Internalist moral cognitivism and listlessness

Ethics 106 (4):727-753 (1996)
This paper criticizes the conjunction of two theses: 1) cognitivism about first-person moral ought-beliefs, the thesis (roughly) that such beliefs are attitudes with truth-valued contents; 2) robust internalism about these beliefs, the thesis that, necessarily, agents' beliefs that they ought, morally, to A constitute motivation to A. It is argued that the conjunction of these two theses places our moral agency at serious risk. The argument, which centrally involves attention to clinical depression, is extended to a less demanding, recent brand of internalist moral cognitivism. Philosophers discussed include Dancy, McDowell, McNaughton, and Nagel
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DOI 10.1086/233670
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Sarah Sawyer (2014). Minds and Morals. Philosophical Issues 24 (1):393-408.

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