Plato's penchant for mythmaking sits uneasily beside his reputation as the inventor of rationalist philosophy. Hegel's solution was to ignore the myths. Popper thought them disqualifying. Tae-Yeoun Keum responds by carving out a place for myth in the context of rationalism and shows how Plato's tales inspired history's great political thinkers.

Why did Plato conclude the Republic, arguably his most celebrated work of political theory, with the Myth of Er, an obscure story of indeterminate political-theoretical significance? This paper advances a novel reading of the Myth of Er that attends to the common plot that it shares with two earlier narrative interludes in the Republic. It suggests that Plato constructed the myth as an account of a search, akin to the sorting of potential philosopher-kings that underwrites the kallipolis’ educational curriculum, for (...) natures that have successfully absorbed the cumulative effects of their philosophical upbringing. The model of nature presented in the myth, in turn, helps us approach the category of nature as a working concept: we can recognize contexts in which it is useful to assume in otherwise complex and fluid individuals a fixed, indelible nature, while granting that our sense of what that consists in is subject to revision. (shrink)

This introduction presents an overview of Plato and the Mythic Tradition in Political Thought and its central arguments. I situate the contributions of the book within theoretical work on political myth, both traditional and more recent, and also within scholarship on the philosophical function of Plato’s myths. Whereas political theorists have long conceived of myth in pathological terms, Plato and the Mythic Tradition joins a growing body of work envisioning a more constructive role for myth in politics and philosophy. This (...) was a task that preoccupied Plato and some of his most significant modern readers. Recovering their common project, moreover, helps us tell a different story about Plato’s philosophical myths and their reception in modern political thought. (shrink)

Plato is often regarded as a founding figure for Western philosophy, and specifically as the inventor of a way of doing philosophy grounded in critical, argumentative reason. This article asks whether Plato's practice of writing myths in his dialogues comes into tension with his canonical reputation. I suggest that resolving this tension may require us to revise our standing ideas about the nature of philosophy and its relationship to myth. Against interpretations that minimize the significance of Plato's myths to his (...) philosophy, I argue that he may have constructed them deliberately as a form of philosophical discourse in their own right. (shrink)

Plato's antipathy to crowds is a commonplace that reinforces a prevailing portrait of the Socratic method as a practice that centers on individuals, to the exclusion of crowds and the many. This canonical view, however, comes into tension with the tendency of Plato's Socrates to conduct his dialogues in the presence of collective audiences. I argue that Plato's position on crowds is at once more complex and more ambivalent than has been commonly accepted. I distinguish between two distinct lines of (...) critique that Plato develops against crowds: the argument that the incentive structures that move crowds are unconducive to philosophy; and a more ambiguous argument that crowds tend not to be as amenable to control as their portrayal in the Athenian democratic imaginary seems to promise. Plato's depiction of Socratic practice can be understood as an effort to explore an alternative vision of crowd control. (shrink)

In 1930, the Nazi ideologue Alfred Rosenberg outlined his vision for a ‘new and yet old Bloodmyth’ of the Aryan race.1 His Myth of the Twentieth Century would go on to be a touchstone text of Nazis...

The Socratic method is conventionally understood to be a one-on-one interaction between Socrates and an individual interlocutor. Why, then, does Socrates conduct so many of his dialogues in public places, where they are prone to being witnessed or even interrupted? Through a careful reading of the Gorgias, a dialogue traditionally appealed to in studies of both the Socratic method and the philosophy of rhetoric, I argue that Socrates deliberately involves his audience in his conversations with individuals. The Socratic method seeks (...) to harness the group's constructive potential in the formation of a temporary community around a joint philosophical inquiry. (shrink)