This paper contains an overview of the essays contained in the Mind and morals anthology plus a critical discussion of certain themes raised in many of these essays concerning the bearing of recent work in cognitive science on the traditional project of moral theory. Specifically, I argue for the following claims: (1) authors like Virginia Held, who appear to be antagonistic toward the methodological naturalism of Owen Flanagan, Andy Clark, Paul Churchland, and others, are really in fundamental agreement with the (...) naturalists (at least once the naturalist view is suitably clarified); (2) the prototype theory of moral concepts that is inspired by recent work in cognitive science does not necessarily jeopardize the aim of systematization characteristic of traditional moral theory; (3) nor does it threaten certain widely accepted views about moral rationality that is part of traditional moral theorizing. Moreover, I speculate that (4) recent work in cognitive science can be expected to play a corroborative role in the justification of theories in ethics, but we should probably not expect this work to yield new insights and directions in ethics. Finally, (5) Fodor's recent critique of cognitive science makes clear the perils of methodological ethical naturalism. (shrink)

Friedman presents a well-considered theory of autonomy, usefully elaborating the ways social influence is compatible and incompatible with autonomous action. In its reconciliation of autonomy and gender socialization, Friedman’s account makes important progress in addressing feminist concerns about autonomy. Nonetheless, Friedman could say more about the role of political society, particularly liberal society, in protecting and promoting autonomy.

This essay is a response to the comments and critique, included in this issue, of Claudia Card and Marilyn Friedman to my book, A Passion for Friends. In this response, I emphasize the crucial distinction between female separation and dissociation from the world, so as to register the difference between the positive and negative separations in which women are engaged. I also expand the discussion of individuality and individualism. The latter has arisen within the context of a feminist liberal (...) campaign for sexual liberation which defends, among other things, sadomasochism, prostitution, pornography, and surrogacy. (shrink)

Here, Hirschmann responds to Marilyn Friedman and Susan J. Brison's comments on The Subject of Liberty: Toward a Feminist Theory of Freedom. She clarifies some aspects of her social construction argument, articulates the role of discourse and its relation to material reality, and explicates the potentially paradoxical case of support for women's choices when those choices produce harm.

Here, Hirschmann responds to Marilyn Friedman and Susan]. Brison's comments on The Subject of Liberty: Toward a Feminist Theory of Freedom. She clarifies some aspects of her social construction argument, articulates the role of discourse and its relation to material reality, and explicates the potentially paradoxical case of support for women's choices when those choices produce harm.

The essays collected in this volume reflect the many facets of the debate between communitarianism and individualism and examine its implications for the political arena. They cover a wide spectrum of thought and opinion and include work by Ronald Dworkin, Marilyn Friedman, David Gauthier, Amy Gutmann, Will Kymlicka, Alasdair MacIntyre, David Miller, Robert Nozick, John Rawls, Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor, and Michael Walzer.

Published in 1982, Carol Gilligan's _In a Different Voice_ proposed a new model of moral reasoning based on care, arguing that it better described the moral life of women. ____An Ethic of Care__ is the first volume to bring together key contributions to the extensive debate engaging Gilligan's work. It provides the highlights of the often impassioned discussion of the ethic of care, drawing on the literature of the wide range of disciplines that have entered into the debate. _Contributors:_ Annette (...) Baier, Diana Baumrind, Lawrence A. Blum, Mary Brabeck, John Broughton, Owen Flanagan, Marilyn Friedman, Carol Gilligan, Catherine G. Greeno, Catherine Jackson, Linda K. Kerber, Mary Jeanne Larrabee, Zella Luria, Eleanor E. Maccoby, Linda Nicholson, Bill Puka, Carol B. Stack, Joan C. Tronto, Lawrence Walker, Gertrud Nunner-Winkler. (shrink)

