Integrating experimental-phenomenological methods and neuroscience to study neural mechanisms of pain and consciousness
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):593-608 (2002)
Understanding the nature of pain at least partly depends on recognizing its inherent first person epistemology and on using a first person experiential and third person experimental approach to study it. This approach may help to understand some of the neural mechanisms of pain and consciousness by integrating experiential–phenomenological methods with those of neuroscience. Examples that approximate this strategy include studies of second pain summation and its relationship to neural activities and brain imaging-psychophysical studies wherein sensory and affective qualities of pain are correlated with cerebral cortical activity. The experiential paradigm of Price and Barrell offers the possibility of improved designs and methods for investigating neural mechanisms underlying pain and consciousness
|Keywords||*Consciousness States *Epistemology *Pain *Pain Perception *Psychophysiology Neurophysiology Neuropsychology Pain Measurement|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
James E. Barrell & James J. Barrell (1975). A Self-Directed Approach for a Science of Human Experience. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 6 (1):63-73.
Fred Dretske (1999). The Mind's Awareness of Itself. Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):103-24.
Donald D. Price, Joseph Riley & James J. Barrell (2001). Are Lived Choices Based on Emotional Processes? Cognition and Emotion 15 (3):365-379.
Michael Tye (1995). A Representational Theory of Pains and Their Phenomenal Character. Philosophical Perspectives 9:223-39.
Citations of this work BETA
C. Petitmengin, V. NaVarro & M. Levanquyen (2007). Anticipating Seizure: Pre-Reflective Experience at the Center of Neuro-Phenomenology. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):746-764.
Similar books and articles
Kevin Reuter (2011). Distinguishing the Appearance From the Reality of Pain. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (9-10):94-109.
Rohini Terry, Eric E. Brodie & Catherine A. Niven (2007). Exploring the Phenomenology of Memory for Pain: Is Previously Experienced Acute Pain Consciously Remembered or Simply Known? Journal of Pain 8 (6):467-475.
Tim Crane (2003). The Intentional Structure of Consciousness. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. 33-56.
C. Richard Chapman (2004). Pain Perception, Affective Mechanisms, and Conscious Experience. In Thomas Hadjistavropoulos & Kenneth D. Craig (eds.), Pain: Psychological Perspectives. 59-85.
Terry Dartnall (2001). The Pain Problem. Philosophical Psychology 14 (1):95-102.
C. R. Chapman & Yutaka Nakamura (1999). A Passion of the Soul: An Introduction to Pain for Consciousness Researchers. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (4):391-422.
Mélanie Boly, Marie-Elisabeth Faymonville, Brent A. Vogt, Pierre Maquet & Steven Laureys (2007). Hypnotic Regulation of Consciousness and the Pain Neuromatrix. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press. 15-27.
Yutaka Nakamura & R. Chapman (2002). Measuring Pain: An Introspective Look at Introspection. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):582-592.
Yutaka Nakamura & C. Chapman (2002). Constructing Pain: How Pain Hurts. In Kunio Yasue, Marj Jibu & Tarcisio Della Senta (eds.), No Matter, Never Mind. John Benjamins.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads16 ( #113,362 of 1,413,138 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #51,373 of 1,413,138 )
How can I increase my downloads?