David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Oxford University Press (1992)
Sorensen presents a general theory of thought experiments: what they are, how they work, what are their virtues and vices. On Sorensen's view, philosophy differs from science in degree, but not in kind. For this reason, he claims, it is possible to understand philosophical thought experiments by concentrating on their resemblance to scientific relatives. Lessons learned about scientific experimentation carry over to thought experiment, and vice versa. Sorensen also assesses the hazards and pseudo-hazards of thought experiments. Although he grants that there are interesting ways in which the method leads us astray, he attacks most scepticism about thought experiments as arbitrary. They should be used, he says, as they generally are used--as part of a diversified portfolio of techniques. All of these devices are individually susceptible to abuse, fallacy, and error. Collectively, however, they provide a network of cross-checks that make for impressive reliability.
|Keywords||Thought experiments Philosophy and science|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$24.95 used (51% off) $29.93 new (41% off) $38.62 direct from Amazon (23% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||B105.T54.S67 1992|
|ISBN(s)||019512913X 0585160740 9780195129137|
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Joseph Shieber (2010). On the Nature of Thought Experiments and a Core Motivation of Experimental Philosophy. Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):547-564.
Adrian Walsh (2011). A Moderate Defence of the Use of Thought Experiments in Applied Ethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (4):467-481.
Shaun Nichols (2008). Imagination and theI. Mind and Language 23 (5):518-535.
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