Sometimes dictators are benevolent. Sometimes masters are kind and gentle to their slaves. John Adams was a pretty good "husband" to Abigail Adams. But it seems like there’s something very wrong with being a dictator or a master or a spouse with the power that John Adams had over Abigail Adams in late 18th Century America. A theory of domination tries to pinpoint what’s distinctive about dictatorship and mastery and traditional husbanding, and what is distinctively wrong with such—even the benevolent, (...) kind, gentle, and pretty good varieties. -/- There has been a lot of thinking about domination over the last twenty-five or so years. This is due largely to the efforts of republican political philosophers, who have used domination and its absence — nondomination — as the primary moving part in their conceptions of freedom. Even so, perhaps because domination has often appeared in a supporting role for the analysis of other concepts, conceptualizing domination itself is still a fairly nascent endeavor. -/- Accounts of domination need at least two movements. First, domination is a subset of a social phenomenon with—at least more or less—unobjectionable varieties. Maybe this social phenomenon is power; maybe it’s the capacity to interfere with choice; maybe something else. Whatever it is, it’s plausible to think it’s not always bad. Sometimes it’s perfectly alright to have power over someone else; sometimes there’s nothing wrong with the capacity to interfere with someone’s choices. (For example, if what you’d rather do is go after your neighbor with a meat-axe, it’s a good thing if someone is in a position to interfere with you, or if your choice situation can be worsened, so that charging next door, axe in hand, without having to worry about a lengthy prison sentence is not among your options.) The first task of a theory of domination is to specify exactly what this broader social phenomenon is. -/- Next we need to figure out what gives domination its negative moral valence, and thus sets it apart from that broader social phenomenon. Republicans usually say that what makes domination morally problematic is its arbitrariness. Frank Lovett claims that domination is instantiated in a social relationship between A and B only if A is permitted to exercise power over B arbitrarily (2010, 120). Philip Pettit, until recently, claimed that domination is a capacity for arbitrary interference. Marilyn Friedman calls it “arbitrary interference in someone’s choices…”(2008, 265). If that’s right, and arbitrariness is the difference maker between forms of social power that aren’t domination and those that are, we need a story about what arbitrariness is. -/- Such are the two essential tasks of conceptualizing domination. I offer here what I think are important course-corrections for recent attempts to complete them. In §1 I set out some desiderata for a useful conception of domination before sketching the elements of earlier attempts I think we can’t do without. §2 addresses the problem of “cheap domination”. This is the problem of identifying ordinary, innocuous human interactions with anything we call domination. I don’t think we should do this, but some of the most influential accounts of domination on offer nowadays — in particular, Lovett’s and Pettit’s — have this result. Instead, I contend that only certain forms of social power can underwrite domination, and try to provide a principled way of identifying what these forms are like. Finally, in §3, I address the nature of arbitrariness. (shrink)

Published in 1982, Carol Gilligan's _In a Different Voice_ proposed a new model of moral reasoning based on care, arguing that it better described the moral life of women. ____An Ethic of Care__ is the first volume to bring together key contributions to the extensive debate engaging Gilligan's work. It provides the highlights of the often impassioned discussion of the ethic of care, drawing on the literature of the wide range of disciplines that have entered into the debate. _Contributors:_ Annette (...) Baier, Diana Baumrind, Lawrence A. Blum, Mary Brabeck, John Broughton, Owen Flanagan, Marilyn Friedman, Carol Gilligan, Catherine G. Greeno, Catherine Jackson, Linda K. Kerber, Mary Jeanne Larrabee, Zella Luria, Eleanor E. Maccoby, Linda Nicholson, Bill Puka, Carol B. Stack, Joan C. Tronto, Lawrence Walker, Gertrud Nunner-Winkler. (shrink)

John Rawls’s use of the “fully cooperating assumption” has been criticized for hindering attempts to address the needs of disabled individuals, or non-cooperators. In response, philosophers sympathetic to Rawls’s project have extended his theory. I assess one such extension by Cynthia Stark, that proposes dropping Rawls’s assumption in the constitutional stage (of his four-stage sequence), and address the needs of non-cooperators via the social minimum. I defend Stark’s proposal against criticisms by Sophia Wong, Christie Hartley, and Elizabeth Edenberg and (...) class='Hi'>Marilyn Friedman. Nevertheless, I argue that Stark’s proposal is crucially incomplete. Her formulation of the social minimum lacks accompanying criteria with which the adequacy of the provisions for non-cooperators may be assessed. Despite initial appearances, Stark’s proposal does not fully address the needs of non-cooperators. I conclude by considering two payoffs of identifying this lack of criteria. (shrink)

