The past fifty years have witnessed the flourishing of scholarship in virtually every area of ancient Greek philosophy, but the sophists have for the most part been neglected. This is certainly true of Prodicus of Ceos: of the four most well-known sophists--Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus, and Antiphon--he has received the least attention. Robert Mayhew provides a reassessment of his life and thought, and especially his views on language, religion, and ethics. This volume consists of ninety texts with facing translations--far (...) more than have appeared in any previous edition--and provides the first commentary on the extant evidence for Prodicus' life and thought. The texts are drawn from the best available editions; the translations are new, and faithful to the original. Mayhew's commentary is designed to serve the needs of a wide range of readers: both scholars of ancient philosophy, and advanced students curious about this intriguing figure who appears in over a dozen Platonic dialogues. (shrink)

© 2013 The Editors of The Philosophical QuarterlyProdicus of Ceos was a major figure of the sophistic movement in Greece during the latter part of the fifth century bc. He features in a number of Platonic dialogues in ways that suggest he was regarded by Socrates more sympathetically than the other sophists. Robert Mayhew has undertaken to present and discuss all the extant textual evidence for Prodicus’ life and thought. The presentation consists of ninety pieces of mostly Greek and (...) some Latin texts, ranging from a few lines to a few pages, accompanied by facing English translation and organized topically under four main headings—Life and Character ; Language ; Natural Philosophy, Cosmology, and Religion ; and Ethics. An introduction on Prodicus’ life and thought together with an account of the collection's organizing principles precede the texts and translations, and there follows extensive commentary... (shrink)

Not much is known about Prodicus of Ceos, though he is mentioned in more than a dozen Platonic dialogues and appears as a character in the Protagoras. In this article I examine the extant evidence about Prodicus from Plato and other ancient authors and show that Plato's attitude toward him was, surprisingly, one of great respect. In fact, Plato suggests that Prodicus was quite literally Socrates' teacher. I argue that by considering the evidence carefully we can determine (...) with some confidence what Socrates probably took from his instruction, namely, an art of making careful distinctions (diairesis), which had important political and philosophical applications. (shrink)

Prodicus gained a reputation for formulating a novel theory concerning the origins of religious belief, sometimes labelled as atheistic in antiquity, notably by the Epicureans. He suggests that humans initially regarded as gods whatever was useful for their survival such as fruits and rivers, and in a more advanced stage they deified culture heroes such as Demeter and Dionysus. I first suggest that Prodicus’ theory can be connected with other doctrines attributed to him, especially the speech concerning “Heracles’ (...) choice” and the keen interest in the etymology of words. Moreover, I argue that the different representations of his theory reflect the debate between the Epicureans and the Stoics concerning the involvement of gods in human and cosmic affairs. An examination of the fragmentary evidence shows Prodicus to be a thinker who was interested in the rise of civilization in general, and so his theory was part and parcel of a large-scale project to explain several interconnected aspects of social life in rational terms. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyze the tale of Heracles at the Crossroads, attributed to Prodicus by Socrates in Xenophon’s Memorabilia, through the notion of antilogy. The apologue has got an antilogic structure that is immediately outlined in the description of the situation in which the young Heracles finds himself. But the text, seemingly antilogic, does not develop itself according to one of the most important rules of antilogies, i.e., the epistemic parity of two speeches, since it (...) appears to be completely in favor of just one of the theses. Prodicus would have had no interest in writing a text that did not demonstrate his rhetorical and linguistic abilities. According to this perspective, Xenophon’s version of Heracles at the Crossroads does not seem to be the original version by Prodicus, as can be seen by analyzing its structure and properties. (shrink)

In an article in an earlier issue of this journal Vivienne Gray sought to challenge my claim that Xenophon's account of Prodicus' narrative concerning the Choice of Heracles represents ‘a very close approximation to Prodicus’ actual wording'. Since that time, Gray's article has been cited approvingly by Louis-André Dorion and David Wolfsdorf, both of whom consider that Gray has settled the matter, at least as far as the linguistic aspect of my argument is concerned. In view of this, (...) I feel it necessary to point out that Gray's argument is fundamentally flawed. In addition, I should like to take this opportunity to show that the arguments of Dorion and Wolfsdorf, which are aimed at other aspects of the case that I made for Xenophon's faithfulness to Prodicus' text, are likewise invalid. (shrink)

