Synthese 124 (1-2):1-43 (2000)
|Abstract||Quineans have taken the basic expression of ontological commitment to be an assertion of the form '' x '', assimilated to theEnglish ''there is something that is a ''. Here I take the existential quantifier to be introduced, not as an abbreviation for an expression of English, but via Tarskian semantics. I argue, contrary to the standard view, that Tarskian semantics in fact suggests a quite different picture: one in which quantification is of a substitutional type apparently first proposed by Geach. The ontological burden is borne by constant symbols, and truth is defined separately from reference.|
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