David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):175-197 (2007)
Although Frege was eager to theoretically eliminate the judging subject from logic and mathematics, his system is permeated with notions that refer to subjective mental processes, such as grasping a thought, assuming, judging, and value. His semantic system depends on such notions, but since Frege in general shuns explaining them, his central conception of judgment and truth remains dark. In this paper it is proposed to fill out the gaps in Frege's explanations with the help of Husserl's phenomenological descriptions, especially those of the sixth Logical Investigation. This leads to a comparison between Frege's notion of judgment and Husserl's "Evidenz", and finally also to a phenomenological classification of Frege's remarks on truth.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Ari Maunu (2002). Frege's Gedanken Are Not Truth Conditions. Facta Philosophica 4 (2):231-238.
Robin Jeshion (2001). Frege's Notions of Self-Evidence. Mind 110 (440):937-976.
M. Textor (2010). Frege on Judging as Acknowledging the Truth. Mind 119 (475):615-655.
Richard Heck & Robert May (forthcoming). Truth in Frege. In M. Glanzberg (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Truth. Oxford University Press
Dirk Greimann (2008). Does Frege Use a Truth-Predicate in His ‘Justification’ of the Laws of Logic? A Comment on Weiner. Mind 117 (466):403-425.
Clinton Tolley (2011). Frege's Elucidatory Holism. Inquiry 54 (3):226-251.
Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock (1986). On Frege's Two Notions of Sense. History and Philosophy of Logic 7 (1):31-41.
Gila Sher & Cory D. Wright (2007). Truth as a Normative Modality of Cognitive Acts. In Geo Siegwart & Dirk Griemann (eds.), Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language. Routledge 280-306.
Erich H. Reck (2007). Frege on Truth, Judgment, and Objectivity. Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):149-173.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads31 ( #135,239 of 1,934,573 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #269,381 of 1,934,573 )
How can I increase my downloads?