In this article I criticize some traditional impartiality practices in Western philosophical ethics and argue in favor of Marilyn Friedman’s dialogical practice of eliminating bias. But, I argue, the dialogical approach depends on a more fundamental practice of equanimity. Drawing on the works of Tibetan Buddhist thinkers Patrul Rinpoche and Khenpo Ngawang Pelzang, I develop a Buddhist-feminist concept of equanimity and argue that, despite some differences with the Western impartiality practices, equanimity is an impartiality practice that is not only (...) psychologically feasible but also central to loving relationships. I conclude by suggesting ways that feminist dialogical practices for eliminating bias and meditative practices are mutually supportive. (shrink)

Feminist Theory: A Philosophical Anthology addresses seven philosophically significant questions regarding feminism, its central concepts of sex and gender, and the project of centering women’s experience. Topics include the nature of sexist oppression, the sex/gender distinction, how gender-based norms influence conceptions of rationality, knowledge, and scientific objectivity, feminist ethics, feminst perspectives on self and autonomy, whether there exist distinct feminine moral perspectives, and what would comprise true liberation. Features an introductory overview illustrating the development of feminism as a philosophical movement (...) Contains both classic and contemporary sources of feminist thought, including selections by Mary Wollstonecraft, John Stuart Mill, Simone de Beauvior, Kate Millett, bell hooks, Marilyn Frye, Martha Nussbaum, Louise Antony, Sally Haslanger, Helen Longino, Marilyn Friedman, Catharine MacKinnon, and Drucilla Cornell. (shrink)

This essay is a response to the comments and critique, included in this issue, of Claudia Card and Marilyn Friedman to my book, A Passion for Friends. In this response, I emphasize the crucial distinction between female separation and dissociation from the world, so as to register the difference between the positive and negative separations in which women are engaged. I also expand the discussion of individuality and individualism. The latter has arisen within the context of a feminist liberal (...) campaign for sexual liberation which defends, among other things, sadomasochism, prostitution, pornography, and surrogacy. (shrink)

A Foucauldian assessment of the common presumption that genetic information is potent and thus oppressive demonstrates that the concern may be misplaced. Foucault's concept of “technologies of self” reveals that genetic power originates not only from the potency of genetic information but from the penchant of individuals to victimize themselves in the name of optimal health, enhanced intelligence, perfect babies, or would-be immortality. Rather than seeking liberation from the power of the new genetics, Foucault's reinterpretation of the ancient understanding of (...) concern for the self offers the possibility to avoid control by the scientific discourse. His ethical response calls for resistance rather than opposition and places responsibility for resistance in the hands of the subject. Characteristically, he avoids a generalizable form of morality but clarifies that resistance includes acknowledging the human appetite for perfection and subordinating science to ethical and aesthetic matters. (shrink)