프로디코스는 자신의 『시기들』이라는 글에서 인간이라면 마땅히 취해야 하는 인간적 삶의 방향을 제안한다. 그 글 안에서 아레테와 카키아라는 두 신적인 존재가 등장하여 헤라클레스에게 각각 자신이 제안하는 삶의 길을 따르라고 요청한다. 아레테가 제안하는 길은 노고 및 땀으로 이루어진 삶인 반면, 카키아가 제안하는 길은 즐거움과 함께 하는 쉬운 삶이며, 둘 모두 궁극적으로는 자신들의 길을 통해 행복(eudaimonia)에 이르리라 약속한다. 그리고 헤라클레스는 아레테의 길을 선택한다. 이러한 내용으로 인해 프로디코스의『시기들』은 인간의 자제력(enkrateia)을 중요시하며, 이를 통해 탁월함(덕)에 이를 수 있다는 인본주의적 성격을 담고 있다고 이해되어 왔다.BR 전통적 신관과는 (...) 달리, 프로디코스는 인간의 생존에 유익함을 보장하는 것들을, 예를 들어 음식과 음료 그리고 해와 달 등을, 신으로 강조하는 논의를 펼쳤다고 전해진다. 이와 함께 그는 ‘용어의 옳음’(orthoepeia)이라 알려진 언어론적 입장 또한 고수했다고 알려지고 있다. 그의 언어론에 따를 경우, 가령 ‘플레그마’(phlegma: 점액)는 본성상 그 의미가 ‘페플레크타이’(pephlechthai: 끓는)인 대상에 부응하고 그 대상으로부터 어원의 형태가 일관되기에 옳다는 논의처럼, 각 용어는 그것이 가리키는 대상과 의미에서 본성적 일관성을 유지해야 하며 동시에 용어 자체의 형태에서도 일관성이 갖추어진 경우에만 옳다. 이와 같은 프로디코스의 신론적 및 언어론적 입장을 고려할 경우, 두 신적인 존재가 행복으로서의 ‘즐거움’을 다루는 『시기들』에 담지된 인본주의적 성격은 인간 한정적 유익함으로서의 탁월함 완수가 곧 결과론적 즐거움으로서의 행복이라는 내용으로 보다 구체화될 수 있다. (shrink)

In a well-known parable, told by Xenophon but credited by him to the sophist Prodicus, the young Heracles setting out on the road meets two women whose appearance turns out to be in accord with their characters and names, which are soon proclaimed by each to be Virtue and Vice. The former comports herself as a proper Greek woman should, ‘becoming to look at and freeborn by nature, her body adorned with purity, her eyes with shame, her stature with (...) moderation, dressed in white’. Vice, on the other hand, is self-absorbed and slutty: ‘well nourished to the point of fleshiness and softness, made up to appear whiter and redder than she was in fact’, τὸ δὲ σχῆμα ὥστε δοκεῖν ὀρθοτέραν τῆς φύσεως εἶναι, ‘with wide-open eyes, dressed to show off her ripeness, often checking herself out and seeing whether anyone was looking at her, often even looking at her own shadow’. (shrink)

Cet article analyse le problème de l’« athéisme » prétendu de Prodicos. Un ré-examen des sources à notre disposition et, surtout, une nouvelle reconstruction des témoignages fournis par le Sur la piété de Philodème, dont l’un est consacré à la théologie du stoïcien Persaïos, démontre que Prodicos n’était pas un athée mais un critique virulent de la conception traditionnelle des dieux.

The question of the method was central in the thought and teaching of Prodicus. We have abundant information on this method but it is, probably, closely connected to various other issues, on which we are less well informed. The right method to solve diverse linguistic problems comprised two moments and not just one as it frequently assumed. Similarly, the terms orthotes and diairesis of names, which appear in the sources, do not designate one single and simple procedure, but rather (...) a double and more complex one, which is reconstructed in this article and whose objectives are clarified. (shrink)

This literature review describes the current state of research on the Greek sophists. It draws on recent work on the beginnings of rhetoric, overviews of sophistic thought and case studies on Protagoras, Gorgias, Antiphon and Prodicus. It is shown that the traditional notion of a sophistic antithesis to philosophy has lost further ground: While earlier »rehabilitations« of sophistic thought still use the dichotomous distinction of philosophy und sophistic, now any generic talk of »the sophist« should better be regarded as (...) misleading. (shrink)

In the 5th century a number of sophists challenged the orthodox understanding of morality and claimed that practicing injustice was the best and most profitable way for an individual to live. Although a number of responses to sophistic immoralism were made, one argument, in fact coming from a pair of sophists, has not received the attention it deserves. According to the argument I call Immortal Repute, self-interested individuals should reject immorality and cultivate virtue instead, for only a virtuous agent can (...) win the sort of everlasting reputation that makes a life truly admirable and successful. (shrink)

For the lack of forty-nine drachmas Socrates was unable to attend the costly epideixis of Prodicus from which he would have learnt the truth about correct use of words. From Prodicus' ὥραι Socrates could also have learnt the concepts and characteristic words associated with arete and kakia: these compete in that work for the allegiance of Heracles, parading their respective characteristics. Thanks to Professor Arthur Adkins we have had for the past decade a book which not only confronts (...) arete and kakia, but also analyses the meaning and usage of many Greek words for the evaluation of action from Homer to Aristotle. The importance of this book is generally acknowledged but it has not received the detailed discussion it deserves. Professor Adkins finds the social structure of ancient Greece inimical to the development of an adequate concept of moral responsibility. He shows, in a most interesting manner, how Greek values changed as the needs of society changed. (shrink)

