Self-location is no problem for conditionalization

Synthese 182 (3):393-411 (2011)
Abstract
How do temporal and eternal beliefs interact? I argue that acquiring a temporal belief should have no effect on eternal beliefs for an important range of cases. Thus, I oppose the popular view that new norms of belief change must be introduced for cases where the only change is the passing of time. I defend this position from the purported counter-examples of the Prisoner and Sleeping Beauty. I distinguish two importantly different ways in which temporal beliefs can be acquired and draw some general conclusions about their impact on eternal beliefs
Keywords Self-locating belief  Conditionalization  The Prisoner  Sleeping Beauty
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-010-9748-9
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References found in this work BETA
Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - Oxford University Press, Usa.
Humean Supervenience Debugged.David Lewis - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):473--490.
Belief and the Will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Journal of Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 235-256.

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Citations of this work BETA
An Embarrassment for Double-Halfers.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):146-151.
Belief Update Across Fission.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (3):659-682.
Everettian Confirmation and Sleeping Beauty: Reply to Wilson.Darren Bradley - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (3):683-693.
Everettian Confirmation and Sleeping Beauty.A. Wilson - 2014 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (3):573-598.

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