David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Peter A. French & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy. Blackwell Pub. Inc. 128-159 (2007)
There has been a movement recently to bring to bear on the conduct of philosophical thought experiments (henceforth “thought experiments”)1 the empirical techniques of the social sciences, that is, to treat their conduct as in the nature of an anthropological investigation into the application conditions of the concepts of a group of subjects. This is to take a third person, in contrast to the traditional ﬁrst person, approach to conceptual analysis. This has taken the form of conducting surveys about scenarios used in thought experiments.2 It has been called “experimental philosophy” by its practitioners and has been applied across a range of ﬁelds: the philosophy of language, the philosophy of action, the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and ethics.3 The results of these surveys have been used to support conclusions about the application conditions of particular concepts of interest in philosophy. They have also been used to support (and been motivated by) skeptical claims about the traditional approach to conceptual analysis. The..
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Citations of this work BETA
Paul Silva (2015). The Composite Nature of Epistemic Justification. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2).
Jonathan Schaffer & Joshua Knobe (2012). Contrastive Knowledge Surveyed. Noûs 46 (4):675-708.
Jonathan M. Weinberg, Chad Gonnerman, Cameron Buckner & Joshua Alexander (2010). Are Philosophers Expert Intuiters? Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):331-355.
John Bengson (2015). The Intellectual Given. Mind 124 (495):707-760.
Regina A. Rini (2015). How Not to Test for Philosophical Expertise. Synthese 192 (2):431-452.
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John D. Norton (2004). Why Thought Experiments Do Not Transcend Empiricism. In Christopher Hitchcock (ed.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Science. Blackwell 44-66.
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