To speak of ‘the real subject’ or ‘the primary aim’ of a Platonic dialogue usually means to magnify one aspect of it at the expense of other aspects as important. Such is not my intention. It is quite clear, however, without prejudice to the philosophic value of any of the topics discussed, that the Protagoras is an attack upon the sophists as represented by Protagoras, the greatest of them. Hippias and Prodicus are present and some of the great man's (...) glory is reflected upon them; they are also no doubt to some extent implicated in his defeat, though they seem quite unaware of the fact. (shrink)

To speak of ‘the real subject’ or ‘the primary aim’ of a Platonic dialogue usually means to magnify one aspect of it at the expense of other aspects as important. Such is not my intention. It is quite clear, however, without prejudice to the philosophic value of any of the topics discussed, that the Protagoras is an attack upon the sophists as represented by Protagoras, the greatest of them. Hippias and Prodicus are present and some of the great man's (...) glory is reflected upon them; they are also no doubt to some extent implicated in his defeat, though they seem quite unaware of the fact. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Task of the Name: A Reply to Carol PosterJason HelmsIn the fields with which we are concerned, knowledge comes only in lightning flashes. The text is the long roll of thunder that follows.—Walter Benjamin, Arcades N1, 1 (1999)Logos, in whose lighting they come and go, remains concealed from them, and forgotten.—Martin Heidegger, “Aletheia” (1975, 122)One of the first things learned in the most rudimentary attempt at stargazing is (...) that the utmost effort must be paid in neglecting to gaze at stars. Instead, one must gaze near them. Owing to the physiological organization of the eye, night vision is enhanced toward the periphery of vision rather than the center. Consequently, one can actually perceive one’s own lack of perception by staring at a star, finding it disappear, and then staring near the star only to see it reappear. What follows, in this light or darkness or tension of these two extremes, is not empirical in any sense of the word, which is given to its own extremes. Rather, I hope through various a/(i)llusions and sidelong tangents to glance offthe surface of my target. As you may guess, superficial puns—like star(e)—provide one of the most reflective surfaces offof which to bounce/riff. [End Page 278]Carol Poster’s recent article, “The Task of the Bow: Heraclitus’ Rhetorical Critique of Epic Language” (2006), provides much fruitful ground for a rhetorical critique of Heraclitus and a Heraclitean critique of rhetoric—many surfaces offof which to glance. However, her analysis is often in a decidedly unharmonious tension with itself. Accordingly, this essay constitutes an attempt to tune by ear. In the course of this response I will outline at which points I diverge from her argument, offering my own listening relation to, and consequently my own reading of, Heraclitus, and propose alternative, but perhaps corrective, views of Heraclitus’s relation to the Logos and his practiced rhetorics. Let us first start at the end before proceeding through Poster’s argument.Poster’s ConclusionsAt the end of her article, Poster offers five conclusions that afford us now an ingress for her essay. For the sake of brevity (and, of course, clarity and sincerity) I have shortened them and added a sixth with which she concludes the article:1. Heraclitus focuses on the problem of correctness of names substantially before Prodicus and Protagoras.... Heraclitus thus prefigures two themes discussed more extensively by later writers. First, Heraclitus seems concerned with the art of what came to be called “orthoepeia” (the study of correctness of names) for which the sophists Prodicus and Protagoras later became famous. Second, he at least considers the possibility that one can learn something about the nature of things by examining the nonliteral senses of their names, a position that is articulated in its most extreme form by the Heraclitean Cratylus in Plato’s dialogue of that name.2. Heraclitus is an early example of logos philosopher, in the Gadamerian sense, in that he believes that investigation of language can provide information that is not exclusively or trivially linguistic. He is an early example of the “linguistic turn” in Greek thought.3. For Heraclitus, the instability of language is part of a radical instability of the world. Since things change too quickly to be examined, their stable names are all that is available for investigation. While surfaces change, hidden harmonies, which are both concealed and revealed in words, remain. And yet even names themselves, if temporally fixed, are still interpretively unstable. [End Page 279]4. Each positively attributed name or statement should be read two ways simultaneously in a sustained and irresolvable tension, literally and nonliterally, with the opposing figurative statement both contradicting and yet sustaining the literal one.5. These considerations lead Heraclitus, in his own prose, to a constant tension between rejection of epic vocabulary and ideas as inaccurate and frequent use of them; even when Homer and Hesiod are partially rejected, inquiry into them remains a valid means of investigation. Heraclitus does not simply suggest that epic should be entirely ignored in favor, for example, of direct examination of or experimentation on physical objects, nor purely internal (Cartesian... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Evidence, Authority, and Interpretation: A Response to Jason HelmsCarol PosterAs someone with a long-standing interest in Heraclitus, I am delighted that Philosophy and Rhetoric is providing a forum for an ongoing discussion of his work.1 Although Jason Helms and I do disagree on specific matters concerning Heraclitean interpretation, we are, I think, in full agreement concerning the importance of Heraclitus for both rhetorical and philosophical studies and intend these (...) essays as contributions to what, it is hoped, will be a fruitful ongoing discussion of Heraclitus within the interdisciplinary tradition of this journal. Rather than address many minor points of disagreement superficially, I will concentrate below on close analysis of a few specific issues that I consider paradigmatic of differences in method rather than merely in conclusions.Panta Rhei (All Things Flow)That Heraclitus was interested in establishing any sense of orthoepia plays down his insistence on the panta rhei (everything flows). To suggest any final rightness of words would suggest that everything flows but the Logos.(Helms, this issue)Actually, I do not use the phrase “final rightness of words” but, rather, describe Heraclitus as “focus[ing] on the problem of correctness of names” and as [End Page 288] “consider[ing] the possibility that one can learn something about the nature of things by examining the non-literal sense of their names” (2006, 15).2 Name is an English equivalent of the Greek onoma (Latin nomen, substantive as opposed to verb or particle), not rhêma (word, verb, phrase) or logos (word, account, speech, saying, story, ratio, reason, etc.). The phrase “correctness of names” alludes to an ongoing discussion among scholars in classics and philosophy about a specific problem in early Greek thought (normally discussed in relation to Heraclitus, Protagoras, Prodicus, Plato’s Cratylus, and Aristotle’s Categories and On Interpretation).More importantly, Helms seems to think it impossible a priori that Heraclitus might have considered some sort of doctrine of flux compatible with a belief in correctness of names. Ancient evidence, however, suggests that Heraclitus did, in fact, consider stability of logos, correctness of names, and sensible flux compatible in some manner.For logos as unchanging, dk22b1 begins, “Of the logos that exists always [eontos aiei] uncomprehending are men.”3 Although the syntax is ambiguous, eontos aiei suggests some stability of logos. Sextus Empiricus states that Heraclitus considered the “divine logos” stable and eternal and human reason grounded in its participation therein (Adv. Math. 7.126–33).4 The “commonality” of logos in dk22b2 also suggests some interpretive stability, in the sense of logos not varying with respect to the perception of the individual.The phrase panta rhei, although solidly entrenched in the reception history of Heraclitus, often as part of a “doctrine of flux,” is not actually a well-attested Heraclitean saying (included in the dk “b” fragments) but, rather, derived from early testimonia. Whether the phrase is a paraphrase, indirect quotation, or Platonic/Aristotelian recasting of Heraclitus is uncertain. The earliest sources are Platonic:Therefore you [Theaetetus] were quite right in saying that knowledge is nothing else than perception, and there is complete identity between the doctrine of Homer and Heraclitus and all their followers— that all things are in motion like streams [hoion rheumata kineisthai ta panta]—the doctrine of the great sophist Protagoras that man is the measure of all things—and the doctrine of Theaetetus that, since these things are true, perception is knowledge.(Theaet. 160d) [End Page 289]Those... would agree well enough with Heraclitus that all things move and nothing remains still [panta menein ouden].(Crat. 401d)Heraclitus says that all things move and nothing remains still [hoti panta chorei kai ouden menei], and he likens the universe to the current of a river, saying that you cannot step twice in the same stream.(Crat. 402a)Nor will he condemn himself and all things and say that there is no health in them, but that all things are flowing like leaky pots [panta hôsper keramia rhei], or believe that all things are just like people afflicted with catarrh, flowing and running all the time [rheumatos te kai katarrou panta ta chrêmata].(Crat. 440c–d... (shrink)

