Conditionals, probability, and non-triviality

Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (5):455-467 (1995)
We show that the implicational fragment of intuitionism is the weakest logic with a non-trivial probabilistic semantics which satisfies the thesis that the probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabilities. We also show that several logics between intuitionism and classical logic also admit non-trivial probability functions which satisfy that thesis. On the other hand, we also prove that very weak assumptions concerning negation added to the core probability conditions with the restriction that probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabilities are sufficient to trivialize the semantics
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF01052599
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 23,316
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 6 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Peter Milne (2012). Probability as a Measure of Information Added. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 21 (2):163-188.
Richard Bradley (2006). Adams Conditionals and Non-Monotonic Probabilities. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 15 (1-2):65-81.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

48 ( #99,866 of 1,926,176 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

3 ( #271,894 of 1,926,176 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.