David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (2):287-298 (2000)
This paper disputes the widely held view that one cannot establish the reliability of a belief-forming process with the use of belief's that are obtained by that very process since such self-dependent justification is circular. Harold Brown () argued in this journal that some cases of self-dependent justification are legitimate despite their circularity. I argue instead that under appropriate construal many cases of self-dependent justification are not truly circular but are instances of ordinary Bayesian confirmation, and hence they can raise the probability of the hypothesis as legitimately as any such confirmation does. I shall argue in particular that despite its dependence on perception we can use naturalized epistemology to confirm the reliability of a perceptual process without circularity.
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Citations of this work BETA
Helen de Cruz, Maarten Boudry, Johan de Smedt & Stefaan Blancke (2011). Evolutionary Approaches to Epistemic Justification. Dialectica 65 (4):517-535.
Ulrike Hahn & Mike Oaksford (2006). A Bayesian Approach to Informal Argument Fallacies. Synthese 152 (2):207 - 236.
Tomoji Shogenji (2006). A Defense of Reductionism About Testimonial Justification of Beliefs. Noûs 40 (2):331–346.
Ulrike Hahn & Mike Oaksford (2006). A Bayesian Approach to Informal Argument Fallacies. Synthese 152 (2):207-236.
Frederick F. Schmitt (2004). What is Wrong with Epistemic Circularity? Philosophical Issues 14 (1):379–402.
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