The Sophists, who rose to prominence in democratic Athens during the mid-fifth century b.c., understood the art of rhetoric and the importance of being able to transform effective reasoning into persuasive public speaking. Their inquiries-into the gods, the origins of religion, and whether virtue can be taught-influenced the next generation of classical philosophers and formed the foundations of the European prose style and formal oratory. In this new translation each chapter is organized around the work of one character, including Gorgias, (...) Prodicus, Protagoras, and Antiphon, among others. (shrink)

The article seeks to show that, contrary to the standard view, the 'Choice of Heracles' preserved at Xen. Mem. 2.1.21-33 is not a summary or paraphrase, but is a very close approximation to the actual wording of Prodicus' epideixis. The language and style are shown to be uncharacteristic of Xenophon, and the fact that Prodicus' original was known to exist in both written and orally performed versions serves to explain why the piece is framed by language that disclaims (...) strict accuracy in reproducing it. It is further shown that the way in which near-synonyms are used in the piece is not necessarily inconsistent with other evidence for Prodicus' practice: it is rather the personified character Vice whose usage conflicts with that of Prodicus himself and with that of the personification of Virtue. Finally, it is proposed that the 'Choice of Heracles' represented the contents, not of Prodicus' advanced teaching, but of the popular, cut-rate lecture intended for a general audience. (shrink)

