Authors
Joshua Anderson
Virginia State University
Abstract
Recently, Margaret Gilbert has argued that it appears that the wisdom of a society impinges, greatly, on its freedom. In this article, I show that Gilbert’s “negative argument” fails to be convincing. On the other hand, there are important lessons, particularly for democratic theory, that can be by looking carefully, and critically, at her argument. This article will proceed as follows. First, I present Gilbert’s argument. Next, I criticize her understanding of freedom, and then, using arguments from Christopher McMahon, criticize her understanding of a wise society. Finally, I discuss how what has been said can inform how one should think about democratic theory.
Keywords Margaret Gilbert  Social Groups  Group Knowledge and Action  Freedom  Democratic Theory
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Democratic Intentions.Henry S. Richardson - 1997 - Modern Schoolman 74 (4):285-300.
Collective Wisdom and Individual Freedom.Christopher McMahon - 2006 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1):168-176.
Can a Wise Society Be a Free One?Margaret Gilbert - 2006 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1):151-167.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Collective Wisdom and Individual Freedom.Christopher McMahon - 2006 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1):168-176.
We and the Plural Subject.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2009 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (2):235-259.
Can a Wise Society Be a Free One?Margaret Gilbert - 2006 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1):151-167.
Collective Epistemic Virtues.Reza Lahroodi - 2007 - Social Epistemology 21 (3):281 – 297.
'Shared Agency', Gilbert, and Deep Continuity.Thomas H. Smith - 2015 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):49-57.
Why Accept Collective Beliefs?Anthonie Meijers - 2003 - ProtoSociology 18:377-388.
Modelling Collective Belief.Margaret Gilbert - 1987 - Synthese 73 (1):185-204.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-07-14

Total views
37 ( #275,544 of 2,411,736 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #66,665 of 2,411,736 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes