Why Believe in Demonstrative Concepts?

Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):636-638 (2011)
Abstract
I examine two arguments for the existence of demonstrative concepts—one due to Chuard (2006) and another due to Brewer (1999). I point out some important difficulties in each. I hope to show that much more work must be done to legitimize positing demonstrative concepts.
Keywords Philosophy of Mind  Perception
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References found in this work BETA
Pete Mandik (2012). Color-Consciousness Conceptualism. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):617-631.
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Philippe Chuard (2007). Indiscriminable Shades and Demonstrative Concepts. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):277 – 306.
J. Levine (2008). Demonstrative Concepts. Croation Journal of Philosophy 8 (24):328-336.
Joseph Levine (2010). Demonstrative Thought. Mind and Language 25 (2):169-195.
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