Oxford University Press UK (1998)

Authors
Simon Blackburn
Cambridge University
Abstract
Simon Blackburn puts forward a compelling original philosophy of human motivation and morality. He maintains that we cannot get clear about ethics until we get clear about human nature. So these are the sorts of questions he addresses: Why do we behave as we do? Can we improve? Is our ethics at war with our passions, or is it an upshot of those passions? Blackburn seeks the answers in an exploration of guilt, shame, disgust, and other moral emotions; he draws also on game theory and cognitive science in his account of the structures of human motivation. Many philosophers have wanted a naturalistic ethics a theory that integrates our understanding of human morality with the rest of our understanding of the world we live in. What is special about Blackburn's naturalistic ethics is that it does not debunk the ethical by reducing it to the non-ethical. At the same time he banishes the spectres of scepticism and relativism that have haunted recent moral philosophy. Ruling Passions sets ethics in the context of human nature: it offers a solution to the puzzle of how ethics can maintain its authority even though it is rooted in the very emotions and motivations that it exists to control.
Keywords metaethics   expressivism   noncognitivism   nonfactualism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2000
Buy this book Find it on Amazon.com
Call number BJ1311.B53 2000
ISBN(s) 9780199241392   0198247850   0199241392   9780198247852
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 62,401
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.
The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy.Antti Kauppinen - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):95 – 118.
A Puzzle About Epistemic Akrasia.Daniel Greco - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.
Slurring Perspectives.Elisabeth Camp - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (3):330-349.
Epistemology Formalized.Sarah Moss - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (1):1-43.

View all 286 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reason.Simon Blackburn - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):110-114.
Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning.Michael E. Bratman - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):586-589.
Ruling Passions. A Theory of Practical Reasoning. [REVIEW]Michael Quante - 2000 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 54 (1).
Aquinas on the Passions’ Contribution to Moral Reasoning.David T. Echelbarger - 2012 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 86:281-293.
Sensibility Theory and Conservative Complancency.Peter W. Ross & Dale Turner - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (4):544–555.
Computation, Coherence, and Ethical Reasoning.Marcello Guarini - 2007 - Minds and Machines 17 (1):27-46.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
355 ( #24,545 of 2,445,593 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
16 ( #44,134 of 2,445,593 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes