David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Psychology 8 (3):255-64 (1995)
McGinn claims that there is nothing “inherently mysterious” about consciousness, even though we will never be able to understand it. The first claim is no more than a rhetorical flourish. The second may be read either as a claim that we are unable to construct an explanatory theory of consciousness, or that any such theory must strike us as unintelligible, in the sense in which quantum mechanics is sometimes said to be unintelligible. On the first reading, McGinn's argument is based on a false premiss . On the second reading, it suffers from the shortcoming that the central notion of intelligibility is too obscure to permit any definite conclusion. I close with a brief discussion of the contemporary tendency to reject non-physicalist approaches to consciousness on a priori grounds
|Keywords||Materialism Mind Mystery Science Mcginn, C|
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Nagel (1974). What is It Like to Be a Bat? Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Colin McGinn (1989). Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem? Mind 98 (July):349-66.
James T. Cushing (1991). Quantum Theory and Explanatory Discourse: Endgame for Understanding? Philosophy of Science 58 (3):337-358.
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