ermeneutics is the art of interpretation – we shall not forget that and we will return to it again and again, for that is what hermeneutics is – the art of interpretation. We might do well, however, to stare at the word ‘hermeneutics’ just by way of a starting point. Hermeneutics – the word goes back to a name, Hermes. Who is Hermes? Among the earliest references to him is made by no less than Plato in the dialogue, Cratylus.1 The (...) dialogue begins rather abruptly, with someone called Hermogenes inviting Socrates to be a party to an argument between him and Cratylus. Cratylus is therefore one of the characters in the dialogue, and it is his name that is also given to the dialogue. The other party to it is Hermogenes, a name which literally means ‘son of Hermes’. Socrates suspects that Cratylus is making fun of Hermogenes, saying that the latter is “no true son of Hermes, because always looking after a fortune and never in luck.” Hermogenes means ‘son of Hermes’. Who, then, is Hermes? The cue is that Hermes is what Hermogenes is not, making the latter not a true son of the former, because Hermes is always looking after a fortune and is apparently always lucky, something Hermogenes is not. Hermes is always in search of a fortune and is always lucky, always fortunate. Always to be in search is always to be on the move, always to be on the way, never still, a nomad. Indeed, as the dialogue ends we hear Cratylus admitting that “I incline to Heraclitus.”2 And why not? The argument between him and Hermogenes has all to do with names, with language. And it looks as though the debate between them is going nowhere, and so they are now intending to bring Socrates into the discussion, hoping that this third party will be able to come to their rescue, help them find the key and bring the restless journey to a quiet conclusion. Even Socrates, however, true to his form, properly excuses himself. “If I had not been poor,” he says, “I might have heard the fifty-drachma course of the great Prodicus, which is a complete education in grammar and language . . . and then I should have been at once able to answer your question about the correctness of names. But, indeed, I have only heard the single- drachma course, and therefore I do not know the truth about such matters.”. (shrink)

By emphasising the role of the social factor in the human life, the sophists created the foundations of European sociopolitical thought which arose from the spirit of criticism, pervading the Athenian democratic culture in the second half of the 5th century B.C. They gave rise to the first anthropological breakthrough in the history of our civilisation by treating philosophy, education and upbringing as preparation for life in a free civil society. They also had their share in depriving the laws of (...) their sacral status since they treated the state and the law as results of a social contract dictated by utilitarian reasons. Therefore they should be regarded as the inventors of legal-political conventionalism and utilitarianism which have formed the basis for today’s democracy. Protagoras was the author of the notion of social evolution. That notion was later to become the foundation of leftist, liberal and conservative sociopolitical attitudes. According to Protagoras, education is preparation for life in the society, and thus he might be called a patron of the modern „education for democracy”. Prodicus put forward the ideal of an individual sacrificing his interests for the sake of the community and showed the social function of work. He also regarded religion as a human invention, acquiring its shape in the course of history. Hippias and Antiphon created the notion of the law of nature and the idea of social egalitarianism, since they claimed that all human beings are naturally equal. Moreover, they formulated and contrasted the two notions: nature and legal convention. Later this opposition became a fundamental question of the European philosophy of law and politics. The sophists of the classical period, though they propagated relativism and epistemological sensualism, were far from preaching antisocial and immoral individualism. Their teachings were based on antihedonistic ethical restraint. They all recognised primacy of the community over an individual which was the most important foundation of the Greek political culture in that period. They were also forerunners of those tendencies in the modern pedagogy that aim at endowing the pupil or student first of all with social and professional efficiency. (shrink)

RésuméLa philosophie autochtone du XVIIe siècle et des siècles précédents est souvent considérée comme irrécupérable en raison du manque d’œuvres existantes. Il y a au moins deux raisons pour lesquelles ce point de vue est erroné. Premièrement, cela néglige le rôle que les traditions orales ont joué dans la préservation de la pensée des peuples autochtones d'Amérique du Nord. Deuxièmement, certains penseurs autochtones ont vu leurs opinions philosophiques enregistrées par des interlocuteurs européens peu de temps après le contact. Avec ces (...) sources, les mêmes techniques que celles utilisées pour récupérer les opinions de philosophes comme le sophiste Prodicus, dont les œuvres sont perdues, peuvent être appliquées aux penseurs autochtones. En reconstruisant une partie de la philosophie de Kondiaronk, je montre comment cela peut être fait. (shrink)

Name and notion -- Protagoras -- Xeniades -- Gorgias -- Lycophron -- Prodicus -- Thrasymachus -- Hippias -- Antiphon -- Critias -- Anonymus Iamblichi -- Dissoi Logoi or Dialexeis -- Appendix: Euthydemus of Chios.

