David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophia 39 (2):357-367 (2011)
In a recent article, Meghan Griffith (American Philosophical Quarterly 47:43–56, 2010) argues that agent-causal libertarian theories are immune to the problem of luck but that event-causal theories succumb to this problem. In making her case against the event-causal theories, she focuses on Robert Kane’s event-causal theory. I provide a brief account of the central elements of Kane’s theory and I explain Griffith’s critique of it. I argue that Griffith’s criticisms fail. In doing so, I note some important respects in which Kane’s view is unclear and I suggest a plausible way of reading Kane that makes his theory immune to Griffith’s objections.
|Keywords||Free will Responsibility Libertarianism Robert Kane Meghan Griffith|
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References found in this work BETA
Robert H. Kane (1996). The Significance of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Alfred R. Mele (2006). Free Will and Luck. Oxford University Press.
Alfred R. Mele (2007). Free Will and Luck. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):153 – 155.
Robert Kane (1999). Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Determinism. Journal of Philosophy 96 (5):217-40.
Robert H. Kane (ed.) (2002). The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
John Lemos (2015). Self-Forming Acts and the Grounds of Responsibility. Philosophia 43 (1):135-146.
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