The last issue of this journal published an exchange between Marilyn Friedman and me that had taken place at a lively session of the American Philosophical Association in December, 1990. Friedman's paper “‘They Lived Happily Ever After’: Sommers on Women and Marriage” was a barbed critique of my views on the family. My rejoinder, “Do These Feminist Like Women?” pointed out that Friedman's orthodox brand of feminism was not sensitive to the values and aspirations of most American women. That (...) issue of the Journal of Social Philosophy also published a third paper of Friedman's “Does Sommers Like Women?” twice as long again as my rejoinder. This second critique went further into earlier writings of mine raising new issues, and criticizing me in rather unpleasant ad feminam ways. If an uncharacteristic asperity colors my response, it is because I do not find myself able to deal coolly and impersonally with the accusation that I intentionally misrepresent some of the feminist philosophers I criticize. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 30.2 (2006) 450-470 MuseSearchJournalsThis JournalContents[Access article in PDF]Romantic Love: A Literary Universal?Jonathan Gottschall Washington and Jefferson College (JG)Marcus Nordlund * Göteborg University (MN)ITo love someone romantically is—at least according to innumerable literary works, much received wisdom, and even a gradually coalescing academic consensus—to experience a strong desire for union with someone who is deemed entirely unique. It is to idealize this person, to think constantly about (...) him or her, and to discover that one's own life priorities have changed dramatically. It is to care deeply for that person's well-being and to feel pain or emptiness when he or she is absent.But is this intense emotional experience a universal experience, something that is characteristically and quintessentially human, or is it merely a sociocultural construct that belongs to a particular time and place? On this point there is less agreement, both within and between different academic disciplines. The audacious question we want to raise in the pages that follow is whether literature—or more specifically, a large-scale, multiple-coder content analysis of thousands of folk tales drawn from different parts of the planet—can contribute something to this difficult question about love, culture, and human nature.Let us first look briefly at the theoretical problem that we aim to address. A widespread view among literary scholars and social scientists over the last decades has been that romantic love is a social construction specific to Western culture. This is part of a relentless skepticism [End Page 450] toward assumptions that important categories of human psychology and emotion—romantic and parental love, gender, sexual orientation, and so on—are "natural" rather than constructed. This position is often, if not always, linked to an ideological concern to demystify (or at least problematize) what is perceived as an essentially destructive or oppressive emotion or belief. Taking her cue from Simone de Beauvoir, Marilyn Friedman gives no less than ten reasons why it may be problematic for women to fall in love with men. 1Of course, no argument of any kind can be strictly ideological in nature since it always involves empirical assumptions—either explicit or implicit—about the nature of things. For example, the psychoanalyst E. S. Persons opines that the "best evidence that romantic love is not hard-wired into the emotional repertoire of humanity but is a cultural construct is the fact that there are so many cultures in which it is virtually absent." 2 Another frequent argument for love's constructedness has been that "there is no definition that describes love throughout the ages or across cultures." 3In some literary-critical accounts, it is even argued that romantic love is a cultural invention that can be traced back with precision to the courtly troubadour culture of twelfth-century France. 4 According to yet another school, represented by the influential literary theorist Jonathan Culler, "the notion of romantic love (and its centrality to the lives of individuals) is arguably a massive literary creation." 5While the social constructivist position on romantic love typically involves a strong commitment to cultural specificity, a weaker version is held even by some cognitive theorists who grant more to biology and panhuman traits. From the perspective of their communicative theory of emotion, Philip Johnson-Laird and Keith Oatley argue that the "components [of romantic love] exist separately in different societies, but their integration into a recognizable complex is a cultural accomplishment [by the West]." 6At the other end of the romantic love continuum we find those who argue that this emotion belongs to a universal human nature: or, more specifically, that it can be attributed to specialised neural circuits whose ultimate purpose is to enhance reproductive success. Not surprisingly, this has been a favorite position among evolutionary psychologists, and it has recently received some support from neuroscientific studies.For example, the neuroscientists Andreas Bartels and Samir Zeki claim to have uncovered a "functionally specialised system" that lights up in fMRI (magnetic resonance) scans of brains whose owners claim to... (shrink)

Family members are widely believed to be the best decisionmakers for those with brain injuries, but the rehabilitation process does not in fact give them that authority.

This essay unearths the meaning of community in John Dewey’s Experience and Nature, using Marilyn Friedman’s terms “community of choice” and “community of origin.” The authority of communication as determinative of Dewey’s community comes out. In fact, communication seems to be the philosophical point of Dewey’s descriptions in that book which reveals his anticipation of a community wherever communication obtains. Dewey is shown, in conclusion, to call us beyond communities of choice or origin to a community of authority which (...) holds both peculiar promise for, and demands of, individuals. (shrink)

Summary: An introduction to this special issue of Hypatia, in which feminist philosophers analyze, critically engage, and extend several predominant ideas in the work of Claudia Card. Authors in this collection include Lisa Tessman, Marilyn Friedman, Hilde Lindemann, Sheryl Tuttle Ross, Joan Callahan, David Concepción, Kathryn Norlock and Jean Rumsey (co-authors), Linda Bell, Samantha Brennan, and Victoria Davion.

We review different conceptions of the set-theoretic multiverse and evaluate their features and strengths. In Sect. 1, we set the stage by briefly discussing the opposition between the ‘universe view’ and the ‘multiverse view’. Furthermore, we propose to classify multiverse conceptions in terms of their adherence to some form of mathematical realism. In Sect. 2, we use this classification to review four major conceptions. Finally, in Sect. 3, we focus on the distinction between actualism and potentialism with regard to the (...) universe of sets, then we discuss the Zermelian view, featuring a ‘vertical’ multiverse, and give special attention to this multiverse conception in light of the hyperuniverse programme introduced in Arrigoni and Friedman (2013). We argue that the distinctive feature of the multiverse conception chosen for the hyperuniverse programme is its utility for finding new candidates for axioms of set theory. (shrink)

