David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):58–80 (2003)
Wittgenstein's discussion of rule-following is widely regarded to have identified what Kripke called "the most radical and original sceptical problem that philosophy has seen to date". But does it? This paper examines the problem in the light of Charles Peirce's distinctive "scientific hierarchy". Peirce identifies a phenomenological inquiry which is prior to both logic and metaphysics, whose role is to identify the most fundamental philosophical categories. His third category, particularly salient in this context, pertains to general predication. Rule-following scepticism, the paper suggests, results from running together two questions: "How is it that I can project rules?", and, "What is it for a given usage of a rule to be right?". In Peircean terms the former question, concerning the irreducibility of general predication (to singular reference), must be answered in phenomenology, while the latter, concerning the difference between true and false predication, is answered in logic. A failure to appreciate this distinction, it is argued, has led philosophers to focus exclusively on Wittgenstein's famous public account of rule-following rightness, thus overlooking a private, phenomenological dimension to Wittgenstein's remarks on following a rule which gives the lie to Kripke's reading of him as a sceptic
|Keywords||Peirce Wittgenstein rule-following thirdness Kripke realism|
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References found in this work BETA
Claudine Engel-Tiercelin (1992). Vagueness and the Unity of C.S. Peirce's Realism. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 28 (1):51 - 82.
Charles Hartshorne (1980). A Revision of Peirce's Categories. The Monist 63 (3):277-289.
Christopher Hookway (1985/1999). Peirce. Routledge.
Frank Jackson (1982). Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Saul A. Kripke (1982). Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Catherine Legg (2008). Making It Explicit and Clear: From "Strong" to "Hyper-" Inferentialism in Brandom and Peirce. Metaphilosophy 39 (1):105–123.
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