This chapter outlines how biotechnology can be seen as a challenge to our notion of nature, and how the complexity of the concept of nature in itself is a challenge in the debate on enhancement of capacities in humans, animals and plants by means of biotechnology. It then explores how the same concept contributes to the ethical arguments both for and against enhancement of human capacities, focusing on two central aspects of the enhancement debate namely: (i) the debate that focuses (...) on enhancement as an overreaching form of therapy; and (ii) the debate that focus on enhancement as the goal in itself. Finally, the chapter summarizes the contribution of the concept of nature in terms of the challenges that its inherent complexity poses to the ethical and philosophical debate on enhancement technologies, also briefly discussing how “nature” and “naturalness” can be said to have moral relevance in the enhancement debate. (shrink)

The complex health and social circumstances of living-at-risk, frequent users of emergency departments (aREDFUs) in the health jurisdictions of high-income countries, and the related, significant challenges posed for emergency departments and the health care providers working within them, are identified and explored in the paper. Ethical analyses of a set of relevant domains are performed, i.e., individual and relational autonomy considerations, relevant social construction and personal responsibility conceptions, patient welfare principles (beneficence, nonmaleficence, continuity of care), harm reduction methodologies and their (...) applications, health equity, and justice considerations of the distributive, formal and social types. The outcomes of these analyses demonstrate that there are ethically compelling reasons for emergency departments to adopt an ethics-informed, policy-based approach to the longitudinal care and management of living-at-risk, frequent users of emergency departments. From a formal justice perspective, the development and uses of such an approach are justified by a demonstrable relevant difference between living-at-risk, frequent users of emergency departments and other persons and groups of patients who visit emergency departments. We propose an example of such a policy-based approach. Examples of possible, pragmatic applications of this approach, which help ensure that aREDFUs who present to the ED are managed in a fair and optimally consistent manner, are provided for the consideration of an urban emergency department’s policymaking working group. (shrink)

Nowadays, special attention is given to the hazards associated with genetic engineering and new inventions in biotechnology, and in fear of severe consequences, researchers, institutions and governments are required to act responsibly. The term “responsibility” may be defined in numerous ways. The definition considered in this paper, is one we believe is in common use: “Generally speaking, a person has a special responsibility for a particular outcome if they knowingly brought it about and it would not exist if not for (...) what they did”. This concept of moral responsibility rests on what we term the three ‘I's’: individual, intentional and informed. Responsibility is individual in the sense that it must be directed towards someone. A second requirement of moral responsibility presupposes the ability to do otherwise, i.e. it presupposes each human being as an intentional actor, capable of acting according to his/her own free will. In order for someone to be responsible for their actions, the choice between alternatives must be informed. The article focus' on these three aspects of responsibility in order to reveal how difficult it is to apply and make sense of this definition with regard to new inventions in science. (shrink)

In the present Western cultural and political context, the concept of nature plays a central role in the debate about new technologies. However, the concept of nature is complex and reflects more than one frame of reference stemming from a long historical tradition. ‘Nature’ is referred to: a) as the object (phenomenon) toward which the debate is directed, and b) as the normative frame of reference that either justifies or rejects the technological method in specific situations. This paper argues, that (...) this double character of ‘nature’ is not particular for the debate on ethical concern for the non-human nature, rather it constitutes the complexity of the concept itself. This, in turn, leads to a more fundamental question, namely: What is ‘nature’?—Or rather: Is ‘nature’ to be defined? (shrink)

An argument is developed that supports a simulationist account about the foundations of infants' and young children's understanding that other people have mental states. This argument relies on evidence that infants come to the world with capacities to send and receive affective cues and to appreciate the emotional states of others – capacities well suited to a social environment initially made up of frequent and extended emotional interactions with their caregivers. The central premise of the argument is that the foundation (...) of infants' understanding of other minds is built upon an early-developing capacity to share others' emotion experiences. The emotion experiences elicited in interactions between caregivers and infants enable the elaboration of this primitive understanding into a more fully developed understanding of psychological subjects. The evidence presented in support of these claims derives from a wide range of studies of the phenomena of emotional contagion, affective communication, and emotion regulation involving infants, young children, and adults. (shrink)