I argue that 'Empathy' is of considerable value in ethical theory and reasoning. In Part One, I explain the concept I refer to as 'Empathy', taking as my starting point Jonathan Bennett's article, 'The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn'. I argue that a focus on Empathy, rather than sympathy, can better explain our intuitive ethical evaluations of the characters Bennett considers. I briefly discuss various interpretations of the traditional distinction between reason and emotion. With respect to the ethical realm, I cast (...) doubt on two of these---the distinctions between feeling and reasoning, and between reasons and emotions/feelings. Part Two further explains an Empathic ethical approach, considers various potential objections and compares some alternatives. I discuss 'feminine' theories, such as Carol Gilligan's and Nel Noddings', which focus on care and the ethical importance of emotional capacities. These are sometimes proposed as alternatives to theories based on values such as autonomy, justice or rights. I agree that the development, and exercise, of emotional capacities are essential to moral agency. I argue, however, that critical capacities are equally essential; and that theories which neglect their importance are deeply flawed. I then compare my view with Stephen Darwall's discussion of 'sympathetic concern' and Douglas Chisinar's claims about 'empathy'. I conclude the second part by summarising the concept of Empathy and inferring that an Empathic agent is an Empathically ethically autonomous agent. In Part Three, I explore this relation between Empathy and ethical autonomy. Traditional conceptions of autonomy regard the emotional as an irrelevance, if not a positive impediment. I argue that Empathic ethical autonomy avoids some of the problems faced by the traditional one, while nonetheless recognising its value. I begin with Thomas E. Hill, Jr.'s discussion of autonomy and compassion, and suggest that these can be better integrated by an Empathic approach. Finally, I consider the challenges Marilyn Friedman identifies for feminist ethical theories which try to acknowledge the value of autonomy while rejecting overly individualistic conceptions of the self. I suggest that developing an Empathic Ethical Theory may offer one promising way to meet these challenges. (shrink)

This thesis explores moral particularism--ethical theories that acknowledge the importance of complex, contextual detail in moral reasoning and judgment. The first four chapters four chapters analyze the work of five theorists who can be classified as particularists: Marilyn Friedman , Peter Winch and Margaret Urban Walker , Michael Oakeshott and Martha Minow . Chapter 5 explains how moral particularism emerges as a practical and normative critique of what I call judicial theories of moral judgment. I also argue that particularist (...) theories of reasoning and judgment rest on a different moral foundation than judicial theories do. Particularists value particulars of various kinds, and this shapes and guides moral reasoning, constraining and justifying particular moral judgments without reference to universal rules or principles. Implications for the practice of particular moral reasoning and judgment are explored in Chapters 5 and 6. A particularist moral method should emphasize an agent's personal experience and engagement in a problematic situation , but must be interpersonal as well, reflecting understanding and respect for others as particular persons . Chapter 7 explores political implications of particularist moral theories, and argues that an inclusive, participatory, conversational model of moral deliberation is best suited to achieve the particularists' moral and political objectives. Chapter 8 briefly surveys and evaluates some possible problems with this model of moral reasoning and judgment. (shrink)

This second edition of _Women, Knowledge, and Reality_ continues to exhibit the ways in which feminist philosophers enrich and challenge philosophy. Essays by twenty-five feminist philosophers, seventeen of them new to the second edition, address fundamental issues in philosophical and feminist methods, metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophies of science, language, religion and mind/body. This second edition expands the perspectives of women of color, of postmodernism and French feminism, and focuses on the most recent controversies in feminist theory and philosophy. The (...) chapters are organized by traditional fields of philosophy, and include introductions which contrast the ideas of feminist thinkers with traditional philosophers. The collected essays illustrate both the depth and breadth of feminist critiques and the range of contemporary feminist theoretical perspectives. (shrink)

We review different conceptions of the set-theoretic multiverse and evaluate their features and strengths. In Sect. 1, we set the stage by briefly discussing the opposition between the ‘universe view’ and the ‘multiverse view’. Furthermore, we propose to classify multiverse conceptions in terms of their adherence to some form of mathematical realism. In Sect. 2, we use this classification to review four major conceptions. Finally, in Sect. 3, we focus on the distinction between actualism and potentialism with regard to the (...) universe of sets, then we discuss the Zermelian view, featuring a ‘vertical’ multiverse, and give special attention to this multiverse conception in light of the hyperuniverse programme introduced in Arrigoni-Friedman :77–96, 2013). We argue that the distinctive feature of the multiverse conception chosen for the hyperuniverse programme is its utility for finding new candidates for axioms of set theory. (shrink)

