The aim of this paper is to argue in favor of the view that some counterpossibles are false. This is done indirectly by showing that accepting the opposite view, i.e., one that ascribes truth to each and every counterpossible, results in the claim that every necessarily false theory has exactly the same consequences. Accordingly, it is shown that taking every counterpossible to be true not only undermines the value of debates over various alternative theories and their consequences, but also puts (...) into question the very possibility of such debates. In order to explicate this thesis, the close bond between counterpossibles and the so-called story prefix is explored. A number of possible responses to this criticism are also presented, and it is argued that none of them address the main problem. (shrink)

Nina Emery and Christopher Hill proposed a pragmatic approach toward the debate about counterpossibles—i.e., counterfactuals with impossible antecedents. The core of this approach is to move the burden of the problem from the notion of truth value into the notion of assertion. This is meant to explain our pre-theoretical intuitions about counterpossibles while claiming that each and every counterpossible is vacuously true. The aim of this paper is to indicate a problematic aspect of this view.

The subject of this article is the Principle of Characterization—the most controversial principle of Alexius Meinong’s Theory of Objects. The aim of this text is twofold. First of all, to show that Bertrand Russell’s well-known objection to the Principle of Characterization can be reformulated against contemporary unrestricted interpretations of it. Second, to propose an alternative formulation of this principle. This refers to the methodology of metaphysics and is based on the distinction between pre-theoretical and theoretical languages. The proposed formulation fits (...) well with every type of contemporary interpretation of the Theory of Objects and helps to overcome Russell’s criticism. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show why the theories of impossible worlds do not fully solve the problem of counterpossibles, but merely shift it. Moreover, by making a distinction between two types of languages, we will show that some expectations about proper theory of counterfactuals might be too great.

The subject of this article is the Principle of Characterization—the most controversial principle of Alexius Meinong’s Theory of Objects. The aim of this text is twofold. First of all, to show that Bertrand Russell’s well-known objection to the Principle of Characterization can be reformulated against contemporary unrestricted interpretations of it. Second, to propose an alternative formulation of this principle. This refers to the methodology of metaphysics and is based on the distinction between pre-theoretical and theoretical languages. The proposed formulation fits (...) well with every type of contemporary interpretation of the Theory of Objects and helps to overcome Russell’s criticism. (shrink)

The distinction between quantitative and qualitative parsimony is supposed to allow David Lewis to dismiss one of the charges against his modal realism: that is, the charge of bloated ontology. The aim of this paper is to undermine Lewis's response to this objection. In order to do this, a distinction between multipliable and nonmultipliable objects is introduced. Based on this it is argued that the acceptance of Lewis's response requires one to believe in modal realism in the first place—that is, (...) one has to believe in the view that the existence of nonactual spatiotemporal worlds does not affect the quality of the ontological commitment. Although the paper focuses on the problem of the metaphysics of possible worlds, this should be regarded merely as a case study. Accordingly, the results of this analysis should find applications in other metaphysical debates as well. (shrink)

The subject of my article is the principle of characterization – the most controversial principle of Meinong’s Theory of Objects. The aim of this text is twofold. First of all, I would like to show that Russell’s well-known objection to Meinong’s Theory of Objects can be reformulated against a new modal interpretation of Meinongianism that is presented mostly by Graham Priest. Secondly, I would like to propose a strategy which gives uncontroversial restriction to the principle of characterization and which allows (...) to avoid Russell’s argument. The strategy is based on the distinction between object- and metalanguage, and it applies to modal Meinongianism as well as to other so-called Meinongian theories. (shrink)

To solve the problem of counterpossibles, many philosophers have been arguing that one needs to invoke impossible worlds. This extension of the ontology of modality should save the analysis of counterfactuals from being insensitive to the problem of counterpossibles. Since theories of impossible worlds are extensions of original accounts of modalities, it is worth stressing that proper analyses of counterpossibles should not weaken the latter.In this paper I argue that these theories of impossible wolrds, which are based on D. Lewis' (...) modal realism - Extended Modal Realism and Hybrid Modal Realism - might be consider as either an unattractive for modal realists or insufficient for analyzing counterpossibles. (shrink)

