Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity. By John Greco. (Cambridge UP, 2010. Pp. x + 205. Price £17.99/US$29.99.)

Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):208-211 (2012)
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Abstract

A Review of John Greco's book Acheiving Knowledge. The critical points I make involve three claims Greco makes that represent common ground between the reliabilists (including agent reliabilists like himself) and the character epistemologists (which would include myself): I. Such virtues are often needed to make our cognitive abilities reliable (to turn mere faculties into excellences); II. Such virtues might be essentially involved in goods other than knowledge; III. Such virtues might be valuable in themselves.

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Guy Axtell
Radford University

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Unreliable Knowledge.John Turri - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):529-545.

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