Through the years, many philosophers have appealed to reflective endorsement to address important philosophical problems. In this dissertation, I evaluate the merits of those approaches. I first consider Christine Korsgaard’s appeal to reflective endorsement to solve what she calls “the normative problem.” I then consider Harry Frankfurt’s use of reflective endorsement as part of his account of “caring,” which plays a crucial role in his accounts of agency, free will, and personhood. I then turn to Marilyn Friedman’s use of (...) reflective endorsement to explain autonomous action. Finally, I turn to Alan Gibbard’s use of reflective endorsement as part of an account of what it is to make a normative judgment. I argue that each of these positions is subject to similar problems—they fail to provide a plausible account of the self. In the remaining chapters, I argue that empirical psychological studies suggest that reflective endorsement plays an important role with respect to psychological health, but that judgments made by using a process of reflective endorsement are generally not accurate. Ultimately, I argue that reflective endorsement is valuable, but only under certain circumstances. (shrink)

In this paper we are concerned about the ways GCH can fail in relation to rank-into-rank hypotheses, i.e., very large cardinals usually denoted by I3, I2, I1 and I0. The main results are a satisfactory analysis of the way the power function can vary on regular cardinals in the presence of rank-into-rank hypotheses and the consistency under I0 of the existence of j:Vλ+1≺Vλ+1\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${j : V_{\lambda+1} {\prec} V_{\lambda+1}}$$\end{document} with the failure of GCH (...) at λ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\lambda}$$\end{document}. (shrink)

Two arcas of continuing interest to direct marketing professionals are the perceived myths and unethical practices in the field. Documentation of specific cases and more abstract discussion of these two points of interest frequently appear in the direct marketing literature (e.g. Gitlitz and Barton, 1983; Lewis, 1982; Pierce, 1985). Indeed, the Direct Marketing Association (DMA) has promulgated specific guidelines (DMA, 1985) for ethical business practices within the industry. Up to this point, however, there has been no attempt at a systematic (...) evaluation of the perceptions of professionals in the field.Such an evaluation of these two areas of practice would appear to beg the following questions: (1) What are the major common myths which abound in direct marketing as perceived by professionals who come into direct contact with the operations of direct marketing organizations? (2) Which of these so-called myths are most requently mentioned? (3) What are the most commonly perceived unethical practices? (4) Which of these unethical practices are most frequently mentioned by direct marketing professionals? (5) To what extent do these perceived unethical practices coincide with the industry's own guidelines? (shrink)

In this article we introduce and study hyperclass-forcing in the context of an extension of Morse-Kelley class theory, called MK∗∗. We define this forcing by using a symmetry between MK∗∗ models and models of ZFC− plus there exists a strongly inaccessible cardinal. We develop a coding between β-models ℳ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $$\mathcal {M}$$ \end{document} of MK∗∗ and transitive models M+ of SetMK∗∗ which will allow us to go from ℳ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} (...) \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $$\mathcal {M}$$ \end{document} to M+ and vice versa. So instead of forcing with a hyperclass in MK∗∗ we can force over the corresponding SetMK∗∗ model with a class of conditions. For class-forcing to work in the context of ZFC− we show that the SetMK∗∗ model M+ can be forced to look like Lκ∗[X]\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $$L_{\kappa ^*}[X]$$ \end{document}, where κ∗ is the height of M+, κ strongly inaccessible in M+ and X ⊆ κ. Over such a model we can apply definable class forcing and we arrive at an extension of M+ from which we can go back to the corresponding β-model of MK∗∗, which will in turn be an extension of the original ℳ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $$\mathcal {M}$$ \end{document}. Our main result combines hyperclass forcing with coding methods of Beller et al. and Friedman to show that every β-model of MK∗∗ can be extended to a minimal such model of MK∗∗ with the same ordinals. A simpler version of the proof also provides a new and analogous minimality result for models of second-order arithmetic. (shrink)