Year:

  1.  7
    A Note on Murakami’s Theorems and Incomplete Social Choice Without the Pareto Principle.Wesley H. Holliday & Mikayla Kelley - 2020 - Social Choice and Welfare 55:243-253.
    In Arrovian social choice theory assuming the independence of irrelevant alternatives, Murakami (1968) proved two theorems about complete and transitive collective choice rules that satisfy strict non-imposition (citizens’ sovereignty), one being a dichotomy theorem about Paretian or anti-Paretian rules and the other a dictator-or-inverse-dictator impossibility theorem without the Pareto principle. It has been claimed in the later literature that a theorem of Malawski and Zhou (1994) is a generalization of Murakami’s dichotomy theorem and that Wilson’s (1972) impossibility theorem is stronger (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2.  13
    Arrow's Decisive Coalitions.Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit - 2020 - Social Choice and Welfare 54:463–505.
    In his classic monograph, Social Choice and Individual Values, Arrow introduced the notion of a decisive coalition of voters as part of his mathematical framework for social choice theory. The subsequent literature on Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem has shown the importance for social choice theory of reasoning about coalitions of voters with different grades of decisiveness. The goal of this paper is a fine-grained analysis of reasoning about decisive coalitions, formalizing how the concept of a decisive coalition gives rise to a (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
 Previous issues
  
Next issues