The Sophists, the Socratics and the Cynics had one important characteristic in common: they mainly used spoken natural language as their instrument of investigation, and they were more concerned to discover human nature in its various practical manifestations than the facts of the physical world. The Sophists are too often remembered merely as the opponents of Socrates and Plato. Rankin discusses what social needs prompted the development of their theories and provided a market for their teaching. Five prominent Sophists – (...) Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus, Hippias and Thrasymachus – are looked at individually. The author discusses their origins, aims and arguments, and relates the issues they focussed on to debates apparent in contemporary literature. Sophists, Socratics and Cynics, first published in 1983, also traces the sophistic strand in Greek thought beyond the great barrier of Plato, emphasising continuity with the Cynics, and concludes with a look forward to Epicureans and Stoics. (shrink)

Sophists’ apologia. -/- Sophists were the first paid teachers ever. These ancient Greek enlighteners taught wisdom. Protagoras, Antiphon, Prodicus, Hippias, Lykophron are most famous ones. Sophists views and concerns made a unified encyclopedic system aimed at teaching common wisdom, virtue, management and public speaking. Of the contemporary “enlighters”, Deil Carnegy’s educational work seems to be the most similar to sophism. Sophists were the first intellectuals – their trade was to sell knowledge. They introduced a new type of teacher-student relationship (...) – the mutually beneficial communication on equal terms. They taught pupils how to think independently and how to persuade others, which was inseparably connected with the rise of democracy in the most advanced Greek polices. Sophists were the first to proclaim that all people are naturally equal. They put forward the idea of natural rights and social contract, working out the fundamentals of the present-day law. In addition, they developed the basics of philology, psychology, logic, and gave a scientific explanation to the origins of religions. They embodied definite positive ideals of their epoch. Sophistry flourished in the second half of the Vth through he first third of the IVth centuries B. C. The period coincides with the heyday of the entire Greek history – the so called Greek Miracle epoch. Sophists expressed some present-day concepts of Ancient Greek ideology and mentality, characteristic of its Golden Age times. The Ancient Athens of the times of Periclus were similar to the Florence of Renaissance as to the type of social structure. That is why (?) the art of eloquence (public speaking) was highly respected in Florence. The two cities had a lot of features of the present-day capitalist society, which was due to their role as the main centres of industry of their “worlds-economies”. During the subsequent Hellenic period, the Old Order was restored, based on the feudal rent recipients’ rule. The degradation of society resulted in the decline of sophistry. Sophistry represents the highest point in the evolution of Greek philosophy. It is also the most prominent school as to the novelty of its ideas. That was owing to the common propensity for innovation typical of Periclus’ Golden Age, which in its turn resulted from the establishment of the individualistic and rationalistic thinking similar to present-day mentality. Among other aspects, close attention was paid to ethnic issues; some humanistic ideas such as Master and Servant ethics and Enlightment as the primary condition of man’s freedom, received scientific grounding. The genre of philosophical dialogue was developed, as well as the rationalistic scientific gnoceology, aimed at consistently opposing any religion. Dialectics, the most outstanding achievement of the Antiquity, was also worked out by the sophists. Zeno of Helleas was one of the sophists. Democrites’ ideas were, too, quite close to dialectics. Socrates’ contemporaries regarded him ironically, as shown, for example, in the Aristophanes’ comedy “Clouds”. Nevertheless, this scholar can still be referred to as a sophist, although of somewhat weird personality. Socrates’ popularity, which came later, should be attributed to the fact that he was the first philosopher ever to have been sentenced and executed by law, rather than to any valuable scientific contributions. Sophistry as such, rather than Socrates, marks the line between pre-Socratic and post- Socratic schools. Plato, with the exception of his latest works, is considered to belong to the same philosophical school. Specifically, there are valid reasons to believe that he was paid fees by his disciples. In Plato’s Dialogues, all points of view will be proven and then disproved, so that an integral philosophical system is hard to observe. Plato’s “Idealism” is but one of the many possible theories. His ideal philosophy is a high-minded argument of wise men. As late as towards the end of his life, Plato betrayed the ideals of sophistry, turning into the world’s first proponent of totalitarianism. Sophistry is Greek classical literature. Later on, philosophy, as well as the entire Greek civilization, started to fall into decline. Over 500 subsequent years, Hellenistic-Roman scholars never came up with anything novel. The entire process of antique philosophical evolution can be subdivided into the following six stages: Phoenician (IX–VIIth centuries B. C.), archaic (VIth – the first half of IVth century B. C., classic (the epoch of sophistry: the second half of the Vth through the first decades of the IIIrd centuries B. C.), late antique (middle of the IIIrd – first decades of the VI th centuries B.C.) The fact that early in the VIth century B. C. sophistry was rejected in Athens, has a lot to do with the consequences of their defeat in Peloponnesian war, a social catastrophe. Ever since, the prevalent part of the criticism of sophistry is a criticism of sophists’ immoral ways of life and personalities, rather than the essentials of their philosophy. For instance, Aristotle’s criticism primarily concerns their pragmatism and tendency to make a profit out of teaching. However, Aristotle himself taught his disciples along similar lines, showing them how to “be able to prove both opposites”. It was Aristotle who summed up sophists’ century-long elaborations. The traditional modern interpretation of sophists as shown in Plato’s dialogues appears to be groundless. The truth of the matter is that Plato regards sophists as more serious philosophers than Socrates was. It becomes especially clear in the dialogue titled “Protagoras”, which shows the latter as gaining an undoubted victory over Socrates. Generally speaking, Plato’s works never regard sophists as weak or worthless opponents. A common opinion as to the essence of sophists’, in particular, Protagoras’s philosophy, has hitherto not been worked out. Many researchers renounce the very existence of any specific philosophical position in sophistry. The term “relativism” itself now has a bad name. However, it should be borne in mind that Protagoras doctrine emerged as a result of an attempt to get out of the ontological dead-end to which the entire Greek natural philosophy had come. To this purpose, he employed Anaxagoras’s idea about everything comprising everything, whereupon he built his physical-ontological theory, and Zeno of Helleas’s concept that all objects are such and different at the same time in the same respect. According to Protagoras’s philosophy, every object does not only seem, but is different from every other object, including human beings. Therefore, every person is his or her own measure of all other entities. The objective reality is the Ego’s relations