This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
57 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 57
  1. Peter Ayton, Alice Pott & Najat Elwakili (2007). Affective Forecasting: Why Can't People Predict Their Emotions? Thinking and Reasoning 13 (1):62 – 80.
    Two studies explore the frequently reported finding that affective forecasts are too extreme. In the first study, driving test candidates forecast the emotional consequences of failing. Test failers overestimated the duration of their disappointment. Greater previous experience of this emotional event did not lead to any greater accuracy of the forecasts, suggesting that learning about one's own emotions is difficult. Failers' self-assessed chances of passing were lower a week after the test than immediately prior to the test; this difference correlated (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Annette C. Baier (1987). Getting in Touch with Our Own Feelings. Topoi 6 (September):89-97.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Luca Barlassina (2013). Simulation is Not Enough: A Hybrid Model of Disgust Attribution on the Basis of Visual Stimuli. Philosophical Psychology 26 (3):401-419.
    Mindreading is the ability to attribute mental states to other individuals. According to the Theory-Theory (TT), mindreading is based on one's possession of a Theory of Mind. On the other hand, the Simulation Theory (ST) maintains that one arrives at the attribution of a mental state by simulating it in one's own mind. In this paper, I propose a ST-TT hybrid model of the ability to attribute disgust on the basis of visual stimuli such as facial expressions, body postures, etc. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Lisa Bortolotti (ed.) (2008). The Philosophy of Happiness. Palgrave.
    Philosophy and Happiness addresses the need to situate any meaningful discourse about happiness in a wider context of human interests, capacities and circumstances. How is happiness manifested and expressed? Can there be any happiness if no worthy life projects are pursued? How is happiness affected by relationships, illness, or cultural variants? Can it be reduced to preference satisfaction? Is it a temporary feeling or a persistent way of being? Is reflection conducive to happiness? Is mortality necessary for it? These are (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. A. Charuvastra & S. R. Marder (2008). Unconscious Emotional Reasoning and the Therapeutic Misconception. Journal of Medical Ethics 34 (3):193-197.
  6. Simon Clarke (2003). Psychoanalytic Sociology and the Interpretation of Emotion. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 33 (2):145–163.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Remy Debes (2010). Which Empathy? Limitations in the Mirrored “Understanding” of Emotion. Synthese 175 (2):219-239.
    The recent discovery of so-called “mirror-neurons” in monkeys and a corresponding mirroring “system” in humans has provoked wide endorsement of the claim that humans understand a variety of observed actions, somatic sensations, and emotions via a kind of direct representation of those actions, sensations, and emotions. Philosophical efforts to assess the import of such “mirrored understanding” have typically focused on how that understanding might be brought to bear on theories of mindreading (how we represent other creatures as having mental states), (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. C. Z. Elgin (2008). Emotion and Understanding. In G. Brun, U. Dogluoglu & D. Kuenzle (eds.), Epistemology and Emotions.
  9. R. Ellis (2008). In What Sense is “Rationality” a Criterion for Emotional Self-Awareness?☆. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):972-973.
  10. Ralph D. Ellis (1999). Why Isn't Consciousness Empirically Observable? Emotion, Self-Organization, and Nonreductive Physicalism. Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (4):391-402.
  11. Eva-Maria Engelen (2012). Meaning and Emotion. In Paul A. Wilson (ed.), Dynamicity in Emotion Concepts. Peter Lang.
    Two aspects about meaning and emotion are discussed in this paper. The first, which is the main focus of this paper, addresses the semantic shaping of emotions (semanticization). It will be shown how language acquisition leads to the semantic shaping of emotions. For this purpose I will first introduce the theory of language acquisition that has been developed mainly by Michael Tomasello and also by Donald Davidson. Then I will take basic emotions into account in order to show that language (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Eva-Maria Engelen, Hans J. Markowitsch, Christian Scheve, Birgitt Roettger-Roessler, Achim Stephan, Manfred Holodynski & Marie Vandekerckhove (2009). Emotions as Bio-Cultural Processes: Discipinary Debates and an Interdisciplinary Outlook. In Birgitt Röttger-Rössler & Hans Markowitsch (eds.), Emotions as Bio-cultural Processes.
    The article develops a theoretical framework that is capable of integrating the biological foundations of emotions with their cultural and semantic formation.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Michael Fox (1973). On Unconscious Emotions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 34 (December):151-170.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Peter Goldie (1999). How We Think of Others' Emotions. Mind and Language 14 (4):394-423.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Mitchell Green (2010). Perceiving Emotions. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):45-61.
    I argue that it is possible literally to perceive the emotions of others. This account depends upon the possibility of perceiving a whole by perceiving one or more of its parts, and upon the view that emotions are complexes. After developing this account, I expound and reply to Rowland Stout's challenge to it. Stout is nevertheless sympathetic with the perceivability-of-emotions view. I thus scrutinize Stout's suggestion for a better defence of that view than I have provided, and offer a refinement (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Mitchell S. Green (2010). Replies to Eriksson, Martin and Moore. Acta Analytica 25 (1):105-117.
