Intensional aspects of semantical self-reference

In Robert L. Martin (ed.), Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox. Oxford University Press. pp. 119--31 (1984)
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Brian Skyrms
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Citations of this work

Conditionals in Theories of Truth.Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):27-63.
Assertion, denial, and the liar paradox.Terence Parsons - 1984 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (2):137 - 152.
Self-reference in arithmetic I.Volker Halbach & Albert Visser - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (4):671-691.
Paradox, truth and logic part I: Paradox and truth.Peter W. Woodruff - 1984 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (2):213 - 232.
A consistent way with paradox.Laurence Goldstein - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (3):377 - 389.

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