Discoverers' induction

Philosophy of Science 64 (4):580-604 (1997)
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Abstract

In this paper I demonstrate that, contrary to the standard interpretations, William Whewell's view of scientific method is neither that of the hypothetico-deductivist nor that of the retroductivist. Rather, he offers a unique inductive methodology, which he calls "discoverers' induction." After explicating this methodology, I show that Kepler's discovery of his first law of planetary motion conforms to it, as Whewell claims it does. In explaining Whewell's famous phrase about "happy guesses" in science, I suggest that Whewell intended a distinction between "inductions," which can be empirically verified, and "mere hypotheses"--or guesses--which cannot. Finally, I argue that Whewell's discoverers' induction is a view worthy of our attention today, because it avoids a number of problems faced by prominent alternative methodologies

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Author's Profile

Laura J. Snyder
Johns Hopkins University (PhD)

Citations of this work

Truth-Seeking by Abduction.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 2018 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer.
Defending abduction.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (3):451.

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References found in this work

Philosophy of Natural Science.Carl G. Hempel - 1967 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 18 (1):70-72.
The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Founded upon their History.William Whewell - 2016 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 47 (1):205-225.
Novum Organon Renovatum.William Whewell - 2018 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 55 (2):186-211.
Beyond divorce: Current status of the discovery debate.Thomas Nickles - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (2):177-206.

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