    I reply to the main criticisms and suggestions for further clarification made by the contributors to this symposium on my book, Self-Expression . These replies are organized into the following sections: (1) What's in the name?, (2) Showing, expressing and indicating, (3) Expressing and signaling, (4) Perceiving emotions, (5) Voluntary/involuntary, (6) Expression and handicaps, (7) Expression and aesthetics, and (8) Looking ahead.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Mitchell S. Green (2007). Self-Expression. Oxford University Press.
    Mitchell S. Green presents a systematic philosophical study of self-expression - a pervasive phenomenon of the everyday life of humans and other species, which has received scant attention in its own right. He explores the ways in which self-expression reveals our states of thought, feeling, and experience, and he defends striking new theses concerning a wide range of fascinating topics: our ability to perceive emotion in others, artistic expression, empathy, expressive language, meaning, facial expression, and speech acts. He draws on (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (2003). Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press.
  19. Larry A. Herzberg (2008). Constitutivism, Belief, and Emotion. Dialectica 62 (4):455-482.
    Constitutivists about one's cognitive access to one's mental states often hold that for any rational subject S and mental state M falling into some specified range of types, necessarily, if S believes that she has M , then S has M . Some argue that such a principle applies to beliefs about all types of mental state. Others are more cautious, but offer no criterion by which the principle's range could be determined. In this paper I begin to develop such (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Daniel D. Hutto (2002). Understanding Emotions: Mind and Morals. Brookfield: Ashgate.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Christoph Jäger (2009). Affective Ignorance. Erkenntnis 71 (1):123 - 139.
    According to one of the most influential views in the philosophy of self-knowledge each person enjoys some special cognitive access to his or her own current mental states and episodes. This view faces two fundamental tasks. First, it must elucidate the general conceptual structure of apparent asymmetries between beliefs about one’s own mind and beliefs about other minds. Second, it must demarcate the mental territory for which first-person-special-access claims can plausibly be maintained. Traditional candidates include sensations, experiences (of various kinds), (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Robert S. Kruger (2009). The Assessment of Emotional Awareness : Can Technology Make a Contribution? In James Phillips (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives on Technology and Psychiatry. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Joel J. Kupperman (1997). Felt and Unfelt Emotions: A Rejoinder to Dalgleish. Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):91.
  24. Michael Lacewing (2007). Do Unconscious Emotions Involve Unconscious Feelings? Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):81-104.
    The very idea of unconscious emotion has been thought puzzling. But in recent debate about emotions, comparatively little attention has been given explicitly to the question. I survey a number of recent attempts by philosophers to resolve the puzzle and provide some preliminary remarks about their viability. I identify and discuss three families of responses: unconscious emotions involve conscious feelings, unconscious emotions involve no feelings at all, and unconscious emotions involve unconscious feelings. The discussion is exploratory rather than decisive for (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Michael Lacewing (2005). Emotional Self-Awareness and Ethical Deliberation. Ratio 18 (1):65-81.
    How are we to distinguish between appropriate emotional responses that reveal morally salient reasons and inappropriate emotional responses that reflect our prejudices? It is often assumed that reason – considered as distinct from emotion – will make the distinction. I argue that this view is false, and that the process by which emotional responses are vetted involves ‘emotional self-awareness’. By this, I mean feeling an emotion, being aware of so doing, and feeling some usually subtle emotional response, often of calm (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (15 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. J. Lambie (2008). What is Awareness of Emotion and How Does It Aid Rational Decision Making?: Reply to Ellis☆. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):974-980.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Stephen R. Leighton (1986). Unfelt Feelings in Pain and Emotion. Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):69-79.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Michael W. Martin (1979). Self-Deception, Self-Pretence, and Emotional Detachment. Mind 88 (July):441-446.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Alfred R. Mele (2003). Emotion and Desire in Self-Deception. In Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press. 163-179.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Alfred R. Mele (2000). Self-Deception and Emotion. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (1):115-137.
    Drawing on recent empirical work, this philosophical paper explores some possible contributions of emotion to self-deception. Three hypotheses are considered: (1) the anxiety reduction hypothesis: the function of self-deception is to reduce present anxiety; (2) the solo emotion hypothesis: emotions sometimes contribute to instances of self-deception that have no desires among their significant causes; (3) the direct emotion hypothesis: emotions sometimes contribute directly to self-deception, in the sense that they make contributions that, at the time, are neither made by desires (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Harvey Mullane (1976). Unconscious and Disguised Emotions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36 (March):403-411.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Harvey Mullane (1965). Unconscious Emotion. Theoria 31 (3):181-190.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Gerald E. Myers (1963). Feelings Into Words. Journal of Philosophy 60 (December):801-810.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Joe Neisser (2006). Making the Case for Unconscious Feeling. Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (1):129-138.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. A. Newen, K. Vogeley & A. Zinck (2008). Social Cognition, Emotion and Self-Consciousness: A Preface. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):409-410.