with the outer world. Every object’s essence is defined through its interaction with ourselves. Nothing remains stagnant – every existence already contains non-existence, and vice-versa. However, the relativity of being is not to be regarded as absolute. That means, that relatively stable and therefore relatively cognizable entities do exist, among them the words we say. Doubt is not considered absolute by relativists either, which differentiates them from skeptics and agnostics. They dare to believe. Uncertainty is Godly – here, Protagoras becomes very close to the concept of apathetic theology. Gorgius shared Protagoras’s views and tried to prove them applying the same method as Zeno applied when upholding Parmenidis’s philosophy. He argued that if one accepts the opposite point of view and agrees that nothing can exist and not exist at the same time, one is bound to come to an the absurd conclusion that nothing is cognizable and nothing exists. To prove that there is a universal contradiction within the Existence itself, Protagoras and his followers in their turn put forward a number of special logical arguments, called rules of contraries, or sophisms. The most well-known of them is the Euathle’s sophism, which proves that an object can be such and different at the same time in the same respect. Generally speaking, all relationships of any entity are extraneous. The idea that all entities, including concepts, exist and do not exist at the same time, was also accepted by Plato. It should be stressed, that Plato’s philosophy as a whole is relativists’ greatest achievement. In his dispute against relativism, Aristotle put forward the main concepts of his ontology: the existence falls into the existence in possibility and the existence in reality, or substance and accidence – the ever changing “sublunary” world and the stable world of divine heavenly bodies. This division made his system self-contradictory to the point of absurd. Aristotle quite realized, that the direct disproof of relativism is hardly possible, which fact makes his criticism a mere tautology. It is very indicative in this respect that materialists, idealists and even skeptical agnostics applied the same arguments do disprove relativism. That demonstrates that the inner contradiction between any forms of “absolutism” and relativism is the most fundamental philosophical problem. Relativist ideas were repeatedly renewed throughout history, provided the social conditions were favourable. In variations, the concepts were advanced by Tzuan Tsi and ancient Chinese sophists, apostle Paul, Nicolas of Cusa, Galileo, Rene Descartes, G. Berkley, D. Hume, Ch. S. Pierce, E. Mach, A. Bogdanov, F. de Saussure, N. Bore, P. Feuerabend, U. Quain and others. However, no consistent relativist ontological system was developed after Protagoras. Meanwhile, a valid relativist theory could provide a clue to a fuller and more adequate general physical concept of the world, and to a deeper understanding of quantum mechanics. -/- Relativism as an ontological system of beliefs. -/- The relativist principle of relativity of all that exists is fundamental for the entire system of philosophy. Absolutely everything exists, but, at the same time, no existence is absolute. Anything is possible, but those entities only exist for us with which we interact this way or another, i. e., reality is interaction, “I interact – hence, I exist”. However, an overly close relationship between entities leads to non-existence – in other words, there is a certain existential optimum. For all of us, information, or perceptible heterogeneities, is real. Each of us is the center of a definite system of interactions with the world. If God is an endless Possibility, then the World is but the man’s dialogue with God. However, the ties that bind us with the world are of some definite kind, which predetermines our reality. The principle of relativity constrains itself, as any relativity is relative. On the one hand, that calls forth the Evil – caused by our own weakness. On the other hand, it makes our world relatively stable and cognizable. Generally speaking, the world is what we are. Everybody has an own Universe, but since people are fairly similar, our universes can be regarded as one Universe with common laws and regulations. It is possible for us to change the degree of objects’ existence in relation to ourselves and one another. It is equally important, though, to remain ourselves (keep following our “warrior’s path”). Since everything exists and no existence is absolute, the process of cognition should involve a criticism of everything but never a complete rebuttal of anything. The criterion of verity for any theory then is in its capacity to build itself upon a bigger number of diverse statements than in any other theory. Theoretically, all philosophies should ideally be complementary. The question of what in fact happened is meaningless unless we specify the “we”, the “where” and the “when”. The past can only exist as part of the present. When we change, our past undergoes corresponding qualitative objective changes, all of which are irreversible. The contemporary physics regards all objects of the Universe as existing for one another, which results in absurd conclusions. In fact, only what we interact with, exists. The so called “speed of light in vacuum” c is the maximum speed of direct interaction and direct exchange of signals. Specifically, at the oncoming speed c with a significant blue parallax the gamma-quantum is unable to interact with the matter. When this speed is reached, the gravitational mass of objects in relation to one another becomes equal to zero (imaginary), whereas their inertial mass equals infinity. Further acceleration will bring us into an entirely different Universe. That means that the Universe is an open system, which fact destroys all present-day cosmological models. Anything is possible in this world. Our reality is magic. Every bit of space contains a potentially limitless number of bits of other, however virtual, universes, as well as an infinite number of particles, which are still virtual for us (as postulated by quantum mechanics). In other words, there exists an infinity of different realities. With all the above in mind, the different levels of entities’ existence, in particular, of Life and Reason, should be taken into consideration. For example, to which extent a live system exists in relation to the inanimate forms of being is very indefinite, as what life is has to be determined by living creatures. An even greater compass of levels of existence can be brought about through interaction – that is the core idea of Godel’s theorem. As a result, the range of forms of existence tends towards infinity – the evolution of matter through super-intelligence will bring us up to God’s heights. A more generalized mathematical model of the physical world, including a universal operator of the co-existence of objects, can be developed based on the above considerations. The bonds between objects become weaker owing to 1) a high speed, 2) acceleration, 3) rotation, 4) strong gravity, 5) strong fields of other kinds, 6) the difference of levels of existence , 7) phase shifts. Yet, there always is an existential optimum. Such mathematical model is to operate certain non-transitive algebras. Relativist ontology assumes that the notion of “temperature” is relative, thus making it possible to ignore the Second Law of Thermodynamics. In its turn, that will allow for phase shifts. A perpetual motion machine of the second type will become a reality. Rotation could presumably be used to increase inertial and decrease gravitational mass, slowing down the time. An experimental research could shed light on the mentioned effects. (shrink)