"The main aim of the paper is to compare two types of abstractionistic accounts of fictional objects, and to analyze their consequences for interpretation of existential quantification. According to a proponent of general abstractionistic theory, fictional objects have abstract nature in a way similar to contracts, marriages, and the likes. This view is an alternative to strongly realistic accounts of fictional objects, defended by Terence Parsons or David Lewis. Within abstractionistic theories, as in all philosophical areas, one can find divergences (...) of opinions. The main differences between two of them – Peter van Inwagen's and Edward Zalta's – are connected with the interpretation of existential quantification. According to van Inwagen, “being” is the same as “existence” and its sense is captured by the existential quantifier. Edward Zalta's theory is much closer to the Meinongian Theory of Objects. He argues for the need of distinguishing between “being” and “existence” and for invoking nonexistent objects. Because of that he suggests an alternative interpretation of quantification. Admittedly, there is one abstractionistic source for both theories, but their ontological consequences are different - van Inwagen is a staunch opponent of nonexistent objects, and Zalta describes his own theory as "Meinongian".". (shrink)

The subject of this paper is the notion of similarity between the actual and impossible worlds. Many believe that this notion is governed by two rules. Ac-cording to the first rule, every non-trivial world is more similar to the actual world than the trivial world is. The second rule states that every possible world is more similar to the actual world than any impossible world is. The aim of this paper is to challenge both of these rules. We argue that (...) acceptance of the first rule leads to the claim that the rule ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet is invalid in classical logic. The second rule does not recognize the fact that objects might be similar to one an-other due to various features. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to point out the limitations of Hybrid Modal Realism as a general theory of modalities, i.e. one that gives an analysis of possibilities as well as impossibilities. To do so we will firstly sketch the goals that theories of impossible worlds should achieve. Secondly we will briefly present the two most popular accounts of impossibilities—Extended Modal Realism and Extended Ersatzism. We will focus on the aspects of both theories which became the motivation for a (...) hybrid view. In the last part of this paper we will analyze Francesco Berto’s Hybrid Modal Realism and present reasons why this account is an insufficient tool for analyzing impossibilities. (shrink)

In 1947 Quine wrote one of the most important and influential articles in the twentieth century philosophy - "On What There Is". One of the aims of this article was a critique of Meinong's Theory of Object. The critique was especially focused upon nonactual possibilities, which (according to Meinong) are some kinds of nonexistent objects. In my paper I want to present Neo-Meinongian refutations of Quine's critique. In order to do this I discuss: (i) the main thesis of "On What (...) There Is" ,(ii) premises of Meinongian Theory, (iii) views of proponents and opponents of the idea of nonexistent objects, (iv) Quine's critique aimed at nonactual possibilities, (v) Terence Parsons' theory, based on the distinction between nuclear and extranucler properties, and (vi) noneism, defended by Richard Routley. I also try to give a reply to the most popular critiques aimed at both Neo-Meinongian theories. The main conclusion is that Quine's critique and his arguments against nonactual possibilities aren't dangerous for theories endorsing Meinong's Theory of Object. Contrary to what Gilbert Ryle once claimed (If Meinongianism isn't dead, nothing is), Meinongian theories are still alive and doing well. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss one of Peter van Inwagen’s charges against the Meinongian thesis, which states that some objects do not exist. The charges aimed to show that the thesis either leads to a contradiction or that it is obscure. Both consequences support the opposite Quinean thesis, which states that every object exists. As opposed to the former, the latter ought to be consistent and clear. I argue why there is no contradiction in the Meinongian thesis and why the (...) Quinean thesis is not clear. (shrink)

This paper aims to introduce Meinongian Abstractionism (MA), i.e. a view on the metaphysics of truthmaking and modality. This approach is based on the notion of objectives—one of the key elements of Alexius Meinong’s Theory of Objects. In the light of it, worlds are interpreted in terms of sets of subsistent and non-subsistent objectives. This—along with Meinong’s characterization of objectives—provides a ground for possible as well as impossible worlds. One of the consequences of Meinongain Abstractionism is a reformulation of the (...) relation of truthmaking in modal terms. Importantly, this reformulation avoids the problem of too-coarse grained analysis of truthmakers. This makes MA a metaphysically–oriented supporter of the so-called ‘hyperintensional revolution.’. (shrink)

According to the most popular theories, counterfactuals with impossible antecedents are vacuously true. Critiques of this view argue that contrary to this, we tend to consider only some of them true and others to be false. In his recent paper Timothy Williamson has ingeniously explained the motivations for the orthodox view and argued that although there are some heuristic reasons that may suggest the plausibility of the unorthodox view, they are fallible. The most important of Williamson’s arguments is that the (...) unorthodox interpretation is inconsistent with the heuristic assumption that supposedly motivates this very view. The aim of this paper is to consider Williamson’s critique and to support the unorthodox approach towards counterpossibles. In order to do so, we argue in favor of the modified version of the heuristic assumption. (shrink)

