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Why Decision Theory Remains Constructively Incomplete
Mind 125 (500):1033-1043 (2016)
Abstract
The existence of a transitive, complete, and weakly independent relation on the full set of gambles implies the existence of a non-Ramsey set. Therefore, each transitive and weakly independent relation on the set of gambles either is incomplete or does not have an explicit description. Whatever tools decision theory makes available, there will always be decision problems where these tools fail us. In this sense, decision theory remains incomplete.My notes
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Citations of this work
Exceeding Expectations: Stochastic Dominance as a General Decision Theory.Christian Tarsney - manuscript
The strength of de Finetti’s coherence theorem.Michael Nielsen - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11713-11724.
References found in this work
Is Evaluative Compositionality a Requirement of Rationality?Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2014 - Mind 123 (490):457-502.
Outlines of a formal theory of value, I.Donald Davidson, J. C. C. McKinsey & Patrick Suppes - 1955 - Philosophy of Science 22 (2):140-160.
Non-Archimedean Probability.Vieri Benci, Leon Horsten & Sylvia Wenmackers - 2013 - Milan Journal of Mathematics 81 (1):121-151.
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