease characterized by compulsive use of drugs or alcohol. Large-scale national survey data demonstrate that rates of substance dependence peak in adolescence and early adulthood and then decline steeply; addicts tend to “mature out” in their late twenties or early thirties. The exceptions are addicts who suffer from additional psychiatric disorders. I hypothesize that this difference in patterns of use and relapse between the general and psychiatric populations can be explained (...)
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  91. Hanna Pickard (2011). Book Review George Graham and Jeffrey Poland (Eds.) Addiction and Responsibility. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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  92. Hanna Pickard & Steve Pearce, Addiction in Context: Philosophical Lessons From a Personality Disorder Clinic.
    Popular and neurobiological accounts of addiction tend to treat it as a form of compulsion. This contrasts with personality disorder, where most problematic behaviours are treated as voluntary. But high levels of co-morbidity, overlapping diagnostic traits, and the effectiveness of a range of comparable clinical interventions for addiction and personality disorder suggest that this difference in treatment is unjustified. Drawing on this range of clinical interventions, we argue that addiction is not a form of compulsion. Rather, the misuse of drugs (...)
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  93. Tia Powell (2007). Wrestling Satan and Conquering Dopamine: Addiction and Free Will. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (1):14 – 15.
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  94. A. David Redish, Steve Jensen & Adam Johnson (2008). Addiction as Vulnerabilities in the Decision Process. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (4):461-487.
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  95. A. David Redish, Steve Jensen & Adam Johnson (2008). A Unified Framework for Addiction: Vulnerabilities in the Decision Process. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (4):415-437.
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  96. Peter B. Reiner (2011). The Paradox of Addiction Neuroscience. Neuroethics 4 (2):65-77.
    Neuroscience has substantially advanced the understanding of how changes in brain biochemistry contribute to mechanisms of tolerance and physical dependence via exposure to addictive drugs. Many scientists and mental health advocates scaffold this emerging knowledge by adding the imprimatur of disease, arguing that conceptualizing addiction as a brain disease will reduce stigma amongst the folk. Promoting a brain disease concept is grounded in beneficent and utilitarian thinking: the language makes room for individuals living with addiction to receive the same level (...)
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  97. Laura Weiss Roberts (2002). Addiction and Consent. American Journal of Bioethics 2 (2):58-60.
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  98. Ole Rogeberg (2004). Taking Absurd Theories Seriously: Economics and the Case of Rational Addiction Theories. Philosophy of Science 71 (3):263-285.
    Rational addiction theories illustrate how absurd choice theories in economics get taken seriously as possibly true explanations and tools for welfare analysis despite being poorly interpreted, empirically unfalsifiable, and based on wildly inaccurate assumptions selectively justified by ad-hoc stories. The lack of transparency introduced by poorly anchored mathematical models, the psychological persuasiveness of stories, and the way the profession neglects relevant issues are suggested as explanations for how what we perhaps should see as displays of technical skill and ingenuity are (...)
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  99. Don Ross, Author's Personal Copy.
    Addiction may or may not be a highly prevalent condition, but the concept of addiction is undeniably ubiquitous. From the people who cheerfully and publicly announce their addiction to coffee, or chocolate, or shopping, to those who ruefully and perhaps only in very special settings admit their addiction to alcohol or drugs, ‘‘addiction” is an oft-invoked explanatory frame for the presentation and characterization of individual behavior. Lately, it has even been applied to the behavior of super-personal entities, as in America’s (...)
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  100. Patricia A. Ross (2007). The Truth Will Set You Free, or How a Troubled Philosophical Theory May Help to Understand How People Talk About Their Addiction. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (3):227-231.
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