Once upon a time, there were no academic disciplines. There were no definitions, either, at least as we understand them. Plato and Aristotle changed both of those situations in ways that continue to influence Western thought. If Plato's and Xenophon's accounts are to be trusted, Socrates and Prodicus also deserve credit for early efforts to define words, thereby helping to formulate the classic Socratic/Platonic question "What is X?" And here we are, twenty-four hundred years later, still occasionally wrestling with (...) how to describe rhetoric, philosophy, and the relationship between the two.Drawing on my thirty-five years of thinking and writing about the classical and contemporary mediation of philosophy and... (shrink)

Werner Jaeger once remarked that fifth-century sophistry is the one ancient intellectual movement that is readily comprehensible to a modern mind. In the light of this fact, it is all the more surprising that until the publication of the present volume there has been no complete English version of the sophist material collected in the standard edition of Diels-Kranz. Kathleen Freeman’s Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers: A Complete Translation of the Fragments in Diels’ "Fragmente der Vorsokratiker" included some of the (...) material, but the longer extracts from Gorgias and Prodicus, a concluding essay by the Anonymous Iamblichi, and the Dissoi Logoi were summarized rather than translated. Apparently complete translations of sophist texts have heretofore existed only in two Italian versions, one of which dates back to 1923. The present handbook is the first complete English translation of the sophist material, and it is the work of ten different hands under the general editorship of Rosamond Kent Sprague. It is also a new edition in that J. S. Morrison, the translator of Antiphon, believed, contrary to Diels, that the sophist Antiphon and the orator Antiphon of Rhamnus were one and the same, and he has reedited the material completely so as to produce a unified Antiphon. Another exception is the sophist Euthydemus of Chios, who is an historical person and is included in an appendix. (shrink)

Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy is a volume of original articles on all aspects of ancient philosophy. The articles may be of substantial length, and include critical notices of major books. OSAP is now published twice yearly, in both hardback and paperback.

Abstract At Charmides 163, Critias attempts to extricate himself from refutation by proposing a Prodicean distinction between praxis and poiēsis . I argue that this distinction leads him further into contradictions.

A collection of ten scholarly articles, including two each on Xenophanes, Prodicus, and Antiphon. Xenophanes' role in anticipating Sophist thought is seen in his subversion of the mythologizing Ionian tradition, represented by Anaximander. Prodicus' ethics is characterized as "utilitarian-eudaemonist"; Antiphon's continued interest in pre-Sophist cosmological speculation and in Pythagoreanism is shown to shed light on his polemic with Protagoras. Discussions of Parmenides, of Diogenes of Apollonia, and of Nausiphanes are also included.--W. L. M.