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Why Believe in Demonstrative Concepts?
Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):636-638 (2012)
Abstract
I examine two arguments for the existence of demonstrative concepts—one due to Chuard (2006) and another due to Brewer (1999). I point out some important difficulties in each. I hope to show that much more work must be done to legitimize positing demonstrative concepts.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Mental Colors, Conceptual Overlap, and Discriminating Knowledge of Particulars.Pete Mandik - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):641-643.
References found in this work
Demonstrative concepts without reidentification.Philippe Chuard - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (2):153-201.
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