Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 22 (1):43-52 (2007)
This paper examines Moran’s argument for the special authority of the first-person, which revolves around the Self/Other asymmetry and grounds dichotomies such as the practical vs. theoretical, activity vs. passivity, and justificatory vs. explanatory reasons. These dichotomies qualify the self-reflective person as an agent, interested in justifying her actions from a deliberative stance. The Other is pictured as a spectator interested in explaining action from a theoretical stance. The self-reflective knower has authority over her own mental states, while the Spectator does not. I highlight the implications of this construal for a theory of action, and call attention onto some other interesting normative relations between the self-reflective agent and the Other that escape both the first-person and the third-person approach. My contention is that the authority of self-reflection (and of reason) is best understood as a relation of mutual recognition between self and others, hence from a second-person stance
|Keywords||Analytic Philosophy Philosophy of Science|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Constitutivism and the Self-Reflection Requirement.Caroline T. Arruda - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-19.
Transparência, reflexão e vicissitude.Waldomiro J. Silva Filho - 2011 - Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia 52 (123):213-236.
Similar books and articles
The Authority of Self-Consciousness.Richard A. Moran - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):174-200.
Moral Testimony and its Authority.Philip Nickel - 2001 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (3):253-266.
Three Conceptions of Practical Authority.Daniel Star & Candice Delmas - 2011 - Jurisprudence 2 (1):143-160.
Elusive Reasons: A Problem for First-Person Authority.Krista Lawlor - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (4):549-565.
First Persons: On Richard Moran's Authority and Estrangement.Taylor Carman - 2003 - Inquiry 46 (3):395 – 408.
Social Externalism and First-Person Authority.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (2):287 - 300.
Belief and its Linguistic Expression: Toward a Belief Box Account of First-Person Authority.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):65-76.
An Elusive Challenge to the Authorship Account: Commentary on Lawlor's "Elusive Reasons".Luca Ferrero - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (4):565 – 577.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads166 ( #27,518 of 2,164,583 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #50,872 of 2,164,583 )
How can I increase my downloads?