Kane's Libertarian Theory and Luck: A Reply to Griffith

Philosophia 39 (2):357-367 (2011)
Abstract
In a recent article, Meghan Griffith (American Philosophical Quarterly 47:43–56, 2010) argues that agent-causal libertarian theories are immune to the problem of luck but that event-causal theories succumb to this problem. In making her case against the event-causal theories, she focuses on Robert Kane’s event-causal theory. I provide a brief account of the central elements of Kane’s theory and I explain Griffith’s critique of it. I argue that Griffith’s criticisms fail. In doing so, I note some important respects in which Kane’s view is unclear and I suggest a plausible way of reading Kane that makes his theory immune to Griffith’s objections
Keywords Free will  Responsibility  Libertarianism  Robert Kane  Meghan Griffith
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    Meghan Griffith (2010). Why Agent-Caused Actions Are Not Lucky. American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (1):43-56.

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