Why Believe in Demonstrative Concepts?
Consciousness and Cognition (2011)
| Abstract | I examine two arguments for the existence of demonstrative concepts—one due to Chuard (2006) and another due to Brewer (1999). I point out some important difficulties in each. I hope to show that much more work must be done to legitimize positing demonstrative concepts. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Philosophy of Mind Perception | |||||||||
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