The article outlines the main motivations for the Guise Theory and its intriguing theses concerning identity, predication, existence, and fiction. The second part of the article is devoted to an assessment of Castañeda’s theory. It discusses the most influential critiques of the Guise Theory, as well as Russell’s objection to theories of nonexistent objects. The last section of the article contains a comparison of the Guise Theory with the Meinong’s Theory of Objects, and points out that despite various similarities, we (...) should draw a distinction between original and moderate versions of Meinong’s theory. The main motivation for this distinction are differences between accounts of predications, which allow us to call the Guise Theory “quasi-Meinongian” rather than just “Meinongian”. This is because one of its main claims is taken from the work of Meinong’s pupil Ernst Mally, and not from Meinong himself. (shrink)

Celem tego artykułu było wykazanie, że ortodoksyjna analiza kontrmożliwych okresów warunkowych prowadzi do niepokojącej konsekwencji. Jest nią niemożność odróżnienia poszczególnych, z konieczności fałszywych teorii. Problem ten opiera się w dużej mierze na związku pomiędzy okresami warunkowymi oraz analizą wyrażeń zawierających operator opowieści. Nie musi to oznaczać, że zwolennik analizy ortodoksyjnej nie może dostarczyć alternatywnego sformułowania różnic pomiędzy teoriami z konieczności fałszywymi. Tym niemniej, nie może on tego dokonać poprzez użycie okresów warunkowych. Te natomiast – jak wskazują zarówno filozofowie oraz psycholodzy (...) rozwoju poznawczego – stanowią naturalny środek wyrazu wnioskowania o konsekwencjach zajścia tego, co faktycznie nie zaszło. Niezależnie od tego, czy jest to konsekwencja zajścia czysto możliwego, czy niemożliwego stanu rzeczy. Podczas gdy analizy prezentowane w ramach podejścia nieortodoksyjnego dostarczają wyjaśnienia tego zjawiska, stanowisko ortodoksyjne nakazuje podważenie moż- liwości takich rozumowań. Stąd można uznać, że w kwestii sporu o adekwatną analizę okresów warunkowych przewaga znajduje się po stronie nieortodoksyjnej. (shrink)

Przedmiotem prezentowanego artykułu jest spor o wartości logiczne kontrfaktycznych okresów warunkowych z niemożliwym poprzednikiem. Zgodnie z rozpowszechnionymi analizami każdy taki okres warunkowy jest prawdziwy. Pogląd ten określany jest mianem ortodoksyjnego i przeciwstawiany jest mu pogląd nieortodoksyjny, który uznaje, że tylko niektóre spośród kontrmożliwych okresów warunkowych są prawdziwe, a inne są fałszywe. W jednym ze swoich ostatnich tekstów Timothy Williamson argumentował na rzecz tezy, że konsekwencje poglądu nieortodoksyjnego są niespójne z motywacjami leżącymi u podstaw tego poglądu. Celem artykułu jest polemika z (...) krytyką Williamsona oraz wskazanie na możliwość spójnego odczytania postulatów zwolenników stanowiska nieortodoksyjnego. (shrink)

The article outlines the main motivations for the Guise Theory and its intriguing theses concerning identity, predication, existence, and fiction. The second part of the article is devoted to assessment of Castañeda’s theory. It discusses the most influential critiques of the Guise Theory, as well as (important from a historical point of view) Russell’s objection to theories of nonexistent objects. The last section of the article contains a comparison of the Guise Theory with the Meinong’s Theory of Objects, and points (...) out that despite various similarities, we should draw a distinction between original and moderate versions of Meinong’s theory. The main motivation for this distinction are differences between accounts of predications, which allow us to call the Guise Theory “quasi-Meinongian” rather than just “Meinongian”. This is because one of its main claims comes rather form the work of Meinong’s pupil Ernst Mally, and not from Meinong himself. (shrink)

Przedmiotem artykułu jest status ontologiczny światów możliwych oraz niemożliwych. Zgodnie z jedną ze współczesnych wersji meinongianizmu, o ile świat aktualny jest przedmiotem istniejącym, o tyle światy czysto możliwe oraz niemożliwe uznawane są za przedmioty nieistniejące. Zwolennicy tego podejścia twierdzą ponadto, że światom nieaktualnym nie przysługuje żaden inny rodzaj istnienia.Celem artykułu jest wskazanie na problematyczne konsekwencje wspomnianego stanowiska oraz zarysowanie poglądu alternatywnego, który oparty jest na pluralizmie ontologicznym, tj. na poglądzie uznającym wielość rodzajów istnienia.