David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press (2013)
A popular account of epistemic justification holds that justification, in essence, aims at truth. An influential objection against this account points out that it is committed to holding that only true beliefs could be justified, which most epistemologists regard as sufficient reason to reject the account. In this paper I defend the view that epistemic justification aims at truth, not by denying that it is committed to epistemic justification being factive, but by showing that, when we focus on the relevant sense of ‘justification’, it isn’t in fact possible for a belief to be at once justified and false. To this end, I consider and reject three popular intuitions speaking in favor of the possibility of justified false beliefs, and show that a factive account of epistemic justification is less detrimental to our normal belief forming practices than often supposed.
|Keywords||Epistemic justification Truth Belief|
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References found in this work BETA
Martin Smith (2010). What Else Justification Could Be. Noûs 44 (1):10 - 31.
Citations of this work BETA
Clayton Littlejohn (2015). Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle About Rationality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):n/a-n/a.
Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (forthcoming). If You Justifiably Believe That You Ought to Φ, You Ought to Φ. Philosophical Studies:1-23.
Hamid Vahid (2016). The Aim of Justification and Epistemic Difference-Making Principles. Acta Analytica 31 (1):11-29.
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