The case for intrinsic theory: XII. Inner awareness conceived of as a modal character of conscious experiences
Journal of Mind and Behavior 27 (3-4):183-214 (2006)
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|Keywords||Awareness* Consciousness States* Metacognition* Phenomenology* Theories|
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