  36. Lisbeth Nielsen (2002). The Simulation of Emotion Experience: On the Emotional Foundations of Theory of Mind. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (3):255-286.
    An argument is developed that supports a simulationist account about the foundations of infants' and young children's understanding that other people have mental states. This argument relies on evidence that infants come to the world with capacities to send and receive affective cues and to appreciate the emotional states of others – capacities well suited to a social environment initially made up of frequent and extended emotional interactions with their caregivers. The central premise of the argument is that the foundation (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Lisa A. Parr (2001). Understanding Other's Emotions: From Affective Resonance to Empathic Action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):44-45.
    Empathy is a developmental process whereby individuals come to understand the emotional states of others. While the exact nature of this process remains unknown, PAM's utility is that it establishes empathy along a continuum of behavior ranging from emotional contagion to cognitive forms, a very useful distinction for understanding the phylogeny and ontogeny of this important process. The model will undoubtedly fuel future research, especially from comparative domains where data are most problematic.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Moreland Perkins (1966). Seeing and Hearing Emotions. Analysis 26 (June):193-197.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Luiz Pessoa, Shruti Japee & Leslie G. Ungerleider (2005). Visual Awareness and the Detection of Fearful Faces. Emotion 5 (2):243-247.
  40. Hanna Pickard (2003). Emotions and the Problem of Other Minds. In A. Hatimoysis (ed.), Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press. 87-103.
    The problem of other minds is a collection of problems centering upon the extent to which our belief in other minds or other's minds can be justified. Swedish psychologist, Gunnar Borg has developed a principle called "the range principle" which helps fill out our "knowledge" of other minds. Borg developed this principle partly in response to the skeptical challenge of Harvard psychophysicist S S Stevens. Stevens claimed that the intersubjective comparison of experience was scientifically impossible. Borg postulates that the range (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Hanna Pickard (2003). Emotions and the Problem of Other Minds. In A. Hatimoysis (ed.), Philosophy and the Emotions. 87-103.
    Can consideration of the emotions help to solve the problem of other minds? Intuitively, it should. We often think of emotions as public: as observable in the body, face, and voice of others. Perhaps you can simply see another's disgust or anger, say, in her demeanour and expression; or hear the sadness clearly in his voice. Publicity of..
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Robert C. Roberts (1995). Feeling One's Emotions and Knowing Oneself. Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):319-38.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Baljinder Sahdra & Paul R. Thagard (2003). Self-Deception and Emotional Coherence. Minds and Machines 13 (2):213-231.
    This paper proposes that self-deception results from the emotional coherence of beliefs with subjective goals. We apply the HOTCO computational model of emotional coherence to simulate a rich case of self-deception from Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter.We argue that this model is more psychologically realistic than other available accounts of self-deception, and discuss related issues such as wishful thinking, intention, and the division of the self.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Mikko Salmela (2005). What is Emotional Authenticity? Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 35 (3):209–230.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. William E. Seager (2002). Emotional Introspection. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):666-687.
  46. Hilary Kathleen Sloan (2011). Joy. Journal of Value Inquiry 45 (4):419-431.
    Joy is often mentioned in discussion of theories of hedonism, happiness, desire, or religion, but is rarely considered in itself. Consequently, much about the nature of joy remains unclear. Is it, for example, a distinctive state? A feeling? An emotion? Why is it experienced? Does it have a functional role? Through discussion of joy's nature, role, and importance, it will be demonstrated that joy can indeed be defined: as an intense, positively-valenced emotion, whose inherent connection to the desire for self-preservation (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Stephen D. Smith & M. Barbara Bulman-Fleming (2004). A Hemispheric Asymmetry for the Unconscious Perception of Emotion. Brain and Cognition 55 (3):452-457.
  48. Andrew Sneddon (2008). Two Views of Emotional Perception. In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press.
    One stream in contemporary philosophical and psychological study of the emotions argues that they are perceptual capacities. The present project is to compare and contrast two possible models of emotional perception. The central difference between these models is the notion of modularity, and the corresponding overall view of the nature of the mind, that they use. One model uses classic, Fodorian modules, which S.L. Hurley characterizes as “vertical”. The other model uses “horizontal” modules. I suggest some empirical tests that might (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Marco Solinas (2012). Review of Elena Pulcini, Invidia. La passione triste. [REVIEW] Iride (65):200-201.
  50. Marco Solinas (2009). Sulle tracce della malinconia. Un approccio filosofico-sociale. Costruzioni Psicoanalitiche (17):83-102.
    The essay aims to analyse the gradual historical process of the partial overlap, replacement and expansion of the theoretical paradigm of depression with respect to that of melancholy. The first part is devoted to analysing some of the central features of the multivalent thematizations of melancholy drawn up during modernity, also with relation to the spirit of capitalism (in its Weberian acceptation). This is followed by an overview of the birth of the modern category of depression, and the process that (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 57