At least since the Neoplatonic commentators, Aristotle’s thesis that place is immobile has been considered a serious problem for his theory of place and locomotion. This diagnosis, however, is essentially based on a single passage (212a14–21)—the famous passage on the boat moving in a river—which interpreters find both central and obscure or imprecise, and which has so far resisted a literal reading. I tackle this issue by considering texts hitherto neglected by scholars and propose a new and charitable interpretation, showing (...) the consistency of Aristotle’s thesis of the immobility of place with his general theory of change, as well as a fresh reading of ll. 212a14–21 that stays close to the text. Further, I argue that there are good reasons to believe that the interpretation I put forward is the most ancient one. (shrink)

The paper provides an interpretation of Aristotle’s view on scientific inquiry as problem solving. It tackles passages where Aristotle emphasises the role that the problem-solving activity has in science, and where he describes the history of humans’ problem-solving activity and the historical development of natural science as a problem-solving activity. Further, the paper examines Aristotle’s practice of raising, assessing and solving problems as well as the heuristic procedures he employs to move from ignorance to scientific knowledge. Finally, it raises a (...) question about Aristotle’s view on the epistemic status of scientific definitions: does Aristotle conceive of the definitions, which are the results of scientific inquiries, as truths or rather as plausible hypotheses that may or may not be true? (shrink)

This book provides a comprehensive and in-depth study of Physics I, the first book of Aristotle's foundational treatise on natural philosophy. While the text has inspired a rich scholarly literature, this is the first volume devoted solely to it to have been published for many years, and it includes a new translation of the Greek text. Book I introduces Aristotle's approach to topics such as matter and form, and discusses the fundamental problems of the study of natural science, examining the (...) theories of previous thinkers including Parmenides. Leading experts provide fresh interpretations of key passages and raise new problems. The volume will appeal to scholars and students of ancient philosophy as well as to specialists working in the fields of philosophy and the history of science. (shrink)

In Physics Α, Aristotle introduces his science of nature and devotes a substantial part of the investigation to refuting the Eleatics’ theses, and to resolving their arguments, against plurality and change. In so doing, Aristotle also dusts off Parmenides’ metaphor of the routes of inquiry and uses it as one of the main schemes of his book. Aristotle’s goal, I argue, is to present his own physical investigation as the only correct route, and to show that Parmenides’ “way of truth” (...) is instead both wrong and a sidetrack. By revisiting Parmenides’ metaphor of the route, Aristotle twists it against him, distorts it and uses this distortion as a source of fun and of some mockery of Parmenides himself. Thereby, Physics Α gives us a taste of Aristotle’s biting humour and of his practice of the “virtue” of wit (eutrapelia). (shrink)

In this paper I aim at showing that, in Aristotle’s view, spoken and written language differ in their material organisation, in particular in their respective part-whole relations. I argue that, according to Aristotle, written language is an additive system (i.e. a system whose parts exist and are produced prior to what they are parts of), whereas spoken language is a non-additive system (i.e. a system whose parts cannot exist and be produced prior to what they are parts of), and that, (...) in his view, spoken language, qua non-additive system, is analogous to organisms. Further, I outline two possible implications of this hypothesis. The first concerns the relevance of Aristotle’s conception of spoken language as a non-additive system to his account of human language’s power to signify. I set out some reasons for thinking that Aristotle endorses the view that the form of human language (i.e. its power to signify) is matter-involving. The second implication concerns the syllable analogy that Aristotle employs in Metaphysics Ζ 17. I argue that the syllable Aristotle refers to is a spoken one, and I develop some consequences of this hypothesis for the meaning of the analogy and, more generally, of the chapter. (shrink)

According to the standard view, the function of the unlimited dunamis argument (Physics VIII.10, Metaphysics Λ.7 1073a5–11) is to introduce a new property of the first immovable mover, namely its lack of magnitude. The paper challenges this view and argues that the argument at issue serves to prove that the eternal motion of the first heavenly sphere is caused by an immovable mover rather than by a moved mover. Further, the paper shows that, at least in Phys. VIII, the unlimited (...) dunamis argument is the main argument for the immobility of the Prime Mover. (shrink)

This book provides a comprehensive and in-depth study of Physics I, the first book of Aristotle's foundational treatise on natural philosophy. While the text has inspired a rich scholarly literature, this is the first volume devoted solely to it to have been published for many years, and it includes a new translation of the Greek text. Book I introduces Aristotle's approach to topics such as matter and form, and discusses the fundamental problems of the study of natural science, examining the (...) theories of previous thinkers including Parmenides. Leading experts provide fresh interpretations of key passages and raise new problems. The volume will appeal to scholars and students of ancient philosophy as well as to specialists working in the fields of philosophy and the history of science. (shrink)