Integrating experimental-phenomenological methods and neuroscience to study neural mechanisms of pain and consciousness

Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):593-608 (2002)
Understanding the nature of pain at least partly depends on recognizing its inherent first person epistemology and on using a first person experiential and third person experimental approach to study it. This approach may help to understand some of the neural mechanisms of pain and consciousness by integrating experiential–phenomenological methods with those of neuroscience. Examples that approximate this strategy include studies of second pain summation and its relationship to neural activities and brain imaging-psychophysical studies wherein sensory and affective qualities of pain are correlated with cerebral cortical activity. The experiential paradigm of Price and Barrell offers the possibility of improved designs and methods for investigating neural mechanisms underlying pain and consciousness
Keywords *Consciousness States  *Epistemology  *Pain  *Pain Perception  *Psychophysiology  Neurophysiology  Neuropsychology  Pain Measurement
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DOI 10.1016/S1053-8100(02)00018-1
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Fred Dretske (1999). The Mind's Awareness of Itself. Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):103-24.

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